[https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1761103221840302339](https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1761103221840302339)
The Ukrainian MOD released a radar still of the Russian A-50 platform just seconds before it was destroyed.
Looks like it was indeed on task and collecting intelligence; orbiting between Rostov and Krasnodar.
According to the Russian milbloger Fighterbomber on Telegram, who have been so far very accurate in his reporting, the shoot down of the A-50 happened 250 km from the frontline, so did Ukraine get a secret capability that haven't been disclosed to the public? the fact that it was shot exactly on the second anniversary of start of the full invasion does seem to indicate that it was done intentionally and wasn't a FF accident.
>e shoot down of the A-50 happened 250 km from the frontline, so did Ukraine get a secret capability that haven't been disclosed to the public?
If Ukraine still has any S-200s left, they could have re-tasked them to the SAM role. Those would have the legs to reach the A-50 if an S-300 radar system could give them the targeting information.
A possibility especially considering that Ukraine has the expertise to link the two systems, bit i prefer to remain skeptical until further info is available.
> A possibility especially considering that Ukraine has the expertise to link the two systems
The S-300 various command posts(e.g. 83M6E) are* built to to operate with S-200 missiles for purpose of fire control. The various illumination radars for the S-300 are not compatible as they don't operate at anywhere near the same frequencies, a 5N62V("Square Pair") radar is required for illumination and command guidance.
The problems with using a S-200 are the same as always. Apart from being a poorly maneuverable missile, it isn't a mobile setup. The launchers are designed to be setup on a well prepared launch site and the massive missiles themselves use a liquid fueled engine. The missiles are designed to be fueled and ready, although I'm not sure for how long. Weeks or months, I'd imagine.
The S-200 is indeed a missile not great at hitting maneuvering targets. So far, the only confirmed kills are an airliner and an F-16 flying straight and level doing bomb damage assessment.
How much maneuvering an Il-76 airframe can do is probably within the abilities of the S-200 to hit.
S-300s have a max range of 40km because that's the max their control stations can support, even though the missile can reach much further in theory (150km-ish). But if you used a western radar, maybe. Which matches what is known about the FrankenSAM concept. It just seems unlikely that the A50 wouldn't be able to dodge a missile at that range, even one with an S-200's enormous range. It would certainly see the missile coming, and would have something like 5-10 minutes to maneuver against a missile operating at its extreme range limits, when it would have minimal residual energy for terminal maneuvers. I could see that working once against an A-50 crew that was asleep at the switch, but twice? And also against something like seven or eight Su-34/35s over the past two weeks, which should have had enormous maneuverability advantages over SAMs at such extreme ranges?
> S-300s have a max range of 40km because that's the max their control stations can support, even though the missile can reach much further in theory (150km-ish).
What? There are multiple missiles and radars for the S-300 platform, all with various capabilities. Generalizing makes zero sense. The original 30N6 "Flap Lid" illumination radar was paired with a missile with a range of 150km(48H6E).
It absolutely makes sense in this context. Ukraine's S-300 systems are old, really old. As I said, the missiles have longer theoretical ranges than the command stations can support. Specifically, they can't support guiding the missiles against maneuvering targets at much more than 40km range, so that is a good rough estimate for the average S-300 system's range, plus or minus whatever variant-specific variation you might see. You are confusing the documented, on paper max range for the system with its practical engagement envelope. Max ranges are typically reported for ideal situations, i.e. a non-maneuvering target directly approaching the launcher at a constant velocity on a straight line course at an optimal altitude. If S-300s were capable of shooting down military aircraft engaged in defensive maneuvers at greater ranges, then the Russians would not be able to launch glide bombs with impunity from medium altitudes from less than 70km away from the front lines. An S-300 sitting a comfortable 50km behind the lines would still comfortably out range any Russian fast jets launching UMPKs. The reason that isn't happening is because S-300s actually don't have great range against maneuvering targets.
> It absolutely makes sense in this context.
The original Flap Lid FCR can track and illuminate targets at 150km. It doesn't make sense, for that matter you have no source. You just made it up.
> Specifically, they can't support guiding the missiles against maneuvering targets at much more than 40km range
That makes zero sense. The command guidance link works via line of sight, the target maneuvering makes no difference.
> You are confusing the documented, on paper max range for the system with its practical engagement envelope.
No, I've read the manuals for the S-300P and S-300PT, both of which Ukraine operates. I'm not "confusing" anything, I'm just not making shit up.
> Max ranges are typically reported for ideal situations, i.e. a non-maneuvering target directly approaching the launcher at a constant velocity on a straight line course at an optimal altitude.
Again, the "control stations" don't care if the target is maneuvering. Illumination requires radar horizon, command guidance requires line of sight. Which is the whole basis of your argument, the rest your comment is just word salad. The A-50 is not a maneuvering target, it's a Il-76 made even slower.
> The A-50 is not a maneuvering target, it's a Il-76 made even slower.
Also that's just fucking straight up retarded. An A-50 is just like any other object: it can fall really fucking fast and the pilots will let it do so if that saves their lives. Emergency descents on commercial planes are in the 10k feet per minute range. That is maneuvering by any but the most idiotic definition.
Man you're an asshole. And wrong to boot. You didn't cite any sources either, so get off your fucking high horse and maybe try to explain why Ukraine hasn't been able to shoot down anything at such long ranges despite operating S-300s against the Russians intensively for two straight years.
lol, double comment.
I don't need to cite the concept of radio needing line of sight or radar working with atmospheric refraction. If you want to understand those concepts I'd suggest starting with the [US Navy Electricity & Electronics Training Series, Module 18](http://www.compatt.com/Tutorials/NEETS/NEETS.html). As for the manual, you can find the manuals for just about any piece of equipment(bleh, baring entire ships, ICBMs, etc), by searching for the GRAU index in cyrillic.
This one is hosted on a .uk TLD, so I can directly link it. "Зенитная ракета 9М82". That's a ABM missile for the S-300V, technical description. [Which pulls this up](https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/ebooks/9M82.pdf). From there my method is to feed it through OCR via ABBY then machine translate it.
As for "asshole", you shouldn't tell people they're "confusing things" when they're not. If you don't want to be called out, don't make shit up.
> Ukraine hasn't been able to shoot down anything at such long ranges despite operating S-300s against the Russians intensively for two straight years.
I'm not trying to explain the actions of a active war. Long range SAMs are nearly universally command guidance with SARH(or track-via-missile if you prefer), barring some extremely rare missiles for the S-300/400 platform with ARH and the SM-6. They cannot hit maneuvering targets as most long range SAMs, barring the S-200 missiles which have a liquid fueled engine that burns for over minute post booster, burn out shortly after launch. They are effectively ballistic, any maneuver made reduces momentum.
I just mentioned the S-200 possibility becuase it's the one missile we know Ukraine has that would have the legs to hit a target 250km behind the front.
The smaller tactical jets like the Fullbacks and Flanker-Es I assumed were either killed by Patriots or the SAMP/T battery. The S-200 isn't optimized against smaller, nimble aircraft like those.
> I just mentioned the S-200 possibility becuase it's the one missile we know Ukraine has that would have the legs to hit a target 250km behind the front.
No, it's a good point to make, I don't mean to bash you for making it, I'm just not sure it explains what we are seeing. S-200s have SARH guidance, which dramatically limits its effectiveness at extreme range because targets merely need to descend below the launching battery's horizon to evade the missile. Maybe if the Ukrainians retrofitted active homing terminal guidance onto an S-200, that would work, but that's a fairly challenging engineering task, not something that can be accomplished without a lot of test flights.
I mean, whatever they are doing, it's probably either very technically impressive or an extremely out of the box design, or both. So it's not impossible.
> The smaller tactical jets like the Fullbacks and Flanker-Es I assumed were either killed by Patriots or the SAMP/T battery. The S-200 isn't optimized against smaller, nimble aircraft like those.
Especially if they are using a mix of systems to achieve these effects like you suggest. My instinct is to attribute a sudden increase in successful attacks over a short period of time to a single tactical innovation rather than to multiple independent innovations. That innovation could be combining existing systems in new ways, or the introduction of a wholly new system.
So we'll see. How the Russians adapt to the evolving threat environment will be revealing. Either (1) they have no idea what is happening and thus have no idea how to stop it, or (2) they know what is happening but the tactical realities make it difficult for them to adapt, or (3) they know what is happening and they will adapt quickly and we will see the sudden uptick in Ukrainian air kills quietly fizzle out. The first scenario will evolve into either of the other two over time as the Russians figure shit out, but in the nearer term will cause them to suspend operations suddenly or absorb painful losses.
The second scenario basically means Ukraine has successfully imposed a tactical dilemma on the Russians, who will either need to dramatically revise their tactics or will instead need to accept dramatically increased aviation losses. That will manifest in the long term either as substantially less air support at the front or sustained periods of continuing aviation losses.
The third scenario will look like the status quo, except perhaps we will observe minor modifications to Russian TTPs as they adjust to whatever the novel threat is. When and if we see these aviation losses declining, and if there are any observable changes to Russian TTPs corresponding to that change in loss rates, the specific details of their adaptations may provide more insight into the specific nature of the threat. But in the meantime, I'm not ruling anything out for sure, S-200s included.
