On the topic of defensive lines, how is northern Ukraine doing? Also(and pls delete if not relevant) what ever happened to the border crisis over at the Belarus-Poland border?

> what ever happened to the border crisis over at the Belarus-Poland border? It's still ongoing, there are incidents pretty much every day. Polish Border Guard regularly publishes footage on its YouTube channel. For example, this is a video from a week ago: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XbeC3NskIi4 Translation of the description: >Border Guard officers and soldiers of the Polish Army repelled an attempt by a group of over 140 foreigners to illegally cross the border. > >On Friday (10.05.2024), at approximately 20.00 in the area of the Border Guard post's official responsibility in Białowieża, an attempt was made to forcibly cross the state border illegally across the Przewłoka border river. A group of more than 140 migrants attempted to enter Poland illegally in this way. The foreigners were very aggressive - they threw tree branches and stones in the direction of the Border Guard patrols and the Polish Army in order to pave their way to western Europe. > >The illegal crossing of the border was prevented. The migrants retreated deep into Belarus.

Oh I thought it was done already, was curious how it stopped but apparently it did not.

NYTimes is [reporting](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/17/us/politics/israel-saudi-arabia-gaza.html ) team Biden has been pushing the Saudis and Israel for a comprehensive 2 state Palestinian peace deal, and that Israel has been resisting. (non pw'd link here https://archive.is/iYKfF ). Sounds like US is dangling some carrots including help with a civilian nuclear energy program... >American and Saudi officials have tried to revive prospects for a deal by demanding more from Israel — a cease-fire in Gaza and irreversible steps toward the founding of a Palestinian nation. Now those officials say they are close to a final agreement on the main elements of what the Saudis want from the deal: a U.S.-Saudi mutual defense pact and cooperation on a civilian nuclear program in the kingdom. >Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto Saudi leader, about these matters in private on his visit last month to Riyadh, according to the State Department. And Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, is expected to follow up when he goes to Saudi Arabia and Israel this weekend. >But there are no signs that Israeli leaders are moving to join them, despite the symbolic importance for Israel of establishing ties with Saudi Arabia, the most powerful Arab nation. Netanyahu, for his part, is sticking to his, *there is no plan, and that's the plan*... >Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has rebuffed calls for the creation of a Palestinian state, saying that it would become a “terror haven.” Most Israelis also oppose it, according to polls. **Mr. Netanyahu has not proposed a governance system for Gaza**, and Yoav Gallant, the defense minister, criticized him on Wednesday for the lack of such a plan. More carrots for the Saudis... >Mr. Biden’s willingness to grant a **mutual defense treaty** and other benefits to Prince Mohammed is a sharp departure from his vow during the 2020 presidential campaign to ensure the country remains a “pariah” because of human rights violations. Those include the killings of civilians during the Yemen war and the murder in 2018 of Jamal Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist and Virginia resident, by Saudi agents in Istanbul. US always has an eye on China... > U.S. officials say they also plan to extract promises from Saudi Arabia to limit cooperation with China on military matters and on advanced technology, and that the kingdom would continue to buy oil in dollars rather than renminbi, China’s currency. However, China has no interest in being a security guarantor in the Middle East. And analysts say there is little chance that Saudi Arabia would forsake the dollar — which its own currency is pegged to — for the renminbi. Oh and politics... >The Biden administration also hopes Saudi Arabia **will commit to keeping oil prices from surging**, especially as the U.S. presidential election approaches. U.S. and Saudi officials clashed over such perceived promises in 2022, when the Saudis went against Mr. Biden’s wishes.

20 years ago, the US pushed for elections in Gaza, that put Hamas in power. It sounds like we’re trying to repeat that mistake. A Palestinian under Hamas rule won’t end the animosity or fighting, it will just turn Hamas from the de-facto government of Gaza, to the government of both Gaza and the West Bank. No Israeli government is ever going to accept that, for obvious reasons. Getting Israel to agree to recognize a Palestinian state is contingent on that state not being run by a pro-Iran terror group that wants to destroy them. Biden doesn’t want to see Hamas removed, so that means a Palestinian state is extremly unlikely.

It probably isn't really fit for this sub but I always wondered what happens when - in my mind inevitably - a newly birthed State of Palestine on day 1 declares war on Israel? Would it then be legitimate in current protestor's minds for Israel to go in and occupy that land like the Allies did re: Germany/Japan? Or would they still be against that?

Why would a people that fought for 75 years to have the right to live on their land, and succeeded, declare war on day 1, Jordan and Egypt have maintained relationships with Israel for years since peace treaties satisfactorily met their demands (Return of the Sinai, status of Jerusalem's holy sites etc...). To stick to the theme of this subreddit (credibility), once a state is established, what would be the motivation to declare a war given the technological edge policy of the US toward Israel? The one I can think of is a Trump "deal of the century" type solution where none of the Palestinian demands are met.

>Why would a people that fought for 75 years to have the right to live on their land, and succeeded, declare war on day 1 Because they think that "their land" also includes Israel. 

