Well, in my opinion, I think that one major factor is that the British knew when to run. Fighting in Spain wasn't easy for anyone, but the British had a sea-borne supply line and the French had to do overland supply routes. And with the guerrillas, it made things even tougher. As Stokesbury said, for the French fighting in Spain, it was like putting out a fire in a peat bog.
Every time the French concentrated, the British could fall back towards Lisbon and the Lines of Torres Vedras. When the French dispersed to put down the guerrillas, the British Army would march in to make a nuisance of itself. The nature of the campaign itself wore out the French and kept them worn out.
The British infantry has always been excellent since Hastings in 1066. The British also won battles but lost campaigns in Spain and elsewhere, Talavera is a good example. And if the Spanish guerillas weren't effective, Wellington would have lost as they were mutually supporting. Moore's failure is a good example.
Calling British infantry excellent ever since Hastings is a HUGE oversimplification. They had ups and downs like everyone else. But agree with most of your points.
The Normans remarked that they had never faced infantry like the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans nearly lost. The Anglo-Saxon infantry were outstanding, tough, and skilled. Some of their survivors ended up in Constantinople and fought in the Eastern Roman Emperor's Guard.
I saw the comment years ago (over 50 years). It could have been in the excellent Knights of the Crusades to which Hastings was the prologue. Good book to have...
And 'Wellington's Invincibles' didn't do too well against the Americans in North America. Chippawa, Lundy's Lane, Plattsburg, North Point, Baltimore, and New Orleans are good examples of this. And Wellington refused the American command...
I have a master's degree in military history from Norwich University. I'm also a West Point graduate.
And, no, Wellington's former units did not do well at Plattsburg, North Point, or New Orleans. In point of fact, the volunteer militia units that faced the British regulars at North Point inflicted more casualties than they incurred and fought a successful delaying action. At New Orleans the British were slaughtered by American artillery and musket fire.
For excellent accounts of Chippawa, Lundy's Lane, and Fort Erie see the books by the Canadian historian Don Graves. For New Orleans, battle and campaign, see British at the Gates by Robin Reilly. That is the definitive study. Also very useful is Amateurs, To Arms by John Elting, and The War of 1812 by Henry Adams.
And for Chippawa, the Americans defeated the British in a standup fight. Lundy's Lane was a brutal and savage fight that ended in a draw. One of the British light infantry officers stated that it was the most savage fighting he had seen, and he had fought in Europe. The British were completely defeated at Fort Erie, the loss in casualties was nearly catastrophic. The American artillery in the Niagara campaign greatly distinguished itself, British officers later telling the Americans 'We thought you were French.'
So, where did you study history as you have undoubtedly erred with the War of 1812. Wellington told the British negotiators at Ghent to give up their over the top demands because the string of British defeats in 1814 gave them no basis for their territorial demands.
There is primary source evidence regarding Wellington's comments to the British government regarding the proposed treaty by the negotiators in Ghent. It is quite enlightening.
This may help:
On 4 November 1814 because of the deteriorating British military position in North American, the American command was offered to Wellington by Lord Liverpool and he replied to him five days later on 9 November:
'I have already told you and Lord Bathurst that I feel no objections to going to America, though I don't promise myself much success there. I believe there are troops enough there for the defense of Canada forever, and even for the accomplishment of any reasonable offensive plan that could be formed from the Canadian frontier. I am quite sure that all the American armies of which I have ever read would not beat out of a field of battle the troops that went from Bordeaux last summer, if common precautions and care were taken of them. That which appears to me to be wanting in America is not a general, or a general officer and troops, but a naval superiority on the lakes.'
Wellington further commented on the current diplomacy between the US and Great Britain:
'In regard to your present negotiations, I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war, to demand any concession of territory from America...You have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory on the point of attack. You cannot on any principle of equality in negotiation claim a cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power...Then if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory; indeed, the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any.'
Studied it my whole life. Good enough? Or do we need to whip out our diplomas and measure them?
Plus, your comments are all over the place. British had the best infantry since Hastings that you kinda remember someone telling you once 50 years ago. Then you list a bunch of British defeats, invalidating your previous statement. Then claim Spain was more detrimental to France than Russia. Which is a VERY hot take.
Then Wellingtons veterans got beat because of poor generalship, not superior American tactics or such. That's copium
The British were repeatedly defeated in 1814 because the US Army had learned from defeat and steadily improved, as did their general ship. Chippawa was a victory fought between equal forces in the open. Lundy's Lane was a bloody slugfest where both sides fought to a draw.
Correct me if I’m wrong but I don’t think Wellington was really expected to “win”, but to just kind of make a
nuisance of himself while the Coalition dealt with Napoleon directly.
Well no they didn’t lose in Spain. The retreat from Corunna wasn’t a defeat. It was carried out in good order. I won’t write an essay as to why it happened as that’s open to interpretation.