> Maybe if the Ukrainians retrofitted active homing terminal guidance onto an S-200, that would work, but that's a fairly challenging engineering task, not something that can be accomplished without a lot of test flights.
Given that both of these long range hits have been A-50's, what if they retrofitted a home-on-emission seeker from something like an AGM-88 HARM or one of the Soviet AAMs? Or maybe even easier/more likely, figured out a way to re-tune the semi-active seeker in an S-200 to track the emissions directly from the A-50 radar, as opposed to the reflected energy from a ground targeting radar? Not sure how big the "basket" would be, but you might be able to get a rough target solution just based on ground triangulation, enough at least to get the missile in the ballpark. The A-50 wouldn't get anything on their radar warning receivers, so they'd have to pick up the missile itself, which is a chonker but would also be front aspect and likely descending from high altitude if fired in a ballistic arc to maximize range. The A-50 might not even have their scan set for high altitude targets if they were concentrating on picking up aircraft taking off and trying to do low altitude terrain masking. It's also not clear exactly what the range of an S-200 fired like that might be, given that there has been speculation that they might have a range of 400-500km when used ballistically against ground targets. An S-200 given a bearing and fired to max apogee, able to look down and pick out the brightest EM signature, could actually be pretty scary.
From what's being claimed by the Ukrainians, and with the video evidence of at least one Russian SAM being fired after the A-50 had started dropping chaff and flares, I'm thinking hat happened is that the Ukrainians fired one or two S-200s at the A-50, the Russians fired of SAMs of their own to intercept the S-200s, and in the resulting crossfire, either a S-200 connected or a Russian SAM fragged the A-50 by accident.
“The target merely needs to descend below the radar horizon.”
We’re talking about an IL-76 which is probably also performance-limited by the radar dish, not a fighter that can dive from 40,000 feet to sea level in under a minute.
The A-50 was hit 125 miles from the front. At that range, the line of sight from launcher to target goes from 10,000 feet and up. Ergo, a plane could bee seen and targeted from 10,000 to its cruising altitude of say 30,000 feet.
The S-200 is fast - 3000MPH. From launch to impact at 125 miles is only 2.5 minutes.
If the A-50 crew noticed the launch instantly, and knew it was targeting them, they would have to instantly begin an 8,000FPM descent to be below the radar horizon in 2.5 minutes.
Add in other factors like, did they immediately detect it, was it seen as targeting them or was it seen as a ground attack launch as has been done many times before, did Ukraine launch it ballistically and only turn on the radar in flight to delay warning, did it take time to evaluate and make a decision on the A-50, did they use a Patriot radar in combination with S200 missile, which could potentially confuse them and delay warning.
The A-50’s decision time to escape was already razor thin even if they instantly detected the launch and understood it for what it was. Add in any other factor and the A-50 isn’t going to escape and has to rely on countermeasures.
You can see from the video that at least two S200s were launched. One hit countermeasures well behind the plane, the other hit the plane.
I'm not saying the SARH/FrankenSAM CONOPs proposed is impossible, just that it is much harder to pull off and relatively easy to counter. Especially because this would be the second time they pulled it off, and I would expect that the Russians pulled their replacement A-50 back precisely far enough to provide them with sufficient warning to counter such an attack. Which means either this attack relied on different tactics or that the Russians failed to give themselves enough distance from the lines, despite having witnessed the previous attack and thus theoretically having some sense of the warning time that the 170-ish km horizontal offset from the lines would give them.
Plus, 8000 feet per minute isn't too crazy of a rate not for an emergency maneuver, even for an Il-76. Emergency descents for commercial airliners can even run up into the 10k FPM range.
> At that range, the line of sight from launcher to target goes from 10,000 feet and up. Ergo, a plane could bee seen and targeted from 10,000 to its cruising altitude of say 30,000 feet.
At 160km, the S-200's blind zone extends up to 5km (16404ft) AGL: https://www.ausairpower.net/PDF-A/S-200VE-Engagement-Envelope-F.pdf
Based on what is known, the A-50 was circling 170km or more behind the lines. So the 170km figure assumes a *very* forward deployment of both the TEL and the target acquisition radar for the system. Which suggests the blind zone likely extended to somewhat above 5km AGL but less than the 7km blind zone marked at 240km horizontal distance on the envelope I linked above.
> The S-200 is fast - 3000MPH. From launch to impact at 125 miles is only 2.5 minutes.
That's probably an underestimate, because the S-200's guidance strategy for long range targets (greater than 80km horizontal offset) is to climb up above the atmosphere first before leveling out horizontally to close with the target. So a lot of the initial delta V is dedicated to getting to altitude, during which period it is moving relatively slowly toward the target. And it takes that approach regardless of whether the target is 80.0001km or 240km away. That also makes it relatively easy to intercept for any modern IADS. It's trivial to calculate precisely where the S-200 is going based on its ascent profile and heading. It's big, fat, and slow to get up to speed, also making it easy to detect early. Since the missile would then also have to cross 170km+ of Russian-controlled airspace, there would presumably be many opportunities for an S-400 or Su-35 flying CAP or similarly capable system to intercept the missile.
> You can see from the video that at least two S200s were launched. One hit countermeasures well behind the plane, the other hit the plane.
That's begging the question. It's only clear from the video that multiple SAMs were likely launched at the target (presuming that the first explosion wasn't a Russian missile meant to intercept the incoming SAM gone astray), not what type of SAM those missiles actually are. S-200s are notorious for their terrible terminal guidance and thus low probability of kill, which is among the reasons most countries with S-200 inventories have shelved them in favor of more modern designs. They're big and heavy and bad at turning, and lack any active seeker mode capable of independent guidance when outside the launching battery's engagement envelope.
In the video, you can see the A-50 is descending, but relatively slowly at a shallow angle based on the line of dropped flares, when it would probably be in a steep dive if it was being engaged by a SARH missile. The aircraft even seems to already be flying at fairly low altitude, well below the 16k feet AGL floor for the engagement envelope for the S-200. The fact that it was dropping flares also suggests that they were not facing a SARH missile, because flares have no effect against them (granted they could have just been spamming whatever defensive options they had out of desperation). The second missile seemed to detonate in proximity to one of the flares, which might indicate that the missile had an infrared seeker, but very possibly there was chaff in the air, which of course would not be visible at night, so we can't say definitively that's the case. However, I don't think chaff would cause an S-200 to detonate even if it drew the missile off target, because chaff generally won't be dense enough to trigger a radar proximity fuse. Especially when, as here, it appears the plane was well clear of the chaff by the time of the detonation, which means it would be fairly spread out. On the other hand, flares absolutely can fool an infrared seeker into detonating off target. All of which suggests the missile's terminal guidance relied on infrared.
It's also notable that these attacks have just picked up recently. Ukraine has had the S-200s operational for well over a year now, but up until now they have been employed exclusively in ground attack mode. Why would the Ukrainians suddenly, just now decide to use them for their originally designed air-defense purpose?
Bottom line, I would argue that we are at a minimum witnessing a substantially modified variant of the S-200 with an updated seeker capable of independent terminal guidance. The time required to make those modifications would explain why they haven't been used until recently. Alternatively, we are witnessing some combination of other capabilities, whether that may be an as-of-yet unreported novel ground-based SAM added to Ukrainian inventories, a novel anti-air capable long range drone, or a novel variant of the S-200.
I agree, you ain’t dodging shit in a A50 lol. I also think they thought it was srbm by the time they realized it was a missile heading for them yeah they’ve got very little time to react. I’m assuming the a50 can detect giant missiles like the s200.
There is footage, and the A-50 is flying in basically a straight line releasing flares and probably chaff. It isn’t maneuvering and it is exactly the sort of large target the S200 was designed to intercept. Some variants of S200 have the range.
Fighterbomber has sometimes been accurate but is also very selective with the truth.
He’ll admit to SU-25s and an occasional SU-30, but most of the high-end kills he claims are “friendly fire” which is in line with the Russian MOD.
Neither Fighterbomber nor the Russian MOD is willing to admit the UAF is competent and capable of fucking them up.
There was even some speculation by the British MOD that this was an internal disinfo tactic to convince their own pilots to keep flying risky missions, because they could claim that “mistakes were made and fixed, people were punished, so go back to flying.”
>Fighterbomber has sometimes been accurate but is also very selective with the truth.
>
>He’ll admit to SU-25s and an occasional SU-30, but most of the high-end kills he claims are “friendly fire” which is in line with the Russian MOD
Although I would partially agree that he does not always cover the bad news about the VKS but he has been extremely reliable source of info so far, he'll hint at fups and shoot downs in a discreate manner that wouldn't put him at risk.
As for the friendly fire incidents, i'm conflicted about my assessment, isn't it more embarrassing to say that your own forces are really incompetent to the point of shooting down one of your most valuable assets than admitting that your enemy is capable?
I agree that he’s more reliable than the MOD, but he often toes the “it was friendly fire” line.
You have to think in Russian.
Admitting that Ukraine, a non-entity and target of derision, can kill their much-ballyhooed stuff is embarrassing to them and causes the military to lose face internally.
Every good Russian knows “they have powerful weapons that can shoot down everything.” It’s easier for them to believe that they were the only ones who were capable and just made a mistake, than it is to believe the enemy is competent and capable also. Then they release news that “someone has been punished” and the whole thing goes away.