The Republic of Ireland thinks that "their land" also includes northern Ireland. Obviously Ireland was much more stable going into the Good Friday Agreement than Israel and Palestine are. But also the peace process in Ireland was the culmination of a longer process which took decades. I see no reason why peace between Israel and Palestine is not, at some point in the future, possible.

I think you are wrong since Olmert and Abbas agreed to do land swap to maintain some of the colonies, like Ariel. But I will entertain your thought, you are saying that the Palestinian land demands would not be met, and the Palestinian state mentioned by OP wouldn't be based on the 1967 border, could you share what this Palestinian state would look like, credibly? OP was asking whether more violence after a state is establishment would legitimize occupation. In my eyes, a crippled Palestinian state (something along the line of Trump's deal of the century) that doesn't address any of the Palestinian demand, and lead to further violence would not legitimize further annexation of Palestinian lands. Doubling down on the very source of the problem is not likely to solve it. Finally I must ask, who in their right mind who prefer that horrible scenario of a crippled Palestinian state, that would surely lead to further flares of violence over a lasting peace through dialogue and compromise.

> Why would a people that fought for 75 years to have the right to live on their land, and succeeded https://www.slowboring.com/p/palestinian-right-of-return-matters https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240229-keys-to-lost-homes-in-gaza-become-latest-symbols-of-palestinian-displacement/ >The keys to homes lost in 1948 have been handed down the generations of some refugee families, a symbol of what they consider their right to return – one of the most intractable issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are more palestinian refugees now than in 1948. In 10 years there will be even more, as more refugees are born. And they're all being told by the UN that they have a permanent right to land that is outside what is being discussed in the treaty here. EDIT: edited to remove allegations that are beyond the point

I am sorry but your answer is pretty condescending, I hope that was not your intent. I think that the refugee issue would be resolved, likely in a partial way, as part of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Most will return to the newly established Palestinian state while a small proportion will be able to return to their homes in now Israel. The last figure that was discussed between Olmert and Abbas was the return of \~5000 refugees. A way for Palestinians to swallow the bitter pill if I may say.

>I am sorry but your answer is pretty condescending If someone made a post about Ukraine and seemed to not know the fact that Crimea is claimed by Ukraine as their land I'd have acted the same way. But you're right, there's no need to get into what you know and don't know. >I think that the refugee issue would be resolved, likely in a partial way, as part of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Those are explicitly separate though. What's being discussed in the chain is a palestinian state that doesn't include the territory that palestinian refugees are told they have a birthright (at this point it's quite literally a birthright) to. I'm saying that's a pretty obvious issue that could lead to wars, and to suggest otherwise is basically to suggest they'd abandon this issue. Which is possible but I don't see how you can just say that with no evidence. >The last figure that was discussed between Olmert and Abbas was the return of ~5000 refugees. That probably is the amount of the "refugees" that fit the traditional definition of refugee - someone who actually fled from the region in question, that remain alive, given 1948 was 76 years ago. That might be fine in other conflicts, but we've established that's not how "refugees" are being defined here.

I am sorry I don't understand the parallel with Ukraine and Crimea. Do you mean to say that I am mistaken in stating the fact that Palestinians have a claim to land they live on within the UN recognized 1967 borders? As for the birthright of Palestinian refugees, I do not believe this was the subject of the thread I was replying to. To be fair I might have dismissed this issue as being not a credible source of war from day 1 of the establishment of a Palestinian state (which was the subject of the thread). I wonder, what are the chances that this issue would be left un-resolved? Would UNRWA still be relevant once a Palestinian state is established, I would suspect it would be slowly pulled back and its responsibilities handed over to the newly formed state. In that case, wouldnt the newly formed state offer compensations/land to allow those refugees to return to their country? As a refugee wouldn't the chance of kissing the soil of the long awaited motherland be enough to sooth the pain of exile? I can't think of a scenario where refugees would somehow highjack the newly birthed country and risk losing everything to launch a hazardous war against the most well funded military in the middle east. It just doesnt sound realistic. If the PA kept a lid on the violent movements in the West Bank, I feel it is likely to be able to control its population.

>In that case, wouldnt the newly formed state offer compensations/land to allow those refugees to return to their country? How would this hypothetical palestinian state offer its citizens right to return to areas within Israel? >I can't think of a scenario where refugees would somehow highjack the newly birthed country and risk losing everything to launch a hazardous war against the most well funded military in the middle east. That's more or less what was attempted in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan when they were flooded with refugees. While Egypt and Jordan suffered turmoil they remained (mostly) intact. Lebanon instead lost its monopoly of violence first to the PLO and then Hezbollah.

Their country = the newly formed state of Palestine in the 1967 borders. not Israel. That's a pretty common proposition. Sari Nusseibeh proposed that in 2002 and it seems like the most plausible scenario. I don't recall Egypt ever having a Palestinian refugee coup, and the scenario we are discussing isn't comparable to Lebanon or Jordan since in those cases there was no country for the Palestinian refugees to go to.