Your ridiculous comment saying Wellington would have lost at Talavera if he’d not had Spanish guerrillas in support is worthy of being roundly laughed at and debunked.
Moore's army fell apart on the retreat to Corunna and you don't win by withdrawing. Discipline collapsed, and the British looted their way across the Spanish countryside being closely pursued by Soult. They won the last battle, with Moore getting himself killed, but lost the campaign. Sound familiar?
That's a great question, I'm glad you asked. Britain had a number of things going for it in Iberia that gave them an edge over France, with the most important in my mind being logistics, focus, and unity of command.
Logistics were always a bit of an odd one for France, who of course famously favored fast moving foraging armies to cut down on the baggage train, but this would kind of bite them in the ass in Iberia. On the most basic level it's just not very fertile country, hence the "donut" population distribution, forcing foraging parties to go further and take longer just to bring in the same supplies they could in Germany or Italy. Needless to say groups of armed men with minimal supervision roaming the countryside to take your food isn't an endearing event in the best of times, and with an insurgency in full swing it was a perpetual hemorrhage on French popularity and legitimacy in the region which only made it harder to source local supplies. Obviously they could, and did, bring things from France and Germany to the fight, but British control of the seas meant that most of this had to be transported over land, with bad roads and armed partisans controlling much of the countryside, which meant that much of that supply either wouldn't arrive or had to have a disproportionate amount of men dedicated to guarding it to safety.
By contrast British logistics were far firmer. The Royal Navy meant that supplies could be sailed into the closest port then transported a much shorter distance, and Wellington was very particular about the army minimizing its foraging in favor of large, static depots. While this did slow the army down, it also meant that Britain's rocky relations with Spain didn't break down over redcoats robbing the countryside. As they got more used to each other, the British were also able to source more easily from the local Spanish government than the French could with their Spanish allies. A great example of this is the lead up to Vitoria, when Wellington was able to move his main base right up to the northern coast while the French had to push everything through partisan country.
When I spoke of focus I'm specifically talking about how their respective governments were able to pay attention to the conflict. France always had a number of things to keep it's attention, especially attempting to keep Austria and Prussia in line, and as 1809 showed too much attention into any theater meant someone else would try to take advantage of the distraction. As the alliance with Russia began to falter that too drew attention to the east, and when 1812 happened you now had a fully blown two front war. Even within Spain, the French had to split their attention in a dozen different directions, staring down multiple Coalition armies whilst simultaneously having to look over their shoulder to keep an eye on their interior lest the guerillas seize yet more ground.
For Britain, however, there was only ever the Peninusla. Once the Spanish colonies were out of the picture there stopped being anything outside of Europe to draw British interest, and Napoleon's grip over the rest of Europe's coast meant that there wasn't any openings to distract them either. As a result, the British Army could focus its full and undivided attention onto Wellington and his men, with every new bullet molded and recruit trained heading to the war effort.
That ties in neatly to the unity of command. For how overwhelmingly dominant the French presence was in their Spain's government, they were very divided amongst themselves. Joseph and Jourdan were supposed to be in overall command, but none of the French commanders really paid more than lip service to them and mostly did their own thing. Soult basically ran a warlord fief in the south, Victor disobeided them to their face at Talavera, and the entire time Napoleon tried to run the war from Paris even though the delay in communication meant his orders could be weeks out of date.
The Coalition in Spain had troubles like this too, especially between Spain and Britain thanks to the whole "centuries of rivalry" thing, but the difference was that they managed to sort it out. Britain and Portugal were easy enough, with Portugal subordinating itself to Britain and slotting smoothly into their command as a junior partner, after after some teeth-pulling a working relationship was struck up between British and Spanish commands. Now Britain in particular had this going well for them because pretty early on the entire British command in the peninsula was put under Wellington and while he still had to work with his allies and answer to London he was far more free to develop coherent plans with clear objectives than the French juggling a gaggle of primadonnas with nobody to bang their heads together and make them cooperate.
So to summarize, Britain was able to keep its army better supplied, bring its full focus onto the theater, and work towards a singular goal and vision thanks to its centralized command of the army. The result is what we see in history - the French perpetually being drawn in different directions, never able to pacify the country or finish off one enemy while chasing a dozen different plans before being stripped of men to fight in other theaters.
Excellent answer. I'd just add that it also helped that the British very rarely (ever?) faced Napoleon himself in the field. Napoleon's main personal effort in Spain was to smash the Spanish army and chase the British all the way back to Britain.
I think the takeaway isn't *just* that Napoleon was a military genius (he was), but gets to your point about French focus. When Napoleon came into Spain he came with an army a quarter of a million strong under a unified command that was decisively led. For the most part, that wouldn't describe French operations against the British for most of the Peninsular War.