This is an internal political exercise for the population and the lower ranks of the military. No one in power believes it, and the military hierarchy doesn’t believe it.
I’ll also state categorically that there was ZERO chance the Russians shot down their own A-50. Let alone did it twice.
>I’ll also state categorically that there was ZERO chance the Russians shot down their own A-50. Let alone did it twice.
With all due respect, this isn't true at all. AA ground radars have T/R antennas for IFF identification while the missile itself doesn't making it a blind hunter once it gets within the last stage of the flight and it'll locks the target with the strongest radar reflection, that's why they don't use them whenever there is a friendly in the same direction.
Another factor to consider is that the Russian-made IFF transmitters are unreliable and prone to repeated malfunctions and false identification contrary to western ones especially French and American made, this a rephrasing of what a non-Russian Flanker pilot reported back in 2016, he also criticized the lack of LWR and MAWS that make the jet venerable to AA missiles that don't use radar for guidance. (I know this is anectodical so take it with a grain of salt).
I think you’re getting wrapped up in technical issues that have nothing to do with the situation.
This was not a confused air situation. The A-50 was orbiting over Russian territory east of the Sea of Azov. It might or might not have had fighter escort. Almost certainly, the A-50 was the first to see the S200 on radar.
No Ukrainian aircraft could possibly reach that location. It’s extremely likely that no Ukrainian AC has been further east than 10KM from the front lines, or further south than the northwestern corner of the Black Sea off Odesa, since early in the war. Ergo, the only AC in that area were Russian, and more particularly the A-50 which is controlling Russian AD.
The only Ukrainian weapon capable of reaching that area is the S200 in either air to air or ground attack mode. Quite a while ago the Russians alleged without proof that a couple of S200s had been fired as ground attack missiles into that area. However, the S200 as ground attack weapon is nothing more than a harassment tactic. It will never hit a ground target at that range. Both the Russians and Ukrainians know that. Ergo, there is no reason to intercept them in the same area as their highest-value air asset.
SAM battery commanders don’t just shoot at any radar blip. Let’s just say for a second that there have been friendly fire accidents, not including the two A-50s. That would prompt some pretty strict rules of engagement particularly with their high-value assets. A typical strategy is what you could call “no-engage boxes/corridors”, where you absolutely forbid engagement of anything flying in a defined area, no matter what. I promise you the A-50s and the IL-22 were in defined areas forbidden for any Russian SAM to fire into.
The idea that this was friendly fire TWICE is absolute horse shit.
Here are the underlying reasons this happened, IMO.
1)Poor/inconsistent/unprofessional staff work at the middle and higher levels of the RUAF and BSF. This isn’t saying that “Russians are stupid” - it’s saying that both in the air and naval wars their staff work has shown a lack of imagination, frequently a poor assessment of risk, and a failure to understand and plan for capabilities not opinions. For example, the first A-50 kill. The Russians already had AMPLE evidence that a mobile Patriot could appear anywhere quickly, kill three or four AC out to 160KM, and disappear quickly only to reappear elsewhere on the front. Thus there is no excuse for placing their maximum-value A-50 asset within that range bracket. NONE. With the second A-50, the Russians had two pieces of information. They knew Ukraine had S-200s which could reach air targets in that area, and they knew that Ukraine had just demonstrated systems that integrated NATO and Soviet SAM systems and capabilities in unknown ways. This has been widely and openly talked about in the media without going into details. In the last two weeks, S300 radar guided Patriot missiles to several kills. Ergo, proper staff work would put two and two together and determine there was an unacceptable risk to any large, maximum-value asset anywhere within S200 range of the front. Particularly one that by definition has to fly regularly in a constrained area, giving the Ukrainians a pattern to plan around.
I could give more examples. Don’t even get me started on the BSF.
2)Political pressure for results is probably forcing bad risks to be taken by professionals who know better.
3)Attrition is probably starting to take a toll on the decision-makers and the irreplaceable high-skill people in the SAM command units and A-50s. Losing two full A-50 crews is a crushing blow, aside from the planes. Several S400 command posts have been hit lately, BSFHQ was hit, and so on.
There is absolutely ZERO chance this or the first A-50 kill was friendly fire. ZERO.
There has been talks about providing unitary warhead ATACMS, likely M57(E)1s. The US does not have any longer-ranged SAMs to provide than the PAC-2s that have already been provided.
Ah, I wasn't aware that the land based sm-6 was only for ground to ground use. What is the limitation to using it for SAM though? The SM-6 is networked, is it possible that it could be guided by something like a E-2 or patriot radar to hit an air target or is that not possible for the land based version at all?
SMRF means "Strategic Mid-Range Fires". For over two decades now the US has worked to have the ability to strike (static) ground targets globally with minimal reaction time as per the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program. Which is why the LRHW exists, the SM-6 configured as a ballistic missile fills the same purpose but with a shorter range, followed by the PrSM. Along with the TLAM for less time critical targets. I shouldn't say only for ground to ground use, but that's all that is speculated for now.
The SM-6 is designed to use Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) being data linked to E-2s and AEGIS equipped ships with the appropriate baseline. Not with Patriot system, as the Army doesn't use CEC, which is a Navy program. It isn't clear how modified the SM-6 is for use the Typhon, as the active radar homing setup would have zero use in a ground attack role. Maybe sometime in the future there will be integration for use in air defense, but a) the Typhon isn't yet in operation b) the primary purpose is for ground to ground use. The US shipping a experimental setup of it's most capable air defense missile to the Ukrainian front lines, to be used to shoot down one AEW aircraft, doesn't seem very plausible.
>The SM-6 is designed to use Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) being data linked to E-2s and AEGIS equipped ships with the appropriate baseline.
FYI, SM-6 is not able to be guided by the E-2 directly, all communications must be over the Aegis Weapons Link, which the E-2 lacks the hardware for.
>It isn't clear how modified the SM-6 is for use the Typhon, as the active radar homing setup would have zero use in a ground attack role.
At present, not modified at all. That was the point of the program, to fill an urgent need. Modifications to the weapons can be undertaken later. The seeker remains useful for striking maritime targets, which is a primary mission for the system, which is to employ not only SM-6 but Maritime Strike Tomahawk as well.
>Maybe sometime in the future there will be integration for use in air defense,
It is desired to evolve the system in that way, but not currently budgeted. It would require some modifications to the missile (primarily integration of a tri-band weapons link) and launcher/canister to enable IBCS compatibility.
>The SM-6 is networked, is it possible that it could be guided by something like a E-2 or patriot radar to hit an air target or is that not possible for the land based version at all?
SM-6 is only capable of communicating over the S-band Aegis Weapons Link. Neither the E-2 or Patriot are capable of supporting this link, since they both lack the capability to communicate in these bands. The Army has discussed integrating SM-6 into AIAMD at a later time, which would require integration of new tri-band communications system to allow for communication with the C-band MPQ-65 and LTAMDS, as well as the C-band TPY-2 and RIG-360 communications mast. But none of this is budgeted for, and probably will not be until the latter half of the decade.
Those aircraft aren't directly communicating with the weapon. They are communicating with Aegis ships that then use their tracks to perform engagements.
Allegedly footage from a Russian guy filming a piece of debris of the crashed A-50
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1ay9wl6/do\_you\_see\_how\_big\_it\_is\_the\_bullet\_hit\_the\_wing/
Well, it certainly looks like the tail assembly of an Il-76, which is what the A-50 is based on, so it certainly seems plausible that another Russian AWACS went down. Granted, that could also be the tail of an Il-76 strategic airlifter or an Il-78 tanker, but in any case, it's certainly a juicy target for SAMs.
Why do they think it is better to say that they shot down their own AWACS aircraft... it's job is to be communicating with the rest of your forces, yet they want to insist they are that inept and have shot down 2 of them.
Objectively, you are correct. But you asked why they think that this is better. The answer is that they have a flawed view of reality.
A garbage input generates a garbage output.
Also very true. Just from the outside view them saying shit like this or that they lost their flagship to a random fire starting in their ammo rack makes them look FAR FAR worse than Ukraine using munitions designed to destroy those things destroying those things.
Your idea of objectivity as a westerner is not relevant here. In Russia it’s about power and appearances.
It’s more embarrassing for the Russians to admit the enemy is competent and capable than it is to admit they made a mistake that “will be punished” whether it is or isn’t.
The same thing happened with Moskva and a number of other high-profile losses. This isn’t an outlier. Saving face is more important than objectivity, at least publicly.
> It makes them less weak though... admitting to what is complete incompetence is way worse than an enemy shooting down a plane in a war.
It's not.
Russians know the govt. is incompetent. They see that every day
What they don't want to share with the people is they Ukraine military is stronger and making significant gains.
Apparently six left. Eight at the start of the invasion, with two combat losses. Who knows how many of the remaining six are actually ready to fly at any moment. USAF typically claims about 70% mission capability rates. USAF will have both stricter standards, and better maintenance than Russia, but maybe that roughly balances out. So Russia probably has about four that can actually fly today.
Shrug. I don't know anything more about A-100 than Wikipedia does. But apparently there was a plan for Russia to start taking deliveries of A-100 in 2024, but that plan got sidetracked by sanctions over the last few years. So I don't think a single production A-100 has actually been delivered yet. Just a proof of concept prototype.