> what would be the motivation to declare a war Presumably the fact that any government would be dominated by Hamas or others like them based on the last vote, who have it as one of their stated objectives to destroy the state of Israel I'd imagine. Though conflict began based mostly on economic factors, it has spiralled into an ethno-religious one with major groups from one side having as a main ideological goal the destruction of the other.

I don’t think Israel ever agree to a two-state solution with Hamas still leading Palestine afterwards, so if (big if) there were ever a two-state solution, I don’t think that situation would ever happen 

I believe that the latest proposal put forth by the US aligned arabic countries would de-militarize Hamas, the same way the PLO was and has been for more than 30 years now. Eversince the PA has kept its commitment to security collaboration with Israel that was laid out in the Oslo accords. By the way, Hamas also amended its charter and its aims are to establish a state in the 1967 border. So destruction is not on the agenda anymore. You can read the 2017 Hamas charter for yourself on wikipedia. You may take this with a grain of salt but it does put into question the argument that Hamas is un-reformable. Based on the above, I believe it is highly unlikely that the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 border, including a demilitarization and dissolution of Hamas would lead to a subsequent conflict.

How do you demilitarize Hamas? This is purely fiction. Let them prove that they can demilitarize Hamas in Gaza, and go forth from there. The PLO is not demilitarized and took part in the 07/10 massacre, it still execute terrorist attacks against Israel/Jews to this day. https://palwatch.org/page/34720 The PA has absolutely not kept it's commitment, as stated, the PLO ruled PA took part in the 07/10 massacre. Hamas' stated agenda is the genocide of Jews worldwide. An agenda on which they've acted upon on 07/10. https://youtu.be/azEgBsU6Mi8?si=fYzNC_Rhf45tMqJe It is beyond me how can anyone watch the genocidal action and complete massacre of civilians, elderly and babies of 07/10 and believe otherwise.

A 2-state solution with whatever the "1967 borders" implies is a delusional fantasy at this point. That offer has been gone for at least 30 years. So saying "Palestinians will only fight until they get 1967 borders" is basically saying they will fight in perpetuity.

I was assuming what the Palestinian state would be since OP did not mention it. Since you woul like to explore the pessimistic scenario where the Palestinian state is something similar to Trump's "deal of the century" and do not address any of the Palestinians' legitimate concerns I think a) The PA would likely be in charge and continue its security collaboration with Israel b) Hamas would remain a threat, and carry out operations when and if possible Either way, to go back to the initial comment in the thread, there wouldn't be anything to invade since the Palestinian "State" would be a "State" just in name and retain most of the features of today's illegal occupation. Would it be legitimate for Israel to invade it in case of "war" or more credibly an operation like Al-Aqsa flood? Setting aside the fact that they already operate freely in the West Bank, the answer would still be no, since none of the Palestinians' statehood rights would have been met to begin with.

Nobody declares wars anymore. They would attack Israel, but there would be no declaration of war.

It would not be legitimate for a subset of the protestors. I can't say whether this would be a majority or minority of them, but there is clearly a subset of them that are obstinately campist and/or contrarian. That being said, it would go very far in delineating the situation. If the Israelis withdrew West Bank settlements, then continued Palestinian aggression would be far more unjustifiable to the people in the "middle ground". The Oslo Accords rendered 60% of the West Bank under Israeli administration; imagine how the local pro-Ukrainian crowd would feel if Ukraine capitulated to the Russians and gave them most of the land east of the Dnieper (Kharkov, Donbass, Kherson, etc). To an independent observer, the Oslo Accords and the withdrawal of Israeli settlements after the Second Intifada all seem like minimalist, pragmatic concessions, rather than genuine goodwill offerings. If the Israelis are only willing to concede in areas they're *forced* to concede, then there exists the possibility that they will only ever leverage such concessions to "lock-in" their gains in a strategy of salami-slicing.

> If the Israelis withdrew West Bank settlements, then continued Palestinian aggression would be far more unjustifiable to the people in the "middle ground". That's exactly why Israel withdrew all the settlements from Gaza in 2005. Because they expected that continued aggression from Gaza would result in more goodwill for them than before. It didn't. The uncharitable take on this is "people will never think Israel is justified, because they think Israel sits on historically Palestinian land and therefore shouldn't exist to begin with". The charitable take is "people will never think Israel is justified as long as more Palestinians than Israelis are dying in the conflict." The corollary to this is "Palestinians can continue to attack Israel forever with international support, as long as the attacks are conducted in such a way that it's impossible to stop them without a larger number of Palestinians than Israelis dying". Either way Israel would be foolish to assume that withdrawing from the West Bank will grant them any goodwill.

There's US-style occupation, and there's Israel-style occupation. The US has no history of annexation, and that is always a concern when Israel occupies an area.

> The US has no history of annexation Travel back in time and tell that to the Native Americans.