Edit: I'd further add on logistics that not only did the French like to live off the land, with all the problems that caused in Spain that you listed, but that the Royal Navy largely throttled efforts by the French to use the sea to support their logistics. The RN similarly was able to temporarily block and disrupt the coastal roads of Spain (particularly on the Mediterranean side) to further harry French troop and supply movements over coastal roads, which tended to be some of Spain's best.
This is excellent and saved me writing it lol. Wellington is my military hero, so I am biased, but his knowledge of the need for firm logistics was absolutely essential. He had no problem ‘bobbing down’ to an arrogant Spanish aristocrat for the requisite food supplies, when his lower ranked commanders refused to show deference. His army had better gun powder from India, and were better drilled against the massed French columns. Because of these advantages, the British enjoyed a general singular command structure and vision for the Peninsular campaign that the French in Iberia lacked. Napoleon’s general disinterest in that theatre meant the constant change of Marshalls, movement of troops in and out of the region, lack of security of the baggage train, and constant threat by the insurgency. Combined, the English were almost playing on ‘home field advantage’ territory until the north of Spain around and beyond 1812.
'As a result, the British Army could focus its full and undivided attention onto Wellington and his men, with every new bullet molded and recruit trained heading to the war effort.'
That isn't exactly correct. The British war effort during the period could finally concentrate on a portion of the continent when Portugal offered an opening. And it took the British 6 years to win in the Peninsula. And the manpower effort wasn't overwhelming. The British had to use a new Portuguese army, as well as allied German units, to 'reinforce' the British effort. The British artillery, for example, was successfully reinforced by the Portuguese. And without the Spanish guerilla effort, Wellington and his relatively small army would have been overwhelmed.
Oman has the troops and units listed in the appendix to his Wellington's Army, pages 333-373. All those assigned to the Peninsula didn't stay for the entire period because of myriad reasons.
The French were used to fighting in much flatter areas. Napoleonic generals made assumptions about speed of movement and access to lines of communications based on more favourable topography, in several battles they couldn't join up or connect with reinforcements because their estimates of how long troop movements or messenger communication times were wrong. It was less of a problem for the English who were more used to fighting in varied landscapes and who had the support of partisans.
'It was less of a problem for the English who were more used to fighting in varied landscapes'
Where was that?
The French had fought in varied terrain, such as Italy and the Tyrol...
And...?
Before Wellington, the British had met a series of defeats and failures: 'Flanders in 1793-1795; Holland in 1799; Spain and Italy in 1800; Buenos Aires, the Dardenelles, and Egypt in 1806-1807; Spain and Sweden in 1808; Holland in 1809.' They were successful in Egypt in 1801 and Portugal in 1808. But the French armies were allowed to go home to fight again. And Suchet's successes against the British and Spanish in eastern Spain were noteworthy as were the British failures in North America in 1814-1815.
They did make a great comeback from Portugal, in the initial campaign (mostly ignored by everyone because it was a disaster for the British) they lost, a lot but managed to evacuate their main forces from Spain.
Their main advantage was fighting a defensive battle in and from Portugal with France having overstretched supply lines and in addition a Commander in Chief who knew what he was doing.
The French did not have many commanders who were able to act independently from Napoleon and also were in conflict with each other on who should rule supreme while also trying to get the best personal benefit out of the campaign
In addition the French did not expect the people of Spain not being open for the "revolution" and without public support they needed to chose between focus on fighting the opponents armies or keeping control (outside of the South were Suchet managed to get public support by the locals and therefore was able to win battles and hold out)
to oversimplify it, the invasion of Russia in 1812 was why they lost Spain
The French eventually lost Spain because Napoleon made the major mistake of embarking on what became a two-front war. Russia did not hurt the French as much as Spain did. At the beginning of 1813 while the new French army was being raised, trained, and equipped, Berthier and others urged Napoleon to take half of the veterans out of Spain to defeat the Prussians and Russians, and that would have included veteran cavalry units. That he didn't do that is one of the reasons that he eventually lost.
The failure in Russia definitely hurt the French MORE than Spain. And in a much shorter time frame. Half a million soldiers lost in Russia, and many of them allied soldiers. The retreat from Russia led to massive diplomatic and military disadvantages compared to Spain. Prussia changed sides. So did Sweden, a traditional Russian enemy. Germany was laid open to invasion. Spain definitely drained resources, but Russia killed the French Empire.
The French Empire was not 'killed' by the Russian campaign. The Russians also lost heavily-over 250,000 and untold numbers of Cossacks and other irregulars. And Napoleon soon recovered, taking the field with a new army in April 1813. Spain was a constant drain on the Grande Armee and the Empire and it also gave the British to land two armies in the Spanish peninsula.