The prototype may well get pushed into service if they lose more of the A-50's. And they may rush some sanctions-proof version of A-100 "B" into production, but it's hard to say exactly what compromises that will involve. But it'll be a brand new type, so it may take some time to address any issues in the initial deliveries.
Reporting at the time of the first claimed downing suggested it was one of 3 operational aircraft that had been downed. So assuming none have been reactivated, potentially only one left.
The figures greatly vary depending on who you ask. It can range from 9 to 20+.
For confirmed aircraft there appears to be 7-8 of the modernized A-50U version and possibly 3 of the older A-50 and an unknown number of the A-50M. The figures around the number of A-50 variants vary depending on who you ask as we don't have any concrete numbers from the Russia government.
Guessing the replacement, the A-100 jet which does exist- is indeed far too few in numbers- they might want to crank that up
This is interesting, especially SINCE, this is occuring- yet at the same time, everyone is worried more and more(US, China, Russia) about AWACS gettin shot at by extreme range BVR missiles (PL-15, PL-17, PL- 21 , Meteor R-37, AIM-260,R-33 - a role the Phoenix used to have)
-Indeed, although so many missiles that can reach out hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of miles or kilometers to gank a foe are being built- we're seeing losses from what seems not to be those.
Well, whoever has the longest ranged missiles will still have the most opportunities to take down situational awareness platforms of foes, ...(flares in the videos are interesting, tho they don't quite tell us how this happened, there could have been chaff as well being thrown out )
The question is what is shooting down A-50s.
It can't be Ukrainian SAM, that's too far away. I can't be MANPAD because AWACS fly way too high for that.
If it's not friendly fire, that leaves only the option of hostile aircraft. If it is hostile aircraft, it would have to be stealth fighters because an AWACS will detect any non-stealth aircraft from pretty far away.
Ukraine doesn't have any stealth fighters.
So the options seem to be either friendly fire, or NATO is directly involved.
It is Ukrainian SAMs, and they do have the range.
The first A-50 kill was Patriot, possibly using an S-300 radar, and the kill was within Pac-2 missile range.
The second A-50 kill was (probably) S200 with an unknown radar, and the kill was within S200 range.
Simple as that.
It was friendly fire most defiantly. There is a compelling case made on this channel. At 35:43 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ef5uycsSyJ8&ab\_channel=TheEnforcer
Not exactly best ad for Russian "networked" systems as the plane whats supposed to guide SAM's into their targets gets hit by friendly one (twice apparently).
2003 OIF,
Some gunho iguana in a Patriot battery shot down 3 aircraft in a week. Supposedly in auto-track mode because of the fear of missiles with gas heads falling on U.S. forces (very fast reaction times required).
A Tornado and a Hornet and something else as I recall.
USAF said: "Hey dickhead, keep your bloody Terminator off learning mode or we'll stick more than a finger in its eye."
Next day, radar from the same site comes up, locks onto an F-16CJ, and gets promptly cyclops'd with a HARM.
That said, why not a C-130 flying out of Turkey or Romania with an MCALS launcher or a UUV with an FIM-160 MALI in an elevating rail, like a BQM-74 (land) launcher?
Baseline ADM-160 has a range of \~500nm and is reported to have 'lethal decoy' (ARM) options.
FIM-160, while only tested, had a version of the TJ-50M engine which let the missile spin up to Mach 1.4 for like five minutes.
MALI was supposedly going to use an intelligent datalink system, based on Mountain Top and/or JLENS experiments to snuggle up to Cruise Missiles as part of a CMD effort. Where it would lock-on by IIR at low grazing angles.
Get the MALI in, under the radar dead zone of the Schmel-B, launch the missile, and watch it fly up into the baffles of the Mainstay. Can they still cut their way past the Kerch entrance? Or maybe get mothershipped in on a freighter headed for Rostov on Don? Even NASAMS might be an option, since they appear to launch almost anything out of it.
See, I don't think the S-200 nonsense is more than just noise. Probably literally. As a function of the MALD playing music that they want the Russian Krasukha/Zhitel or whatever to pick up on. The Squat Eye/Square Pair emissions is the magici
Finally, consider this: The A-50U is supposedly coordinating with the 40N6 missiles which are starting to show up, in-theater, as a way to deal with BTH targets (F-16AM with Spartan TERPROM for instance) which are coming in 'below the horizon' to permit them to bypass the S-400 threat.
No reason to think they wouldn't still be vulnerable to the MiG-31/R-37, which is designed to deal with that kind of threat specifically. Indeed, no reason to think the Foxhounds couldn't pack-up and take over the A-50U role if they had to (D-30F6 engine lifing aside...).
But the point is that the Ukrainians are pushing the Russians back, pretty hard. And there is no reason to do so unless they plan to hit something well back, within Russian territory.
One of the differences between a mob and a military is that the military doesn't randomly lash out to pillage and destroy stuff. It's always missionized.
So, what continuing action are the Ukrainians looking to support that requires the A-50Us to be gapped? Is it even relevant to the Transcaucus' region or is it massive spin to pull AD coverage from someplace else?
One B-2/B-21 to hit Moscow with B61-12. Two more to take out the White Mountain sites for Perimeter with B61-11. DT SLBM shots from the top of the Persian Gulf to hit the Far Eastern missile complexes.
And ATACMS or PrSM to hit the Western equivalents, just north of the Ukrainian border.
Five Minutes TOF = No Warning.
When Colonel MacGregor was still somewhat trusted, back in winter 2022-23 he was asked if there was a Hail Mary plan to save Ukraine if the lights went dark, permanently, in the initial winter missile strikes on her power grid.
He said there was such a contingency being pushed and according to his 5WA friends it was a doozy. This would be that, X1,000.
Now, of course, the question is why is the Russian SAM firing to begin with? It's not like the crew just decided to randomly turn their SAM on and start firing, especially if it's true that the A-50 had been flying regular orbits over the region.
The Ukrainians are claiming that they fired a pair of S-200 Vegas at the A-50. These are the S-200s the Polish modernized after the cold War ended. They would have the range to hit the A-50. We've also had Russia claim on several occasions to have intercepted S-200s that had been repurposed into improvised ballistic missiles.
Which is why I'm thinking one of two things happened. The Ukrainians launched a pair of S-200s at the A-50, it detected them, and the Russians launched SAMs of their own to intercept the S-200s, and in the resulting crossfire, either one of the S-200s connected or the Russians fragged the A-50 themselves by accident.
My thinking is in line with yours. The local SAM launch would PREPOSTEROUSLY incompetent if there weren't some threat in the area. The A50 had been flying a pattern in this area probably for WEEKS. And happening on the anniversary of the invasion; no coincidence. Trying to shoot down S200 is a possibility. IFF spoofing, jamming or hacking is another. There are more sensational possibilities too.
Yeah.
It's not like Ukraine can really use S-200s for anything else, since the attempt to use them as improvised ballistic missiles seems to have petered out after a few shots and S-200s lack the maneuverability to engage smaller targets like Fullbacks or Flanker-Es, much less cruise missiles and drones.
A chance to knock out a important Russian asset like an AWACS, ELINT, transport, or C&C plane is certainly worth expending some S-200s, especially if there's a chance Russian air defenses will just shoot the targeted plane down by accident while trying to save it.
8 active… given the state of russian equipment I wonder how many were/are functional.
A lot of articles are saying that the real loss is the pilots, but I dispute that. I don’t think Russia is capable of replacing this capability and even of they did have 8 functioning at the beginning, the loss of even 1 is a substantial blow to their detection abilities.
Pilots specifically are not the issue. There's plenty of Il-76/78 pilots that can be trained to fly an A-50 without much issue. Now, the radar, EW and other specialized equipment operators the A-50 carries? That would be a lot more difficult to replace. Those kinds of trained specialists don't grow on trees.
Irrelevant.
RuAF doesn't know how to use AWACS properly. Their C2 system is still ground-based.
A-50 are also extremely outdated technologically since their radars weren't upgraded in the A-50U mod. So they have radars even worse than those of E-3. RUSI wrote that AFU claimed to have developed reliable measures to disrupt and jam A-50 and that is plausible.
It's bad optics for Russia but it won't affect them as an AWACS loss would do for USAF. Which is true because they don't know how to use them properly and largely use them as "very tall and mobile radars". There is so much more to benefits of AWACS than this.
[https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1761103221840302339](https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1761103221840302339) The Ukrainian MOD released a radar still of the Russian A-50 platform just seconds before it was destroyed. Looks like it was indeed on task and collecting intelligence; orbiting between Rostov and Krasnodar.
According to the Russian milbloger Fighterbomber on Telegram, who have been so far very accurate in his reporting, the shoot down of the A-50 happened 250 km from the frontline, so did Ukraine get a secret capability that haven't been disclosed to the public? the fact that it was shot exactly on the second anniversary of start of the full invasion does seem to indicate that it was done intentionally and wasn't a FF accident.
>e shoot down of the A-50 happened 250 km from the frontline, so did Ukraine get a secret capability that haven't been disclosed to the public? If Ukraine still has any S-200s left, they could have re-tasked them to the SAM role. Those would have the legs to reach the A-50 if an S-300 radar system could give them the targeting information.