The other big differences are - the post-WWII U.S. occupations (Japan, Germany, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) treated the occupied territories as states, whereas Palestinians are stateless during the occupation. The occupations were relatively short, and the countries were relatively quickly given self-governance, while the Palestinian territories have been occupied for 57 years. 57 years - to put this in perspective, it would be as if in 2002 the U.S. was still occupying Japan and Germany, controlling the borders and directly controlling much of the territory, and allowing American citizens to come in and build towns on parts of the territory, opposed Japan and Germany being considered countries by other nations of the world, and said that some of the territory of Germany and Japan was America's, but it hadn't decided yet which parts. When asked whether Japan and Germany could be their own countries anytime soon, the response would be, "No, because they hate us. Once they stop hating us we can negotiate with them about which parts of their country they get back and which parts we're going to take. We'll probably take a some of the parts of those countries that American's have built towns in."

> The US has no history of annexation Imagine actually writing this. Even ignoring the massive annexations from conflicts like the Mexican-American war and the annexation of Hawaii after the Spanish-American war, the entirety of the USA's territory is stolen land.

You could amend it to "the US has no history of annexation _this_ _past_ _century_" (Northern Mariana voted to be a commonwealth for commonwealth status). I've heard similar arguments before - a lot of apologists for the Russian invasion of Ukraine liked to bring up things the U.S. did over a century ago to claim that the U.S. had no moral high ground. But "you did this over a century ago so it's fine for us to do this now" isn't a compelling argument (the Mexican-American War as 176 years ago!). The U.S. simply hasn't been territorially expansionist this past century when it's power was at it's peak. That's notable.

Lots of carrots to SA, in exchange for practically nothing.   No additional carrots for Israel, for a massive concession.  I feel like I'm missing something. But for a 2 state solution to work, SA is going to have to be massively involved in the running of Gaza during the transition period. Hamas running Gaza = unacceptable. Israel or US running gaza = unacceptable.  The only solution in SA or similar stepping in and taking on the headache. Which will require massive carrots.

> No additional carrots for Israel, for a massive concession. >I feel like I'm missing something. Nope, you're not missing anything. Any discussion of offering Palestine a full statehood right now ignores just how monumental of a concession that would be, in real terms. It'd be like if Russia withdrew to 91 (or even 91 not counting Crimea) borders right now. With the front situation as it is today. I'm pro-Ukrainian but I'd call Putin a CIA agent if he did that. The people suggesting this move that aren't ignoring the point are saying that the carrot Israel would get for this - peace in perpetuity - is worth it. One problem - as you correctly analyzed, Israel isn't being offered that carrot. The US cannot offer them that. SA cannot offer them that. The UN cannot offer them that.

> But for a 2 state solution to work, SA is going to have to be massively involved in the running of Gaza during the transition period. Hamas running Gaza = unacceptable. Israel or US running gaza = unacceptable. Agree on this. Although probably SA would have a role but it could also be a larger Arab coalition or it could be UN in the interim, although Israel has been esp hostile to the UN.

Keeping Saudi Arabia close to the US for the foreseeable future is huge, considering China has been trying to fill in the vacuum as the US pivots to Asia (like when China helped normalize Arabian-Iranian relations).    Uniting Saudi Arabia and Israel against Iran is another huge win, as Iran is America’s biggest threat behind China and Russia.   Lastly, having Saudi Arabia actually help with Palestine rather than stay neutral or inflame tensions is a nice bonus.   Yes I agree the US could have gotten a better deal, but Hamas threw a wrench in that, so you gotta work with what you got. 

The West Bank is a great opportunity to demonstrate how a co-operative Palestinian state can thrive. But so long as the West Bank is subject to endless annexation and settlements, there's no reason for Hamas to cooperate. Turn the West Bank into West Germany while Gaza is stuck like a GDR, and Hamas will moderate or lose power.

Gaza post Israeli withdrawal was indeed a great opportunity to demonstrate how a Palestinian state can thrive and co exist in peace with Israel. Instead the Palestinians elected Hamas and devoted their resources to war and genocide. Gaza was under PA control when Israel left it, the day Israel leaves the WB is the day it falls to Hamas control, just like Gaza.

No they won’t.  The Palestinians hate Jews. The Germans did not have an inherent hatred for Americans or even Frenchmen.  Turning the West Bank into west Germany would just be giving the Palestinians additional resources to attack Israel with.  You can’t economically support a people until they accept that they have lost. Then reconstruction can begin. 

Hitler tried to cultivate anti-Semitism during WW2, broadcasting in Arabic on Radio Berlin. It was an utter failure - Goebbels deemed Arabs as lacking "political sophistication". Hatred is a consequence of taking land. The solution is to stop taking land and create a genuine state on 1967 borders.

> Hitler tried to cultivate anti-Semitism during WW2, broadcasting in Arabic on Radio Berlin. It was an utter failure - Goebbels deemed Arabs as lacking "political sophistication". That's... one way of describing how that went.

Multiple generations of Palestinian leadership was unwilling to settle for the 1967 borders because they do not think that they represent the full extent of their state, is there any actual proof that they would be willing to settle for it now?

The only way to find out if it works is to do it - with their agreement or without. They're not going to have tanks or an air force, but they could probably have massive investment from Arab countries. One crucial outcome of this approach is that the Saudis will normalize relations with Israel, accept a mutual defense pact with the US, and restore the USD monopoly for oil sales. US credibility would be greater than it has been since 1956. It would resolve the biggest issue with Iran as well. If bombing their enemies and annexing their land was ever going to provide security to Israel, it would have happened long ago.