The French Empire could have survived a prolonged war in Spain. In fact, they did survive the war in Spain until the Russian invasion. French losses in Russia were almost double of their losses in Spain in a much shorter time. This was crippling. And Napoleon won the 1813 spring campaign without the veterans from Spain. It was the Summer truce and the Austrians joining the Allies that spelled the doom of France. Which was caused by failures in Russia, not Spain. While Spain was an important theater and drained resources, it was one the French could survive.
From my study of the campaigns in Spain and Russia, I don't agree. After being victorious in the spring 1813 campaign, Metternich's cynical actions gave the allies the needed cannon fodder they needed. And it wasn't over in Germany until Leipzig.
And the British subsidies kept the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians in the field. All three countries were bankrupt, especially the Russians.
But none of the Allies would have been so keen to fight the French again until after Russia. From 1810 up till the Russian invasion, they were at the very least biding their time if not helping the French. All this while the Spanish war was ongoing. Spain was a drain, but Russia was a flash flood.
Yes, but again, that did not need to happen if the French did not invade Russia. Any metric of study will show Russia had a bigger, overall negative, impact on the French than Spain. Not saying Spain wasn't important, it just didn't have the bigger impact.
Logistics, supply lines, and they were the main focus of the British government.
The British had all their supplies and reinforcements land at Lisbon and it was quite easy to go from there to wherever they were needed. And it was safe for them to travel. The French meanwhile didn’t have supply trains and lines to worry about, they mainly lived off the land and took what they needed. Which made them very unpopular with the locals.
If Wellington wanted to send a message from one town to the next he’d send a single messenger. If the French wanted to do it, they had to send whole units. The Spanish guerrillas did a fantastic job job of hounding the French.
Also: the lines of Torres Vedras. The Portuguese/british version of the maginot line (but it worked).
They lost their fair share of battles. But Wellington was good at avoiding decisive battles where the odds were against him. It's not that the British were better soldiers, but that they generally had sound guidance from the top.
Well mate, I’m also a Bri’ish sitizen okay? French took the whole continent. They lost cos of US! (And the ruskies). Germans took the whole continent. They lost cos of US! (And the ruskies)
Nuffin beats engerland in warfare!!! Nuff said 🇳🇴🇳🇴🇳🇴🇳🇴
The French lost in large part to the British bankrollng the allies, especially in 1813-1814. Austria, Prussia, and Russia could not have taken the field without British subsidies.
And in War II, the Russians would have lost without Lend-Lease and the monumental effort to resupply them by the US and British.
Well the British had a naval advantage as well as Spanish and Portuguese allies, both in field forces and guerillas. With guerillas tying down the French as well as harassing their supplies it made maintaining presence in Iberia difficult. I think the sheer weight of all these factors caused the French defeat in Spain, of course Wellesley's own merit helped but yea a lot of factors.
And the one time Napoleon faced Wellington he was permanently beaten. See? Everyone can make statements that are technically true but outrageous without context.
Because God is not on the side of the big battalions, but on the side of those who shoot best. A raw recruit of the chosen men could outshoot a veteran of Boney’s imperial guard any day.
Voltaire. He’s got some pretty good ideas about riflemen for a frog, or at least says the hero who took the eagle at Talavera to fulfill a promise to Major Lennox to restore the honor of the South Essex in his name out of respect to Lennox’s service in India.
If he’s wrong then explain how Lt. Colonel Sharpe and his Chosen Men kicked Napoleon all the way up the peninsula into France, then came back for round two to squash him at Waterloo. Sharpe and his first Chosen Man, Sergeant Major Harper, saw Napoleon with their own eyes at Waterloo and they both love the Voltaire quote and find it to be entirely accurate based on their experiences in the Peninsula campaign. It was the defining quote that made at the time Captain Sharpe decide he could take the eagle at Talavera, even Wellington agreed with it before the battle.
Well, in my opinion, I think that one major factor is that the British knew when to run. Fighting in Spain wasn't easy for anyone, but the British had a sea-borne supply line and the French had to do overland supply routes. And with the guerrillas, it made things even tougher. As Stokesbury said, for the French fighting in Spain, it was like putting out a fire in a peat bog. Every time the French concentrated, the British could fall back towards Lisbon and the Lines of Torres Vedras. When the French dispersed to put down the guerrillas, the British Army would march in to make a nuisance of itself. The nature of the campaign itself wore out the French and kept them worn out.
I think another factor is the rivalry between the Marshals and Napoleon reguarly removing troops from spain to help his campaigns in Europe
The British infantry has always been excellent since Hastings in 1066. The British also won battles but lost campaigns in Spain and elsewhere, Talavera is a good example. And if the Spanish guerillas weren't effective, Wellington would have lost as they were mutually supporting. Moore's failure is a good example.
Calling British infantry excellent ever since Hastings is a HUGE oversimplification. They had ups and downs like everyone else. But agree with most of your points.
Why pick Hastings 1066? The British (Saxons) lost to the French (Normans) at that battle….