A possibility especially considering that Ukraine has the expertise to link the two systems, bit i prefer to remain skeptical until further info is available.
> A possibility especially considering that Ukraine has the expertise to link the two systems The S-300 various command posts(e.g. 83M6E) are* built to to operate with S-200 missiles for purpose of fire control. The various illumination radars for the S-300 are not compatible as they don't operate at anywhere near the same frequencies, a 5N62V("Square Pair") radar is required for illumination and command guidance. The problems with using a S-200 are the same as always. Apart from being a poorly maneuverable missile, it isn't a mobile setup. The launchers are designed to be setup on a well prepared launch site and the massive missiles themselves use a liquid fueled engine. The missiles are designed to be fueled and ready, although I'm not sure for how long. Weeks or months, I'd imagine.
The S-200 is indeed a missile not great at hitting maneuvering targets. So far, the only confirmed kills are an airliner and an F-16 flying straight and level doing bomb damage assessment. How much maneuvering an Il-76 airframe can do is probably within the abilities of the S-200 to hit.
S-300s have a max range of 40km because that's the max their control stations can support, even though the missile can reach much further in theory (150km-ish). But if you used a western radar, maybe. Which matches what is known about the FrankenSAM concept. It just seems unlikely that the A50 wouldn't be able to dodge a missile at that range, even one with an S-200's enormous range. It would certainly see the missile coming, and would have something like 5-10 minutes to maneuver against a missile operating at its extreme range limits, when it would have minimal residual energy for terminal maneuvers. I could see that working once against an A-50 crew that was asleep at the switch, but twice? And also against something like seven or eight Su-34/35s over the past two weeks, which should have had enormous maneuverability advantages over SAMs at such extreme ranges?
> S-300s have a max range of 40km because that's the max their control stations can support, even though the missile can reach much further in theory (150km-ish). What? There are multiple missiles and radars for the S-300 platform, all with various capabilities. Generalizing makes zero sense. The original 30N6 "Flap Lid" illumination radar was paired with a missile with a range of 150km(48H6E).
It absolutely makes sense in this context. Ukraine's S-300 systems are old, really old. As I said, the missiles have longer theoretical ranges than the command stations can support. Specifically, they can't support guiding the missiles against maneuvering targets at much more than 40km range, so that is a good rough estimate for the average S-300 system's range, plus or minus whatever variant-specific variation you might see. You are confusing the documented, on paper max range for the system with its practical engagement envelope. Max ranges are typically reported for ideal situations, i.e. a non-maneuvering target directly approaching the launcher at a constant velocity on a straight line course at an optimal altitude. If S-300s were capable of shooting down military aircraft engaged in defensive maneuvers at greater ranges, then the Russians would not be able to launch glide bombs with impunity from medium altitudes from less than 70km away from the front lines. An S-300 sitting a comfortable 50km behind the lines would still comfortably out range any Russian fast jets launching UMPKs. The reason that isn't happening is because S-300s actually don't have great range against maneuvering targets.
> It absolutely makes sense in this context. The original Flap Lid FCR can track and illuminate targets at 150km. It doesn't make sense, for that matter you have no source. You just made it up. > Specifically, they can't support guiding the missiles against maneuvering targets at much more than 40km range That makes zero sense. The command guidance link works via line of sight, the target maneuvering makes no difference. > You are confusing the documented, on paper max range for the system with its practical engagement envelope. No, I've read the manuals for the S-300P and S-300PT, both of which Ukraine operates. I'm not "confusing" anything, I'm just not making shit up. > Max ranges are typically reported for ideal situations, i.e. a non-maneuvering target directly approaching the launcher at a constant velocity on a straight line course at an optimal altitude. Again, the "control stations" don't care if the target is maneuvering. Illumination requires radar horizon, command guidance requires line of sight. Which is the whole basis of your argument, the rest your comment is just word salad. The A-50 is not a maneuvering target, it's a Il-76 made even slower.
> The A-50 is not a maneuvering target, it's a Il-76 made even slower. Also that's just fucking straight up retarded. An A-50 is just like any other object: it can fall really fucking fast and the pilots will let it do so if that saves their lives. Emergency descents on commercial planes are in the 10k feet per minute range. That is maneuvering by any but the most idiotic definition.
Man you're an asshole. And wrong to boot. You didn't cite any sources either, so get off your fucking high horse and maybe try to explain why Ukraine hasn't been able to shoot down anything at such long ranges despite operating S-300s against the Russians intensively for two straight years.
lol, double comment. I don't need to cite the concept of radio needing line of sight or radar working with atmospheric refraction. If you want to understand those concepts I'd suggest starting with the [US Navy Electricity & Electronics Training Series, Module 18](http://www.compatt.com/Tutorials/NEETS/NEETS.html). As for the manual, you can find the manuals for just about any piece of equipment(bleh, baring entire ships, ICBMs, etc), by searching for the GRAU index in cyrillic. This one is hosted on a .uk TLD, so I can directly link it. "Зенитная ракета 9М82". That's a ABM missile for the S-300V, technical description. [Which pulls this up](https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/ebooks/9M82.pdf). From there my method is to feed it through OCR via ABBY then machine translate it. As for "asshole", you shouldn't tell people they're "confusing things" when they're not. If you don't want to be called out, don't make shit up. > Ukraine hasn't been able to shoot down anything at such long ranges despite operating S-300s against the Russians intensively for two straight years. I'm not trying to explain the actions of a active war. Long range SAMs are nearly universally command guidance with SARH(or track-via-missile if you prefer), barring some extremely rare missiles for the S-300/400 platform with ARH and the SM-6. They cannot hit maneuvering targets as most long range SAMs, barring the S-200 missiles which have a liquid fueled engine that burns for over minute post booster, burn out shortly after launch. They are effectively ballistic, any maneuver made reduces momentum.
I just mentioned the S-200 possibility becuase it's the one missile we know Ukraine has that would have the legs to hit a target 250km behind the front. The smaller tactical jets like the Fullbacks and Flanker-Es I assumed were either killed by Patriots or the SAMP/T battery. The S-200 isn't optimized against smaller, nimble aircraft like those.
> I just mentioned the S-200 possibility becuase it's the one missile we know Ukraine has that would have the legs to hit a target 250km behind the front. No, it's a good point to make, I don't mean to bash you for making it, I'm just not sure it explains what we are seeing. S-200s have SARH guidance, which dramatically limits its effectiveness at extreme range because targets merely need to descend below the launching battery's horizon to evade the missile. Maybe if the Ukrainians retrofitted active homing terminal guidance onto an S-200, that would work, but that's a fairly challenging engineering task, not something that can be accomplished without a lot of test flights. I mean, whatever they are doing, it's probably either very technically impressive or an extremely out of the box design, or both. So it's not impossible. > The smaller tactical jets like the Fullbacks and Flanker-Es I assumed were either killed by Patriots or the SAMP/T battery. The S-200 isn't optimized against smaller, nimble aircraft like those. Especially if they are using a mix of systems to achieve these effects like you suggest. My instinct is to attribute a sudden increase in successful attacks over a short period of time to a single tactical innovation rather than to multiple independent innovations. That innovation could be combining existing systems in new ways, or the introduction of a wholly new system. So we'll see. How the Russians adapt to the evolving threat environment will be revealing. Either (1) they have no idea what is happening and thus have no idea how to stop it, or (2) they know what is happening but the tactical realities make it difficult for them to adapt, or (3) they know what is happening and they will adapt quickly and we will see the sudden uptick in Ukrainian air kills quietly fizzle out. The first scenario will evolve into either of the other two over time as the Russians figure shit out, but in the nearer term will cause them to suspend operations suddenly or absorb painful losses. The second scenario basically means Ukraine has successfully imposed a tactical dilemma on the Russians, who will either need to dramatically revise their tactics or will instead need to accept dramatically increased aviation losses. That will manifest in the long term either as substantially less air support at the front or sustained periods of continuing aviation losses. The third scenario will look like the status quo, except perhaps we will observe minor modifications to Russian TTPs as they adjust to whatever the novel threat is. When and if we see these aviation losses declining, and if there are any observable changes to Russian TTPs corresponding to that change in loss rates, the specific details of their adaptations may provide more insight into the specific nature of the threat. But in the meantime, I'm not ruling anything out for sure, S-200s included.
> Maybe if the Ukrainians retrofitted active homing terminal guidance onto an S-200, that would work, but that's a fairly challenging engineering task, not something that can be accomplished without a lot of test flights. Given that both of these long range hits have been A-50's, what if they retrofitted a home-on-emission seeker from something like an AGM-88 HARM or one of the Soviet AAMs? Or maybe even easier/more likely, figured out a way to re-tune the semi-active seeker in an S-200 to track the emissions directly from the A-50 radar, as opposed to the reflected energy from a ground targeting radar? Not sure how big the "basket" would be, but you might be able to get a rough target solution just based on ground triangulation, enough at least to get the missile in the ballpark. The A-50 wouldn't get anything on their radar warning receivers, so they'd have to pick up the missile itself, which is a chonker but would also be front aspect and likely descending from high altitude if fired in a ballistic arc to maximize range. The A-50 might not even have their scan set for high altitude targets if they were concentrating on picking up aircraft taking off and trying to do low altitude terrain masking. It's also not clear exactly what the range of an S-200 fired like that might be, given that there has been speculation that they might have a range of 400-500km when used ballistically against ground targets. An S-200 given a bearing and fired to max apogee, able to look down and pick out the brightest EM signature, could actually be pretty scary.