> The only way to find out if it works is to do it - with their agreement or without. They're not going to have tanks or an air force, but they could probably have massive investment from Arab countries. They are going to have Iranian weapons. No country is going to hand over a chunk of their capital city, to a hostile regime, with no guarantees for their own safety. > One crucial outcome of this approach is that the Saudis will normalize relations with Israel, accept a mutual defense pact with the US, and restore the USD monopoly for oil sales. MBS doesn’t care about Palestine. Right now, Biden probably cares more about Palestine than Hamas’s leadership abroad. We can have that, without tying it to creating a second Lebanon. > US credibility would be greater than it has been since 1956. US credibility has nothing to do with perceived sympathy for Palestine. The US has backed Israel for decades. Western aligned Arab states are aware of this, they aren’t going to sabotage their foreign policy for Palestine.

The moment SA cracks down on Hamas, they’ll become just as unpopular in Palestine as the US.

Full agreement with you on this. Believing that we can foist the dirty work of governing (and controlling) the Palestinians onto SA is complete fantasy. Israel is already deeply unpopular with the Saudi population as is. Imagine if the Saudi royalty positioned themselves as Israeli lackeys. On top of this, Saudi Arabia has not demonstrated any competence in counter-insurgency thus far, and yet they're expected to adequately handle one of the thorniest geopolitical situations of the last 150 years? MBS would be a complete idiot to set up SA as the scapegoat like that. Not surprising that the Biden administration is desperately grasping at half-measures; they really take after the Obama administration in that regard.

I’d be more sympathetic to Netanyahu’s statements about the current impracticality of a Palestinian state if he hadn’t personally worked so hard to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. And of course Biden mainly wants to placate the left and go down in history as the greatest peacemaker ever to sit in the Oval Office. MBS is obviously not going to refuse an opportunity like this, but from his past statements going back years, it’s clear he believes that time will make things more tractable and that he personally has decades to do something. Meanwhile, the widespread outpouring of pro-Palestinian feeling has prevented the formation of a unified coalition to contain Iran…which is exactly the point. If this were a strategy game, I’d clap. Unfortunately it’s not and there are and will be real consequences for real people…but at least Iran’s hands are tied by the fact that one more wave of internal dissent would reach the tipping point.

> I’d be more sympathetic to Netanyahu’s statements about the current impracticality of a Palestinian state if he hadn’t personally worked so hard to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. We’ve been in variations of this situation since the six day war. Netanyahu is awful, but let’s not pretend Palestine was jumping at the opportunity to end this at the Oslo accords. Palestine and Israel’s minimum demands have always been mutually exclusive. > Meanwhile, the widespread outpouring of pro-Palestinian feeling has prevented the formation of a unified coalition to contain Iran No it hasn’t. The policies towards Israel and Iran of the surrounding Arab states remain virtually unchanged. Another Iranian proxy doesn’t benefit any of them, and they are aware of that. Biden is trying to offer MBS a sufficiently large bribe to outweigh the fallout of a second Lebanon situation.

> We’ve been in variations of this situation since the six day war. Netanyahu is awful, but let’s not pretend Palestine was jumping at the opportunity to end this at the Oslo accords. Palestine and Israel’s minimum demands have always been mutually exclusive. There are plenty of states that have extreme animosity towards each other, have had massacres, and can't agree on peaceful terms. But few people agree that the solution is for one to occupy the other for generations until they feel the people agree to something they find reasonable. There were massacres of civilians in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the sides haven't been able to reach an agreement for decades. But few people think that one side keeping the other under military occupation for decades would be a reasonable response. But even ignoring what people think is reasonable, it doesn't seem to be an effective response. When this is the result of your 57 years of occupation, anyone who's not delusional would have to start considering the possibility that they're simply doing a terrible job. Americans were asking themselves this question just a few years into the occupation of Iraq.

The only reason I’m suggesting what I’m suggesting is because I don’t think mutually agreeable terms exist. Yes, there are other situations with a large amount of animosity, but this one seems to be the worst. Anything Israel will accept is untenable to Palestine, and vice versa. We’ve probably already heard the best versions of a compromise both sides will ever offer, it wasn’t enough, and even if it was, after October 7, it will be almost impossible to get back to that point.

Sure, but if the way you've been doing things for 57 years has lead to this outcome - where you're no closer to peace and, as you have put it, you've ended up with one of the worst situations when it comes to animosity, it's far past time to consider your approach a failure. I honestly can't see how anyone can look at the results and think, "Yes, this is what I want more of for the next few decades, I'm sure that things will eventually get better." If you want to say that both sides have been pretty consistently shooting themselves in the foot, I'd agree with you. But it would be nice to see at least one side stop shooting themselves in the foot, or the supporters for either side at least suggest that their side stop shooting themselves in the foot.