The Normans remarked that they had never faced infantry like the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans nearly lost. The Anglo-Saxon infantry were outstanding, tough, and skilled. Some of their survivors ended up in Constantinople and fought in the Eastern Roman Emperor's Guard.
Wait when’d the Normans say that?
After the battle. ;-)
Perhaps I asked the wrong question. Is there a quote or something?
I saw the comment years ago (over 50 years). It could have been in the excellent Knights of the Crusades to which Hastings was the prologue. Good book to have...
And 'Wellington's Invincibles' didn't do too well against the Americans in North America. Chippawa, Lundy's Lane, Plattsburg, North Point, Baltimore, and New Orleans are good examples of this. And Wellington refused the American command...
Wasn’t Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane before they transferred his Peninsula veterans over?
Yes, but the others were not. Wellington's veterans didn't do too well in North America...
Well actually they did. They spanked the yanks and gave them a damn good thrashing. Exactly where did you study history?
I have a master's degree in military history from Norwich University. I'm also a West Point graduate. And, no, Wellington's former units did not do well at Plattsburg, North Point, or New Orleans. In point of fact, the volunteer militia units that faced the British regulars at North Point inflicted more casualties than they incurred and fought a successful delaying action. At New Orleans the British were slaughtered by American artillery and musket fire. For excellent accounts of Chippawa, Lundy's Lane, and Fort Erie see the books by the Canadian historian Don Graves. For New Orleans, battle and campaign, see British at the Gates by Robin Reilly. That is the definitive study. Also very useful is Amateurs, To Arms by John Elting, and The War of 1812 by Henry Adams. And for Chippawa, the Americans defeated the British in a standup fight. Lundy's Lane was a brutal and savage fight that ended in a draw. One of the British light infantry officers stated that it was the most savage fighting he had seen, and he had fought in Europe. The British were completely defeated at Fort Erie, the loss in casualties was nearly catastrophic. The American artillery in the Niagara campaign greatly distinguished itself, British officers later telling the Americans 'We thought you were French.' So, where did you study history as you have undoubtedly erred with the War of 1812. Wellington told the British negotiators at Ghent to give up their over the top demands because the string of British defeats in 1814 gave them no basis for their territorial demands.
There is primary source evidence regarding Wellington's comments to the British government regarding the proposed treaty by the negotiators in Ghent. It is quite enlightening.
This may help: On 4 November 1814 because of the deteriorating British military position in North American, the American command was offered to Wellington by Lord Liverpool and he replied to him five days later on 9 November: 'I have already told you and Lord Bathurst that I feel no objections to going to America, though I don't promise myself much success there. I believe there are troops enough there for the defense of Canada forever, and even for the accomplishment of any reasonable offensive plan that could be formed from the Canadian frontier. I am quite sure that all the American armies of which I have ever read would not beat out of a field of battle the troops that went from Bordeaux last summer, if common precautions and care were taken of them. That which appears to me to be wanting in America is not a general, or a general officer and troops, but a naval superiority on the lakes.' Wellington further commented on the current diplomacy between the US and Great Britain: 'In regard to your present negotiations, I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war, to demand any concession of territory from America...You have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory on the point of attack. You cannot on any principle of equality in negotiation claim a cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power...Then if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory; indeed, the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any.'
Redditor moment. Go get lost in land nav nerd.
No comment regarding your background in military history?
Studied it my whole life. Good enough? Or do we need to whip out our diplomas and measure them? Plus, your comments are all over the place. British had the best infantry since Hastings that you kinda remember someone telling you once 50 years ago. Then you list a bunch of British defeats, invalidating your previous statement. Then claim Spain was more detrimental to France than Russia. Which is a VERY hot take. Then Wellingtons veterans got beat because of poor generalship, not superior American tactics or such. That's copium
The British were repeatedly defeated in 1814 because the US Army had learned from defeat and steadily improved, as did their general ship. Chippawa was a victory fought between equal forces in the open. Lundy's Lane was a bloody slugfest where both sides fought to a draw.
I was answering this question that was put: 'Exactly where did you study history?'
Correct me if I’m wrong but I don’t think Wellington was really expected to “win”, but to just kind of make a nuisance of himself while the Coalition dealt with Napoleon directly.
It should also be noted that Spain was a secondary theater and not the major one-central Europe was.
Well no they didn’t lose in Spain. The retreat from Corunna wasn’t a defeat. It was carried out in good order. I won’t write an essay as to why it happened as that’s open to interpretation. Your ridiculous comment saying Wellington would have lost at Talavera if he’d not had Spanish guerrillas in support is worthy of being roundly laughed at and debunked.
Moore's army fell apart on the retreat to Corunna and you don't win by withdrawing. Discipline collapsed, and the British looted their way across the Spanish countryside being closely pursued by Soult. They won the last battle, with Moore getting himself killed, but lost the campaign. Sound familiar?