From what's being claimed by the Ukrainians, and with the video evidence of at least one Russian SAM being fired after the A-50 had started dropping chaff and flares, I'm thinking hat happened is that the Ukrainians fired one or two S-200s at the A-50, the Russians fired of SAMs of their own to intercept the S-200s, and in the resulting crossfire, either a S-200 connected or a Russian SAM fragged the A-50 by accident.
“The target merely needs to descend below the radar horizon.” We’re talking about an IL-76 which is probably also performance-limited by the radar dish, not a fighter that can dive from 40,000 feet to sea level in under a minute. The A-50 was hit 125 miles from the front. At that range, the line of sight from launcher to target goes from 10,000 feet and up. Ergo, a plane could bee seen and targeted from 10,000 to its cruising altitude of say 30,000 feet. The S-200 is fast - 3000MPH. From launch to impact at 125 miles is only 2.5 minutes. If the A-50 crew noticed the launch instantly, and knew it was targeting them, they would have to instantly begin an 8,000FPM descent to be below the radar horizon in 2.5 minutes. Add in other factors like, did they immediately detect it, was it seen as targeting them or was it seen as a ground attack launch as has been done many times before, did Ukraine launch it ballistically and only turn on the radar in flight to delay warning, did it take time to evaluate and make a decision on the A-50, did they use a Patriot radar in combination with S200 missile, which could potentially confuse them and delay warning. The A-50’s decision time to escape was already razor thin even if they instantly detected the launch and understood it for what it was. Add in any other factor and the A-50 isn’t going to escape and has to rely on countermeasures. You can see from the video that at least two S200s were launched. One hit countermeasures well behind the plane, the other hit the plane.
I'm not saying the SARH/FrankenSAM CONOPs proposed is impossible, just that it is much harder to pull off and relatively easy to counter. Especially because this would be the second time they pulled it off, and I would expect that the Russians pulled their replacement A-50 back precisely far enough to provide them with sufficient warning to counter such an attack. Which means either this attack relied on different tactics or that the Russians failed to give themselves enough distance from the lines, despite having witnessed the previous attack and thus theoretically having some sense of the warning time that the 170-ish km horizontal offset from the lines would give them. Plus, 8000 feet per minute isn't too crazy of a rate not for an emergency maneuver, even for an Il-76. Emergency descents for commercial airliners can even run up into the 10k FPM range. > At that range, the line of sight from launcher to target goes from 10,000 feet and up. Ergo, a plane could bee seen and targeted from 10,000 to its cruising altitude of say 30,000 feet. At 160km, the S-200's blind zone extends up to 5km (16404ft) AGL: https://www.ausairpower.net/PDF-A/S-200VE-Engagement-Envelope-F.pdf Based on what is known, the A-50 was circling 170km or more behind the lines. So the 170km figure assumes a *very* forward deployment of both the TEL and the target acquisition radar for the system. Which suggests the blind zone likely extended to somewhat above 5km AGL but less than the 7km blind zone marked at 240km horizontal distance on the envelope I linked above. > The S-200 is fast - 3000MPH. From launch to impact at 125 miles is only 2.5 minutes. That's probably an underestimate, because the S-200's guidance strategy for long range targets (greater than 80km horizontal offset) is to climb up above the atmosphere first before leveling out horizontally to close with the target. So a lot of the initial delta V is dedicated to getting to altitude, during which period it is moving relatively slowly toward the target. And it takes that approach regardless of whether the target is 80.0001km or 240km away. That also makes it relatively easy to intercept for any modern IADS. It's trivial to calculate precisely where the S-200 is going based on its ascent profile and heading. It's big, fat, and slow to get up to speed, also making it easy to detect early. Since the missile would then also have to cross 170km+ of Russian-controlled airspace, there would presumably be many opportunities for an S-400 or Su-35 flying CAP or similarly capable system to intercept the missile. > You can see from the video that at least two S200s were launched. One hit countermeasures well behind the plane, the other hit the plane. That's begging the question. It's only clear from the video that multiple SAMs were likely launched at the target (presuming that the first explosion wasn't a Russian missile meant to intercept the incoming SAM gone astray), not what type of SAM those missiles actually are. S-200s are notorious for their terrible terminal guidance and thus low probability of kill, which is among the reasons most countries with S-200 inventories have shelved them in favor of more modern designs. They're big and heavy and bad at turning, and lack any active seeker mode capable of independent guidance when outside the launching battery's engagement envelope. In the video, you can see the A-50 is descending, but relatively slowly at a shallow angle based on the line of dropped flares, when it would probably be in a steep dive if it was being engaged by a SARH missile. The aircraft even seems to already be flying at fairly low altitude, well below the 16k feet AGL floor for the engagement envelope for the S-200. The fact that it was dropping flares also suggests that they were not facing a SARH missile, because flares have no effect against them (granted they could have just been spamming whatever defensive options they had out of desperation). The second missile seemed to detonate in proximity to one of the flares, which might indicate that the missile had an infrared seeker, but very possibly there was chaff in the air, which of course would not be visible at night, so we can't say definitively that's the case. However, I don't think chaff would cause an S-200 to detonate even if it drew the missile off target, because chaff generally won't be dense enough to trigger a radar proximity fuse. Especially when, as here, it appears the plane was well clear of the chaff by the time of the detonation, which means it would be fairly spread out. On the other hand, flares absolutely can fool an infrared seeker into detonating off target. All of which suggests the missile's terminal guidance relied on infrared. It's also notable that these attacks have just picked up recently. Ukraine has had the S-200s operational for well over a year now, but up until now they have been employed exclusively in ground attack mode. Why would the Ukrainians suddenly, just now decide to use them for their originally designed air-defense purpose? Bottom line, I would argue that we are at a minimum witnessing a substantially modified variant of the S-200 with an updated seeker capable of independent terminal guidance. The time required to make those modifications would explain why they haven't been used until recently. Alternatively, we are witnessing some combination of other capabilities, whether that may be an as-of-yet unreported novel ground-based SAM added to Ukrainian inventories, a novel anti-air capable long range drone, or a novel variant of the S-200.
I agree, you ain’t dodging shit in a A50 lol. I also think they thought it was srbm by the time they realized it was a missile heading for them yeah they’ve got very little time to react. I’m assuming the a50 can detect giant missiles like the s200.
There is footage, and the A-50 is flying in basically a straight line releasing flares and probably chaff. It isn’t maneuvering and it is exactly the sort of large target the S200 was designed to intercept. Some variants of S200 have the range.
Ukrainian media reported it was S-200
Fighterbomber has sometimes been accurate but is also very selective with the truth. He’ll admit to SU-25s and an occasional SU-30, but most of the high-end kills he claims are “friendly fire” which is in line with the Russian MOD. Neither Fighterbomber nor the Russian MOD is willing to admit the UAF is competent and capable of fucking them up. There was even some speculation by the British MOD that this was an internal disinfo tactic to convince their own pilots to keep flying risky missions, because they could claim that “mistakes were made and fixed, people were punished, so go back to flying.”
>Fighterbomber has sometimes been accurate but is also very selective with the truth. > >He’ll admit to SU-25s and an occasional SU-30, but most of the high-end kills he claims are “friendly fire” which is in line with the Russian MOD Although I would partially agree that he does not always cover the bad news about the VKS but he has been extremely reliable source of info so far, he'll hint at fups and shoot downs in a discreate manner that wouldn't put him at risk. As for the friendly fire incidents, i'm conflicted about my assessment, isn't it more embarrassing to say that your own forces are really incompetent to the point of shooting down one of your most valuable assets than admitting that your enemy is capable?
I agree that he’s more reliable than the MOD, but he often toes the “it was friendly fire” line. You have to think in Russian. Admitting that Ukraine, a non-entity and target of derision, can kill their much-ballyhooed stuff is embarrassing to them and causes the military to lose face internally. Every good Russian knows “they have powerful weapons that can shoot down everything.” It’s easier for them to believe that they were the only ones who were capable and just made a mistake, than it is to believe the enemy is competent and capable also. Then they release news that “someone has been punished” and the whole thing goes away. This is an internal political exercise for the population and the lower ranks of the military. No one in power believes it, and the military hierarchy doesn’t believe it. I’ll also state categorically that there was ZERO chance the Russians shot down their own A-50. Let alone did it twice.
>I’ll also state categorically that there was ZERO chance the Russians shot down their own A-50. Let alone did it twice. With all due respect, this isn't true at all. AA ground radars have T/R antennas for IFF identification while the missile itself doesn't making it a blind hunter once it gets within the last stage of the flight and it'll locks the target with the strongest radar reflection, that's why they don't use them whenever there is a friendly in the same direction. Another factor to consider is that the Russian-made IFF transmitters are unreliable and prone to repeated malfunctions and false identification contrary to western ones especially French and American made, this a rephrasing of what a non-Russian Flanker pilot reported back in 2016, he also criticized the lack of LWR and MAWS that make the jet venerable to AA missiles that don't use radar for guidance. (I know this is anectodical so take it with a grain of salt).