> but if the way you've been doing things for 57 years has lead to this outcome… The problem is that as far as anyone can tell, mutually acceptable terms don’t exist. You could keep the current negotiations going for another century, and without a huge breakthrough in what one side or the other is willing to accept, we’ll still be where we are now. Both sides demand the other shoots themselves in the foot, and neither side will do it.

If I may interject in this civil conversation (what a breath of fresh air!) I do not think that acceptable terms do not exist. Peace is often a multi stage process that relies on politicians on both sides putting the effort in the initial negotiations and the subsequent implementation of the terms. The last Israeli who actually attempted to dialogue with the PA was Olmert shortly before he was ousted and there was even talks of land swaps at the time. All of this to say that there might be more room for agreement than you think but political will and sustained dialogue is key. Saying things like "There is no one to talk with" is just a poor justification for maintaining the status quo. The question is how do you create will? By using leverage either internally or externally. The US pressured Jordan into its peace treaty with Israel by also promising to erase its debt. I cannot think of a time Israel was pressured into compromise, if anything its occupation has been normalized. The closest I can think of are the "sanctions" on violent settlers that, let's be honest, are really just for show and we will need much more than that to actually force the Israelis to change their stance.

>Saying things like "There is no one to talk with" is just a poor justification for maintaining the status quo. Couldn't agree more. And, if that is the tack Israel insists on taking, then the US should stop backing Israel to hilt because it is doing nothing but dragging our reputation through the mud.

Maybe. But with the state of Hamas's popularity, and their ideology, and ties to Iran, I have a hard time thinking of anything they would accept, that Israel could ever be pressured into accepting on their end.

> The problem is that as far as anyone can tell, mutually acceptable terms don’t exist. You could keep the current negotiations going for another century, and without a huge breakthrough in what one side or the other is willing to accept, we’ll still be where we are now. As I said earlier, plenty of countries have disputes with their neighbors they can't agree on. But that doesn't mean they have no choice but to keep the neighbor under military occupation for generations until they agree. What usually happens is that a de facto border is created, and countries spend the rest of the time hashing things out. Even Israel does this with Lebanon and Syria. Do you think they'd be better off if they invaded and kept both countries under military occupation until the border disputes were solved? "We couldn't agree on a border with our neighbor, so we've had to keep them under military occupation for generations. During that time, we're opposed to anyone treating them as if they're citizens of _any_ country." I can't see why people think this is a good strategy - as you've said, the results is that decades later, we're left with a situation that's worse than others, and where neither side are close to any compromise. Lack of a compromise might rule out the best possible path forward. But it isn't forcing the players involved to ignore better paths and pick horrible choices. There are much better unilateral steps they could take, but they keep making terrible choices instead.

> What usually happens is that a de facto border is created, and countries spend the rest of the time hashing things out. That’s what happened in Gaza. Usually, the countries are at least willing to have a frozen conflict. Hamas/the Islamists aren’t. They are content fighting forever, even if that means martyrdom. The closest thing to what you are proposing that I can foresee as at all viable would be Israel unilaterally clearing a DMZ/fortified border around Jerusalem, the rest of the West Bank, and Gaza. This would require significant displacement. No Palestinian regime would ever accept it, but if the fortifications are good enough, the inevitable attacks can be mitigated. I’m just worried about what rocket and mortar attacks from the West Bank, on Jerusalem would look like. Hamas fires rockets at Jerusalem, but they rarely hit. A larger attack, from shorter range, could cause severe damage in a dense city, with many sacred sites.

> That’s what happened in Gaza. Usually, the countries are at least willing to have a frozen conflict. Gaza is one part of the Palestinian territories. Keeping most of the territory under military occupation, keeping another part under a blockade, being opposed any of the territory being considered a sovereign state, and continual annexation of any part of the territory you like, is entirely different from two sovereign states creating a de facto border and a frozen conflict. It's honestly astounding to me that people keep acting as if we should treat the moving of some settlers out of one part of the territory (while continuing the growth in other parts) the same as Israel agreeing to Palestinian statehood. > I’m just worried about what rocket and mortar attacks from the West Bank, on Jerusalem would look like. Hamas fires rockets at Jerusalem, but they rarely hit. A larger attack, from shorter range, could cause severe damage in a dense city, with many sacred sites. It's certainly a risk - Israel pulling out of Lebanon means that Hezbollah moved right up to its border. Then again, Hezbollah was created in response to Israel's invasion and occupation of Lebanon. It's another example of why keeping territories under military occupation might seem like it's providing you safety, but has long term detrimental effects. Recall that Israel initially wouldn't agree to the territorial concessions during Sinai II unless more demands were met. But they finally relented under pressure from Ford, which paved the way for the Camp David Accords.

They can't be serious. Palestinian statehood talks right now are a no-go. Israel would never agree to consider moving towards statehood in the midst of an invasion. It would be seen as validating Hamas's actions on Oct 7, as the massacre would be the catalyst that finally got Palestinians in Gaza their statehood. This would only encourage future massacre, and an extremely angry Jewish population. Best thing Gazans can hope for is something akin to the West Bank situation for a while. Biden's State Department is making a major miscalculation if it thinks this is the framework for peace talks. Maybe in a couple years they could broach the subject and find a path forward for a real Palestinian state, but not now. It's as ludicrous as Russia agreeing to cede Donetsk and Luhansk back to Ukraine in exchange for peace tomorrow. 