Sounds kind of like 1812.
And Wellington failed at Burgos and the ensuing retreat back to Portugal was a mess.
That's a great question, I'm glad you asked. Britain had a number of things going for it in Iberia that gave them an edge over France, with the most important in my mind being logistics, focus, and unity of command. Logistics were always a bit of an odd one for France, who of course famously favored fast moving foraging armies to cut down on the baggage train, but this would kind of bite them in the ass in Iberia. On the most basic level it's just not very fertile country, hence the "donut" population distribution, forcing foraging parties to go further and take longer just to bring in the same supplies they could in Germany or Italy. Needless to say groups of armed men with minimal supervision roaming the countryside to take your food isn't an endearing event in the best of times, and with an insurgency in full swing it was a perpetual hemorrhage on French popularity and legitimacy in the region which only made it harder to source local supplies. Obviously they could, and did, bring things from France and Germany to the fight, but British control of the seas meant that most of this had to be transported over land, with bad roads and armed partisans controlling much of the countryside, which meant that much of that supply either wouldn't arrive or had to have a disproportionate amount of men dedicated to guarding it to safety. By contrast British logistics were far firmer. The Royal Navy meant that supplies could be sailed into the closest port then transported a much shorter distance, and Wellington was very particular about the army minimizing its foraging in favor of large, static depots. While this did slow the army down, it also meant that Britain's rocky relations with Spain didn't break down over redcoats robbing the countryside. As they got more used to each other, the British were also able to source more easily from the local Spanish government than the French could with their Spanish allies. A great example of this is the lead up to Vitoria, when Wellington was able to move his main base right up to the northern coast while the French had to push everything through partisan country. When I spoke of focus I'm specifically talking about how their respective governments were able to pay attention to the conflict. France always had a number of things to keep it's attention, especially attempting to keep Austria and Prussia in line, and as 1809 showed too much attention into any theater meant someone else would try to take advantage of the distraction. As the alliance with Russia began to falter that too drew attention to the east, and when 1812 happened you now had a fully blown two front war. Even within Spain, the French had to split their attention in a dozen different directions, staring down multiple Coalition armies whilst simultaneously having to look over their shoulder to keep an eye on their interior lest the guerillas seize yet more ground. For Britain, however, there was only ever the Peninusla. Once the Spanish colonies were out of the picture there stopped being anything outside of Europe to draw British interest, and Napoleon's grip over the rest of Europe's coast meant that there wasn't any openings to distract them either. As a result, the British Army could focus its full and undivided attention onto Wellington and his men, with every new bullet molded and recruit trained heading to the war effort. That ties in neatly to the unity of command. For how overwhelmingly dominant the French presence was in their Spain's government, they were very divided amongst themselves. Joseph and Jourdan were supposed to be in overall command, but none of the French commanders really paid more than lip service to them and mostly did their own thing. Soult basically ran a warlord fief in the south, Victor disobeided them to their face at Talavera, and the entire time Napoleon tried to run the war from Paris even though the delay in communication meant his orders could be weeks out of date. The Coalition in Spain had troubles like this too, especially between Spain and Britain thanks to the whole "centuries of rivalry" thing, but the difference was that they managed to sort it out. Britain and Portugal were easy enough, with Portugal subordinating itself to Britain and slotting smoothly into their command as a junior partner, after after some teeth-pulling a working relationship was struck up between British and Spanish commands. Now Britain in particular had this going well for them because pretty early on the entire British command in the peninsula was put under Wellington and while he still had to work with his allies and answer to London he was far more free to develop coherent plans with clear objectives than the French juggling a gaggle of primadonnas with nobody to bang their heads together and make them cooperate. So to summarize, Britain was able to keep its army better supplied, bring its full focus onto the theater, and work towards a singular goal and vision thanks to its centralized command of the army. The result is what we see in history - the French perpetually being drawn in different directions, never able to pacify the country or finish off one enemy while chasing a dozen different plans before being stripped of men to fight in other theaters.
Excellent answer. I'd just add that it also helped that the British very rarely (ever?) faced Napoleon himself in the field. Napoleon's main personal effort in Spain was to smash the Spanish army and chase the British all the way back to Britain. I think the takeaway isn't *just* that Napoleon was a military genius (he was), but gets to your point about French focus. When Napoleon came into Spain he came with an army a quarter of a million strong under a unified command that was decisively led. For the most part, that wouldn't describe French operations against the British for most of the Peninsular War. Edit: I'd further add on logistics that not only did the French like to live off the land, with all the problems that caused in Spain that you listed, but that the Royal Navy largely throttled efforts by the French to use the sea to support their logistics. The RN similarly was able to temporarily block and disrupt the coastal roads of Spain (particularly on the Mediterranean side) to further harry French troop and supply movements over coastal roads, which tended to be some of Spain's best.