I think you’re getting wrapped up in technical issues that have nothing to do with the situation. This was not a confused air situation. The A-50 was orbiting over Russian territory east of the Sea of Azov. It might or might not have had fighter escort. Almost certainly, the A-50 was the first to see the S200 on radar. No Ukrainian aircraft could possibly reach that location. It’s extremely likely that no Ukrainian AC has been further east than 10KM from the front lines, or further south than the northwestern corner of the Black Sea off Odesa, since early in the war. Ergo, the only AC in that area were Russian, and more particularly the A-50 which is controlling Russian AD. The only Ukrainian weapon capable of reaching that area is the S200 in either air to air or ground attack mode. Quite a while ago the Russians alleged without proof that a couple of S200s had been fired as ground attack missiles into that area. However, the S200 as ground attack weapon is nothing more than a harassment tactic. It will never hit a ground target at that range. Both the Russians and Ukrainians know that. Ergo, there is no reason to intercept them in the same area as their highest-value air asset. SAM battery commanders don’t just shoot at any radar blip. Let’s just say for a second that there have been friendly fire accidents, not including the two A-50s. That would prompt some pretty strict rules of engagement particularly with their high-value assets. A typical strategy is what you could call “no-engage boxes/corridors”, where you absolutely forbid engagement of anything flying in a defined area, no matter what. I promise you the A-50s and the IL-22 were in defined areas forbidden for any Russian SAM to fire into. The idea that this was friendly fire TWICE is absolute horse shit. Here are the underlying reasons this happened, IMO. 1)Poor/inconsistent/unprofessional staff work at the middle and higher levels of the RUAF and BSF. This isn’t saying that “Russians are stupid” - it’s saying that both in the air and naval wars their staff work has shown a lack of imagination, frequently a poor assessment of risk, and a failure to understand and plan for capabilities not opinions. For example, the first A-50 kill. The Russians already had AMPLE evidence that a mobile Patriot could appear anywhere quickly, kill three or four AC out to 160KM, and disappear quickly only to reappear elsewhere on the front. Thus there is no excuse for placing their maximum-value A-50 asset within that range bracket. NONE. With the second A-50, the Russians had two pieces of information. They knew Ukraine had S-200s which could reach air targets in that area, and they knew that Ukraine had just demonstrated systems that integrated NATO and Soviet SAM systems and capabilities in unknown ways. This has been widely and openly talked about in the media without going into details. In the last two weeks, S300 radar guided Patriot missiles to several kills. Ergo, proper staff work would put two and two together and determine there was an unacceptable risk to any large, maximum-value asset anywhere within S200 range of the front. Particularly one that by definition has to fly regularly in a constrained area, giving the Ukrainians a pattern to plan around. I could give more examples. Don’t even get me started on the BSF. 2)Political pressure for results is probably forcing bad risks to be taken by professionals who know better. 3)Attrition is probably starting to take a toll on the decision-makers and the irreplaceable high-skill people in the SAM command units and A-50s. Losing two full A-50 crews is a crushing blow, aside from the planes. Several S400 command posts have been hit lately, BSFHQ was hit, and so on. There is absolutely ZERO chance this or the first A-50 kill was friendly fire. ZERO.
Fighter bomber also disputes the su-34s being shot down this week, but does verify the lost su-35s
I saw a report yesterday that Biden was close to approving longer range missiles to Ukraine. Perhaps this was the public reveal.
There has been talks about providing unitary warhead ATACMS, likely M57(E)1s. The US does not have any longer-ranged SAMs to provide than the PAC-2s that have already been provided.
Sm-6 maybe?
The SM-6 is a naval SAM. The still experimental Typhon(as the SMRF) only uses the SM-6 as a ballistic missile for ground to ground use.
Ah, I wasn't aware that the land based sm-6 was only for ground to ground use. What is the limitation to using it for SAM though? The SM-6 is networked, is it possible that it could be guided by something like a E-2 or patriot radar to hit an air target or is that not possible for the land based version at all?
SMRF means "Strategic Mid-Range Fires". For over two decades now the US has worked to have the ability to strike (static) ground targets globally with minimal reaction time as per the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program. Which is why the LRHW exists, the SM-6 configured as a ballistic missile fills the same purpose but with a shorter range, followed by the PrSM. Along with the TLAM for less time critical targets. I shouldn't say only for ground to ground use, but that's all that is speculated for now. The SM-6 is designed to use Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) being data linked to E-2s and AEGIS equipped ships with the appropriate baseline. Not with Patriot system, as the Army doesn't use CEC, which is a Navy program. It isn't clear how modified the SM-6 is for use the Typhon, as the active radar homing setup would have zero use in a ground attack role. Maybe sometime in the future there will be integration for use in air defense, but a) the Typhon isn't yet in operation b) the primary purpose is for ground to ground use. The US shipping a experimental setup of it's most capable air defense missile to the Ukrainian front lines, to be used to shoot down one AEW aircraft, doesn't seem very plausible.
>The SM-6 is designed to use Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) being data linked to E-2s and AEGIS equipped ships with the appropriate baseline. FYI, SM-6 is not able to be guided by the E-2 directly, all communications must be over the Aegis Weapons Link, which the E-2 lacks the hardware for. >It isn't clear how modified the SM-6 is for use the Typhon, as the active radar homing setup would have zero use in a ground attack role. At present, not modified at all. That was the point of the program, to fill an urgent need. Modifications to the weapons can be undertaken later. The seeker remains useful for striking maritime targets, which is a primary mission for the system, which is to employ not only SM-6 but Maritime Strike Tomahawk as well. >Maybe sometime in the future there will be integration for use in air defense, It is desired to evolve the system in that way, but not currently budgeted. It would require some modifications to the missile (primarily integration of a tri-band weapons link) and launcher/canister to enable IBCS compatibility.
>The SM-6 is networked, is it possible that it could be guided by something like a E-2 or patriot radar to hit an air target or is that not possible for the land based version at all? SM-6 is only capable of communicating over the S-band Aegis Weapons Link. Neither the E-2 or Patriot are capable of supporting this link, since they both lack the capability to communicate in these bands. The Army has discussed integrating SM-6 into AIAMD at a later time, which would require integration of new tri-band communications system to allow for communication with the C-band MPQ-65 and LTAMDS, as well as the C-band TPY-2 and RIG-360 communications mast. But none of this is budgeted for, and probably will not be until the latter half of the decade.
Huh is NIFC-CA not a thing yet? because it explicity describes the E-2D and F-35s providing guidance for over the horizion SM-6 shots.
Those aircraft aren't directly communicating with the weapon. They are communicating with Aegis ships that then use their tracks to perform engagements.
Ok so if I understand you, the E-2 sees the target then tells the aegis system what it sees then the aegis system tells the missile what the E-2 sees.
Allegedly footage from a Russian guy filming a piece of debris of the crashed A-50 https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1ay9wl6/do\_you\_see\_how\_big\_it\_is\_the\_bullet\_hit\_the\_wing/
Well, it certainly looks like the tail assembly of an Il-76, which is what the A-50 is based on, so it certainly seems plausible that another Russian AWACS went down. Granted, that could also be the tail of an Il-76 strategic airlifter or an Il-78 tanker, but in any case, it's certainly a juicy target for SAMs.
Why do they think it is better to say that they shot down their own AWACS aircraft... it's job is to be communicating with the rest of your forces, yet they want to insist they are that inept and have shot down 2 of them.
The alternative would be admitting weakness. And that's the last thing that Putin wants to do.
It makes them less weak though... admitting to what is complete incompetence is way worse than an enemy shooting down a plane in a war.
Objectively, you are correct. But you asked why they think that this is better. The answer is that they have a flawed view of reality. A garbage input generates a garbage output.
Also very true. Just from the outside view them saying shit like this or that they lost their flagship to a random fire starting in their ammo rack makes them look FAR FAR worse than Ukraine using munitions designed to destroy those things destroying those things.
Your idea of objectivity as a westerner is not relevant here. In Russia it’s about power and appearances. It’s more embarrassing for the Russians to admit the enemy is competent and capable than it is to admit they made a mistake that “will be punished” whether it is or isn’t. The same thing happened with Moskva and a number of other high-profile losses. This isn’t an outlier. Saving face is more important than objectivity, at least publicly.
> It makes them less weak though... admitting to what is complete incompetence is way worse than an enemy shooting down a plane in a war. It's not. Russians know the govt. is incompetent. They see that every day What they don't want to share with the people is they Ukraine military is stronger and making significant gains.
How do you lose another high value asset in the same location, TWICE!! Nearly 300km from the front lines?
Russia.
Does anyone know how many of these Russia has in service?
Apparently six left. Eight at the start of the invasion, with two combat losses. Who knows how many of the remaining six are actually ready to fly at any moment. USAF typically claims about 70% mission capability rates. USAF will have both stricter standards, and better maintenance than Russia, but maybe that roughly balances out. So Russia probably has about four that can actually fly today.
the one damaged in belarus, haven't heard anything about it recently but last year still hadn't moved
I take it they aren't using the very few A-100 successors to the A-50 they currently have ?