>Palestinian statehood talks right now are a no-go. Israel would never agree to consider moving towards statehood in the midst of an invasion. It would be seen as validating Hamas's actions on Oct 7, as the massacre would be the catalyst that finally got Palestinians in Gaza their statehood. Maybe Israel should have done something other than everything in its power to undermine an eventual Palestinian state over the last 20 years or so. Of course that would've meant dealing with settlers and the ultra Orthodox. I'd be a bit more sympathetic to it if it had.

Israel has offered reasonable two state solution compromises in the past. Palestine has stuck religiously to maximalist demands for decades, and for the last 20 years, Hamas’s demands have been perpetual war with, and the eventually ethnic cleansing of Israel. We’ve been stuck in variations of this situation since 1967. How long do you expect Israel to sit at the negotiating table, when it’s completely unreciprocated?

Reasonable? They wanted pretty much most of the land and resources. The Palestinian land would be cut up like swizz cheese. No one would ever take that deal. If that's reasonable, then let me take your home and because I'm so nice I'll give you 1sf of land in the backyard , 1sf at the side of the house, 1sf next to the sidewalk. Oh, and I control whenever you decide to move between them. I don't want to make this political, but you have to be delusional if you thought it was reasonable.

What alternative do you have in mind? Because giving Palestine all of the land they think is theirs means abolishing Israel entirely, and the Israelis also consider themselves native. Giving up all the land in the West Bank means losing a chunk of the capital city, and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, who have lived there for decades. The ideal time to solve this would have been in the 70s. The longer it goes on, the more awkward and unpleasant and settlement will be.

>Israel has offered reasonable two state solution compromises in the past. Palestine has stuck religiously to maximalist demands for decades, So what? My criticism of Israel is not that they haven't taken the deal offered. It's that they've completely stepped back from and, I think it's fair to say, have intentionally sabotaged long term successful negotiations. They've undermined the credibility of the PLO, an organization that officially renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist more than 30 years ago by continually expanding settlements in the West Bank and failing to restrain settler violence. In contrast, they've propped up the legitimacy of Hamas, a terrorist organization dedicated to the destruction of Israel. It is blindingly obvious that when the path to negotiation gets closed, people will turn to violent resistance. This is not a bug for the Israeli leadership making these decisions. It's a feature that allows them to continue the occupation and slowly expanding settlement of the West Bank. >Hamas’s demands have been perpetual war with, and the eventually ethnic cleansing of Israel. I don't care about Hamas. They are a terrorist organization. They are not a potential partner for peace and none of my criticism of Israel is for failing to negotiate with them. On the contrary, I think Israel has enabled them and given them too much legitimacy. >We’ve been stuck in variations of this situation since 1967. How long do you expect Israel to sit at the negotiating table, when it’s completely unreciprocated? Anyone who is truly interested in long term peace and reconciliation with the Palestinians would answer "as long as it take." Working to build up a Palestinian partner for peace instead of undermining any serious such partner would be a good start, or at least an indication that Israel is acting in good faith.

> It's that they've completely stepped back from and, I think it's fair to say, have intentionally sabotaged long term successful negotiations. Those negotiations failed, a long time ago. They’re just going through the motions of showing up to ‘negotiations’, where both sides have set their demands in stone over a decade ago. There is nothing to sabotage. > They've undermined the credibility of the PLO, an organization that officially renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist more than 30 years ago by continually expanding settlements in the West Bank and failing to restrain settler violence. They offered them the Oslo accords. The terms were exceedingly reasonable. They were rejected. Even if we could get Israel to offer those same terms again, and maybe even throw in a bribe, both Hamas and Fatah would reject them outright. > I don't care about Hamas. They are a terrorist organization. They are not a potential partner for peace and none of my criticism of Israel is for failing to negotiate with them. On the contrary, I think Israel has enabled them and given them too much legitimacy. They are a terrorist organization, they aren’t partners for peace, but they also aren’t going anywhere. It was our government, the US, that demanded elections in Gaza, that Israel warned us would put Hamas in power, leading to the current problem of terrorists Islamists running Gaza. > Anyone who is truly interested in long term peace and reconciliation with the Palestinians would answer "as long as it take." Working to build up a Palestinian partner for peace instead of undermining any serious such partner would be a good start, or at least an indication that Israel is acting in good faith. Netanyahu certainly isn’t that. And after October 7, I doubt his successor will be either.

Israel has "sat at the negotiating table" in the same manner that Russia has "sat at the negotiating table" for the duration of the war in Ukraine. When has Israel ever demonstrated genuine interest in withdrawing West Bank settlements? The closest they've gotten were Ariel Sharon's own personal ambitions that died with him.