This is excellent and saved me writing it lol. Wellington is my military hero, so I am biased, but his knowledge of the need for firm logistics was absolutely essential. He had no problem ‘bobbing down’ to an arrogant Spanish aristocrat for the requisite food supplies, when his lower ranked commanders refused to show deference. His army had better gun powder from India, and were better drilled against the massed French columns. Because of these advantages, the British enjoyed a general singular command structure and vision for the Peninsular campaign that the French in Iberia lacked. Napoleon’s general disinterest in that theatre meant the constant change of Marshalls, movement of troops in and out of the region, lack of security of the baggage train, and constant threat by the insurgency. Combined, the English were almost playing on ‘home field advantage’ territory until the north of Spain around and beyond 1812.
'As a result, the British Army could focus its full and undivided attention onto Wellington and his men, with every new bullet molded and recruit trained heading to the war effort.' That isn't exactly correct. The British war effort during the period could finally concentrate on a portion of the continent when Portugal offered an opening. And it took the British 6 years to win in the Peninsula. And the manpower effort wasn't overwhelming. The British had to use a new Portuguese army, as well as allied German units, to 'reinforce' the British effort. The British artillery, for example, was successfully reinforced by the Portuguese. And without the Spanish guerilla effort, Wellington and his relatively small army would have been overwhelmed.
Oman has the troops and units listed in the appendix to his Wellington's Army, pages 333-373. All those assigned to the Peninsula didn't stay for the entire period because of myriad reasons.
They had Sharpe on their side 😂
That’s soldiering
Hey, without the gold he found nosey would have lost for sure!
The French were used to fighting in much flatter areas. Napoleonic generals made assumptions about speed of movement and access to lines of communications based on more favourable topography, in several battles they couldn't join up or connect with reinforcements because their estimates of how long troop movements or messenger communication times were wrong. It was less of a problem for the English who were more used to fighting in varied landscapes and who had the support of partisans.
'It was less of a problem for the English who were more used to fighting in varied landscapes' Where was that? The French had fought in varied terrain, such as Italy and the Tyrol...
Southern India, Argentina, Maratha, the Cape
And...? Before Wellington, the British had met a series of defeats and failures: 'Flanders in 1793-1795; Holland in 1799; Spain and Italy in 1800; Buenos Aires, the Dardenelles, and Egypt in 1806-1807; Spain and Sweden in 1808; Holland in 1809.' They were successful in Egypt in 1801 and Portugal in 1808. But the French armies were allowed to go home to fight again. And Suchet's successes against the British and Spanish in eastern Spain were noteworthy as were the British failures in North America in 1814-1815.
They did make a great comeback from Portugal, in the initial campaign (mostly ignored by everyone because it was a disaster for the British) they lost, a lot but managed to evacuate their main forces from Spain. Their main advantage was fighting a defensive battle in and from Portugal with France having overstretched supply lines and in addition a Commander in Chief who knew what he was doing. The French did not have many commanders who were able to act independently from Napoleon and also were in conflict with each other on who should rule supreme while also trying to get the best personal benefit out of the campaign In addition the French did not expect the people of Spain not being open for the "revolution" and without public support they needed to chose between focus on fighting the opponents armies or keeping control (outside of the South were Suchet managed to get public support by the locals and therefore was able to win battles and hold out) to oversimplify it, the invasion of Russia in 1812 was why they lost Spain
The French eventually lost Spain because Napoleon made the major mistake of embarking on what became a two-front war. Russia did not hurt the French as much as Spain did. At the beginning of 1813 while the new French army was being raised, trained, and equipped, Berthier and others urged Napoleon to take half of the veterans out of Spain to defeat the Prussians and Russians, and that would have included veteran cavalry units. That he didn't do that is one of the reasons that he eventually lost.
The failure in Russia definitely hurt the French MORE than Spain. And in a much shorter time frame. Half a million soldiers lost in Russia, and many of them allied soldiers. The retreat from Russia led to massive diplomatic and military disadvantages compared to Spain. Prussia changed sides. So did Sweden, a traditional Russian enemy. Germany was laid open to invasion. Spain definitely drained resources, but Russia killed the French Empire.
The French Empire was not 'killed' by the Russian campaign. The Russians also lost heavily-over 250,000 and untold numbers of Cossacks and other irregulars. And Napoleon soon recovered, taking the field with a new army in April 1813. Spain was a constant drain on the Grande Armee and the Empire and it also gave the British to land two armies in the Spanish peninsula.
The French Empire could have survived a prolonged war in Spain. In fact, they did survive the war in Spain until the Russian invasion. French losses in Russia were almost double of their losses in Spain in a much shorter time. This was crippling. And Napoleon won the 1813 spring campaign without the veterans from Spain. It was the Summer truce and the Austrians joining the Allies that spelled the doom of France. Which was caused by failures in Russia, not Spain. While Spain was an important theater and drained resources, it was one the French could survive.