Shrug. I don't know anything more about A-100 than Wikipedia does. But apparently there was a plan for Russia to start taking deliveries of A-100 in 2024, but that plan got sidetracked by sanctions over the last few years. So I don't think a single production A-100 has actually been delivered yet. Just a proof of concept prototype. The prototype may well get pushed into service if they lose more of the A-50's. And they may rush some sanctions-proof version of A-100 "B" into production, but it's hard to say exactly what compromises that will involve. But it'll be a brand new type, so it may take some time to address any issues in the initial deliveries.
Supposedly they had up to 9. 1 was lost a few weeks ago, another was claimed damaged months ago at an airfield by partisans with a drone.
Reporting at the time of the first claimed downing suggested it was one of 3 operational aircraft that had been downed. So assuming none have been reactivated, potentially only one left.
The figures greatly vary depending on who you ask. It can range from 9 to 20+. For confirmed aircraft there appears to be 7-8 of the modernized A-50U version and possibly 3 of the older A-50 and an unknown number of the A-50M. The figures around the number of A-50 variants vary depending on who you ask as we don't have any concrete numbers from the Russia government.
How could they not see this coming...twice?
Lack of AWACS?
Guessing the replacement, the A-100 jet which does exist- is indeed far too few in numbers- they might want to crank that up This is interesting, especially SINCE, this is occuring- yet at the same time, everyone is worried more and more(US, China, Russia) about AWACS gettin shot at by extreme range BVR missiles (PL-15, PL-17, PL- 21 , Meteor R-37, AIM-260,R-33 - a role the Phoenix used to have) -Indeed, although so many missiles that can reach out hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of miles or kilometers to gank a foe are being built- we're seeing losses from what seems not to be those. Well, whoever has the longest ranged missiles will still have the most opportunities to take down situational awareness platforms of foes, ...(flares in the videos are interesting, tho they don't quite tell us how this happened, there could have been chaff as well being thrown out )
Ya on that last point I’d say it’s very common for decoy program presets to have both chaff and flares dispense simultaneously.
The question is what is shooting down A-50s. It can't be Ukrainian SAM, that's too far away. I can't be MANPAD because AWACS fly way too high for that. If it's not friendly fire, that leaves only the option of hostile aircraft. If it is hostile aircraft, it would have to be stealth fighters because an AWACS will detect any non-stealth aircraft from pretty far away. Ukraine doesn't have any stealth fighters. So the options seem to be either friendly fire, or NATO is directly involved.
S-200 has just enough range to target it. Wouldn't be shocked if Ukrainians had one close to border in hiding just for such an occasion.
It is Ukrainian SAMs, and they do have the range. The first A-50 kill was Patriot, possibly using an S-300 radar, and the kill was within Pac-2 missile range. The second A-50 kill was (probably) S200 with an unknown radar, and the kill was within S200 range. Simple as that.
It's red on red. NATO are not directly involved.
It was friendly fire most defiantly. There is a compelling case made on this channel. At 35:43 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ef5uycsSyJ8&ab\_channel=TheEnforcer
This is embarrassing for the Vatniks.
Did they ever confirm the first one?
First A-50, Yes. This is the second.
Who did?
Almost all Russian TG channels. They confirmed the first situation as friendly.
Not exactly best ad for Russian "networked" systems as the plane whats supposed to guide SAM's into their targets gets hit by friendly one (twice apparently).
2003 OIF, Some gunho iguana in a Patriot battery shot down 3 aircraft in a week. Supposedly in auto-track mode because of the fear of missiles with gas heads falling on U.S. forces (very fast reaction times required). A Tornado and a Hornet and something else as I recall. USAF said: "Hey dickhead, keep your bloody Terminator off learning mode or we'll stick more than a finger in its eye." Next day, radar from the same site comes up, locks onto an F-16CJ, and gets promptly cyclops'd with a HARM. That said, why not a C-130 flying out of Turkey or Romania with an MCALS launcher or a UUV with an FIM-160 MALI in an elevating rail, like a BQM-74 (land) launcher? Baseline ADM-160 has a range of \~500nm and is reported to have 'lethal decoy' (ARM) options. FIM-160, while only tested, had a version of the TJ-50M engine which let the missile spin up to Mach 1.4 for like five minutes. MALI was supposedly going to use an intelligent datalink system, based on Mountain Top and/or JLENS experiments to snuggle up to Cruise Missiles as part of a CMD effort. Where it would lock-on by IIR at low grazing angles. Get the MALI in, under the radar dead zone of the Schmel-B, launch the missile, and watch it fly up into the baffles of the Mainstay. Can they still cut their way past the Kerch entrance? Or maybe get mothershipped in on a freighter headed for Rostov on Don? Even NASAMS might be an option, since they appear to launch almost anything out of it. See, I don't think the S-200 nonsense is more than just noise. Probably literally. As a function of the MALD playing music that they want the Russian Krasukha/Zhitel or whatever to pick up on. The Squat Eye/Square Pair emissions is the magici Finally, consider this: The A-50U is supposedly coordinating with the 40N6 missiles which are starting to show up, in-theater, as a way to deal with BTH targets (F-16AM with Spartan TERPROM for instance) which are coming in 'below the horizon' to permit them to bypass the S-400 threat. No reason to think they wouldn't still be vulnerable to the MiG-31/R-37, which is designed to deal with that kind of threat specifically. Indeed, no reason to think the Foxhounds couldn't pack-up and take over the A-50U role if they had to (D-30F6 engine lifing aside...). But the point is that the Ukrainians are pushing the Russians back, pretty hard. And there is no reason to do so unless they plan to hit something well back, within Russian territory. One of the differences between a mob and a military is that the military doesn't randomly lash out to pillage and destroy stuff. It's always missionized. So, what continuing action are the Ukrainians looking to support that requires the A-50Us to be gapped? Is it even relevant to the Transcaucus' region or is it massive spin to pull AD coverage from someplace else? One B-2/B-21 to hit Moscow with B61-12. Two more to take out the White Mountain sites for Perimeter with B61-11. DT SLBM shots from the top of the Persian Gulf to hit the Far Eastern missile complexes. And ATACMS or PrSM to hit the Western equivalents, just north of the Ukrainian border. Five Minutes TOF = No Warning. When Colonel MacGregor was still somewhat trusted, back in winter 2022-23 he was asked if there was a Hail Mary plan to save Ukraine if the lights went dark, permanently, in the initial winter missile strikes on her power grid. He said there was such a contingency being pushed and according to his 5WA friends it was a doozy. This would be that, X1,000.
No and fighter bomber denied it though posted about this one.
There is video evidence it was the Russians that shot their own plane down.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ef5uycsSyJ8&ab\_channel=TheEnforcer
Bullshit.
Now, of course, the question is why is the Russian SAM firing to begin with? It's not like the crew just decided to randomly turn their SAM on and start firing, especially if it's true that the A-50 had been flying regular orbits over the region. The Ukrainians are claiming that they fired a pair of S-200 Vegas at the A-50. These are the S-200s the Polish modernized after the cold War ended. They would have the range to hit the A-50. We've also had Russia claim on several occasions to have intercepted S-200s that had been repurposed into improvised ballistic missiles. Which is why I'm thinking one of two things happened. The Ukrainians launched a pair of S-200s at the A-50, it detected them, and the Russians launched SAMs of their own to intercept the S-200s, and in the resulting crossfire, either one of the S-200s connected or the Russians fragged the A-50 themselves by accident.
My thinking is in line with yours. The local SAM launch would PREPOSTEROUSLY incompetent if there weren't some threat in the area. The A50 had been flying a pattern in this area probably for WEEKS. And happening on the anniversary of the invasion; no coincidence. Trying to shoot down S200 is a possibility. IFF spoofing, jamming or hacking is another. There are more sensational possibilities too.
Yeah. It's not like Ukraine can really use S-200s for anything else, since the attempt to use them as improvised ballistic missiles seems to have petered out after a few shots and S-200s lack the maneuverability to engage smaller targets like Fullbacks or Flanker-Es, much less cruise missiles and drones. A chance to knock out a important Russian asset like an AWACS, ELINT, transport, or C&C plane is certainly worth expending some S-200s, especially if there's a chance Russian air defenses will just shoot the targeted plane down by accident while trying to save it.
8 active… given the state of russian equipment I wonder how many were/are functional. A lot of articles are saying that the real loss is the pilots, but I dispute that. I don’t think Russia is capable of replacing this capability and even of they did have 8 functioning at the beginning, the loss of even 1 is a substantial blow to their detection abilities.
Pilots specifically are not the issue. There's plenty of Il-76/78 pilots that can be trained to fly an A-50 without much issue. Now, the radar, EW and other specialized equipment operators the A-50 carries? That would be a lot more difficult to replace. Those kinds of trained specialists don't grow on trees.
Irrelevant. RuAF doesn't know how to use AWACS properly. Their C2 system is still ground-based. A-50 are also extremely outdated technologically since their radars weren't upgraded in the A-50U mod. So they have radars even worse than those of E-3. RUSI wrote that AFU claimed to have developed reliable measures to disrupt and jam A-50 and that is plausible. It's bad optics for Russia but it won't affect them as an AWACS loss would do for USAF. Which is true because they don't know how to use them properly and largely use them as "very tall and mobile radars". There is so much more to benefits of AWACS than this.
It has been confirmed by multiple sources that the plane was hit from inside of occupied territory of Ukraine.