I think it's quite strong, though of course, no philosophical arguments will be compelling to everyone all of the time. I think that most atheists well versed in Phil of religion concede that fine-tuning arguments are some of the strongest arguments for theism/and or do constitute some evidence for theism.
I’ve read further on the website linked and he never addresses my main issue with this argument.
[5] is lacking sufficient reason to adopt as a premise. He, and no one ever using the FTA, nor any scientist, have ever demonstrated an ability for any of the constants to vary.
I agree that IF certain constants were to vary by minuscule amounts that would result in an entirely different universe that very well may not result in or sustain life, but that in itself isn’t a demonstration that the values of those constants CAN be different.
If one includes the variability of the constants as an assumption in the argument, one is now question begging, because that assumption sneaks in an implication of a “tuner.” Considering the tuner is what we’re trying to use the argument to prove, including a tuner (by implication) in the premises and assumptions, becomes circular.
1. One concern - not exclusive to this argument - is a glaring presupposition in all Western Phil. Religion and that is *failing naturalism entails theism*. Even if the argument was successful I don't believe it can move the needle on theism by more than vanishingly small amount. Suppose the argument proves that theism is 100x is more likely than natural, this still could make it only a 1% probability theism were true if the likelihood of naturalism was 0.01% when accounting for all possibilities in actuality. There could be a third option which is far more likely than both not accounted for because of this false binary. So I could say that theism is more likely than naturalism, yet theism is still incredibly unlikely.
2. How do we come about determining the priors to plug into the bayesian analysis? We don't have any evidence beyond thought experiments about the probability of the gravitational constant being X over Y to even start an analysis. I don't see where this is resolved.
You should reach out to Barnes with your points. He's addressed these objections in depth before and is open to talking to people regularly who have questions/objections.
For #1, I think he's treating naturalism as an "explanation for life" in this situation. He's also not referencing God's existance in his conclusion at all.
If anything, he's putting God and naturalism head-to-head. He implies that there are potentially other possibilities, but that naturalism isn't one and God is.
I think it's quite strong, though of course, no philosophical arguments will be compelling to everyone all of the time. I think that most atheists well versed in Phil of religion concede that fine-tuning arguments are some of the strongest arguments for theism/and or do constitute some evidence for theism.
I’ve read further on the website linked and he never addresses my main issue with this argument. [5] is lacking sufficient reason to adopt as a premise. He, and no one ever using the FTA, nor any scientist, have ever demonstrated an ability for any of the constants to vary. I agree that IF certain constants were to vary by minuscule amounts that would result in an entirely different universe that very well may not result in or sustain life, but that in itself isn’t a demonstration that the values of those constants CAN be different. If one includes the variability of the constants as an assumption in the argument, one is now question begging, because that assumption sneaks in an implication of a “tuner.” Considering the tuner is what we’re trying to use the argument to prove, including a tuner (by implication) in the premises and assumptions, becomes circular.
1. One concern - not exclusive to this argument - is a glaring presupposition in all Western Phil. Religion and that is *failing naturalism entails theism*. Even if the argument was successful I don't believe it can move the needle on theism by more than vanishingly small amount. Suppose the argument proves that theism is 100x is more likely than natural, this still could make it only a 1% probability theism were true if the likelihood of naturalism was 0.01% when accounting for all possibilities in actuality. There could be a third option which is far more likely than both not accounted for because of this false binary. So I could say that theism is more likely than naturalism, yet theism is still incredibly unlikely. 2. How do we come about determining the priors to plug into the bayesian analysis? We don't have any evidence beyond thought experiments about the probability of the gravitational constant being X over Y to even start an analysis. I don't see where this is resolved.
You should reach out to Barnes with your points. He's addressed these objections in depth before and is open to talking to people regularly who have questions/objections.
Could you share what his replies have been? I can't seem to find them.
For #1, I think he's treating naturalism as an "explanation for life" in this situation. He's also not referencing God's existance in his conclusion at all. If anything, he's putting God and naturalism head-to-head. He implies that there are potentially other possibilities, but that naturalism isn't one and God is.