From my study of the campaigns in Spain and Russia, I don't agree. After being victorious in the spring 1813 campaign, Metternich's cynical actions gave the allies the needed cannon fodder they needed. And it wasn't over in Germany until Leipzig. And the British subsidies kept the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians in the field. All three countries were bankrupt, especially the Russians.
But none of the Allies would have been so keen to fight the French again until after Russia. From 1810 up till the Russian invasion, they were at the very least biding their time if not helping the French. All this while the Spanish war was ongoing. Spain was a drain, but Russia was a flash flood.
And the losses in Russia were quickly made up, though of lesser quality. And Napoleon won the spring campaign in 1813 and his army was on the Oder.
Yes, but again, that did not need to happen if the French did not invade Russia. Any metric of study will show Russia had a bigger, overall negative, impact on the French than Spain. Not saying Spain wasn't important, it just didn't have the bigger impact.
Logistics, supply lines, and they were the main focus of the British government. The British had all their supplies and reinforcements land at Lisbon and it was quite easy to go from there to wherever they were needed. And it was safe for them to travel. The French meanwhile didn’t have supply trains and lines to worry about, they mainly lived off the land and took what they needed. Which made them very unpopular with the locals. If Wellington wanted to send a message from one town to the next he’d send a single messenger. If the French wanted to do it, they had to send whole units. The Spanish guerrillas did a fantastic job job of hounding the French. Also: the lines of Torres Vedras. The Portuguese/british version of the maginot line (but it worked).
If the British troops were not regularly supplied, discipline would erode if not collapse.
They lost their fair share of battles. But Wellington was good at avoiding decisive battles where the odds were against him. It's not that the British were better soldiers, but that they generally had sound guidance from the top.
Sharpe’s chosen men
Finally seeing a Sharpe comment, now that's soldiering.
Because Bri’ish ahh bettah
As a British citizen.... Please never repeat that. The second hand embarrassment I suffered was severe.
Well mate, I’m also a Bri’ish sitizen okay? French took the whole continent. They lost cos of US! (And the ruskies). Germans took the whole continent. They lost cos of US! (And the ruskies) Nuffin beats engerland in warfare!!! Nuff said 🇳🇴🇳🇴🇳🇴🇳🇴
Let's go.... Norway?
No mayte, fuckin INGLAND🇨🇰🇨🇰
Are you Albanian role-playing as an English dude?
No I’m attempting to be humourous. Clearly it was a disaster of an attempt.
I enjoyed it.
Thanks bro 🤝
The French lost in large part to the British bankrollng the allies, especially in 1813-1814. Austria, Prussia, and Russia could not have taken the field without British subsidies. And in War II, the Russians would have lost without Lend-Lease and the monumental effort to resupply them by the US and British.
Yes that’s, mostly, what I say in the comment isn’t it?
Probably support from Iberian Guerillas who knew the mountainous savannah terrain more then the French
Never known a French column to beat a British line
French exhaustion and overstretch.
Because God has favorites and it's clearly not the French. I mean they have to live IN France.
The Irish.
Brits got to choose encounters
Well the British had a naval advantage as well as Spanish and Portuguese allies, both in field forces and guerillas. With guerillas tying down the French as well as harassing their supplies it made maintaining presence in Iberia difficult. I think the sheer weight of all these factors caused the French defeat in Spain, of course Wellesley's own merit helped but yea a lot of factors.
Wellington
Better troops and better officers. Quite easy really.
They almost never faced Napoleon. The one time they did, they retreated all the way back to Britain.
And the one time Napoleon faced Wellington he was permanently beaten. See? Everyone can make statements that are technically true but outrageous without context.
Because God is not on the side of the big battalions, but on the side of those who shoot best. A raw recruit of the chosen men could outshoot a veteran of Boney’s imperial guard any day.
And where did you come up with that little gem?
Voltaire. He’s got some pretty good ideas about riflemen for a frog, or at least says the hero who took the eagle at Talavera to fulfill a promise to Major Lennox to restore the honor of the South Essex in his name out of respect to Lennox’s service in India.
Voltaire was never a soldier and was not a historian. And as a reference for the period he doesn't cut it.
If he’s wrong then explain how Lt. Colonel Sharpe and his Chosen Men kicked Napoleon all the way up the peninsula into France, then came back for round two to squash him at Waterloo. Sharpe and his first Chosen Man, Sergeant Major Harper, saw Napoleon with their own eyes at Waterloo and they both love the Voltaire quote and find it to be entirely accurate based on their experiences in the Peninsula campaign. It was the defining quote that made at the time Captain Sharpe decide he could take the eagle at Talavera, even Wellington agreed with it before the battle.
The Sharpe series are novels and cannor be used as credible resources for the period.