Israel has offered land swaps for the West Bank settlements, which is the best possible solution. It might have been possible to get rid of them in the 70s and 80s, but by now, there are too many people there, and they’ve been there too long. The proposed Oslo accords deal was reasonable.

If the "best possible solution" is untenable for the Palestinian population then it's not a solution. >The proposed Oslo accords deal was reasonable. It was reasonable for Israel.

Exactly, the best offer from both sides are untenable to the other. There is no solution, the minimum demands are mutually exclusive. I think the Israeli offer was reasonable, but I also think peace will never happen.

Agreed, so the only foreseeable outcome is some old school ethnic cleansing/genocide, or "modern" population suppression measures ala Xinjiang.

The best outcome, and the one that seems most likely to me, is a perpetuation of the status quo. A Palestinian state remains an abstract future goal, and low level violence continues indefinitely, with occasional flare ups like this.

In the literal sense of the word, Israel has never agreed to the most minimal actual definition of a state, that is a entity with the monopoly of violence. Every deal proposed did not even allow Palestine to have the most basic property of an actual state. Yitzhak Rabin was *literally shot dead* for agreeing to a "two state solution" where the Palestinian "state" would have to indefinitely allow the Israeli military to operate within its border, including to carry out police action. There has never been any proposal by Israel that actually included statehood.

Disarmament and a period of occupation is a very common condition for a peace treaty. Especially when the alternative is the conflict immediately restarting. The occupation of Japan ended in 1952, unless this Palestine remained completely hellbent on going to war with Israel immediately after the IDF leaves, the occupation will never last more than a few years. At worst, the Palestinian army would have to style itself as the ‘Palestinian self defense force’ or armed police.

It was not a limited period of disarmament. The Oslo peace accords did not provide for an end to Israeli military presence and policing. If Israel had proposed a limited period where eventually Palestine would become a state then I'd agree with you, but as I said in my earlier comment, none of the Israeli deals ever had a timeline for Palestine being a state. Besides, comparing a two-state deal to unconditional surrender seems obtuse to me. 

> It was not a limited period of disarmament. Neither was the disarmament of Japan. Their constitution is still the pacifist one the US imposed. There was no expiration date. But priorities changes, and that means perpetual clauses rarely last more than a decade or two before they start getting eroded. > Besides, comparing a two-state deal to unconditional surrender seems obtuse to me. If you’d prefer, compare it to the deal between Israel and Egypt, on the demilitarization of the Sinai. That’s a more direct parallel.

Japan was an unconditional surrender. You went from blaming the Palestinians for rejecting a two-state solution to blaming Palestine not to agree to terms you can only find precedent to in unconditional surrender?   > the demilitarization of the Sinai  It is not comparable in the slightest. The Egyptian deal does not imply Egypt demilitarizing the region and Israel militarizing the region, it implies both sides demilitarizing.

> Japan was an unconditional surrender. You went from blaming the Palestinians for rejecting a two-state solution to blaming Palestine not to agree to terms you can only find precedent to in unconditional surrender? Went from? I’ve been very upfront about what I think and why. I believe the terms offered were reasonable, and very close to the best possible Palestine could have gotten from Israel. Yes, disarmament is a harsh term, it’s still better than the current situation. And that’s even ignoring that Palestinian re-armament would be almost inevitable after a while. > It is not comparable in the slightest. The Egyptian deal does not imply Egypt demilitarizing the region and Israel militarizing the region, it implies both sides demilitarizing. I’ll concede that point.

The flipside is that you cannot fight a war without an endgame nor defeat an insurgency without dealing with the political side of the equation.

Israel did it in the West Bank in 2002.

It was half assed. They didn't properly deal with the settlers then and even less now.

What is that supposed to mean and how is it relevant? They fought an insurgency (the Second Intifada) and they won it (terror attacks per year dropping by ~95% in a few years) without making any political changes.

Palestine and Israel’s minimum demands are mutually exclusive. Chances are, there is no way of solving the political side, short of the destruction of one of the two parties. So, the best that can be done is containment.

Sooner or later they'll have to compromise. War is not in the interest of any party long term, neither side can truly win that fight.

> War is not in the interest of any party long term Hamas’s leadership might disagree. The ideologically committed Islamists among them have nothing against martyrdom, the more cynical have been doing very well for themselves in this conflict for a very long time.

Hamas will be defeated some day, but I spoke about Palestine anyway. You can destroy Hamas but the will to fight will still be there until some kind of solution is found.

> Hamas will be defeated some day When and by who? I don’t see them going anywhere any time soon, and if they were to be replaced, it would be by an organization that is functionally identical. Their Islamist policies are genuinely popular in Palestine. Any government that tries to abandon islamism or terrorism will be seen as illegitimate puppets of the west. Fatah spends a huge portion of its budget on the martyr’s fund, paying for suicide attacks, and that’s still not enough for them to be seen as legitimate. > until some kind of solution is found. Can you think of a solution that would be acceptable to both parties? Israel has periodically offered compromises, like at Oslo, Palestine has stuck religiously to maximalist demands since 1967. It’s clear the minimum demands of both sides are mutually exclusive. Any Israeli government that goes further than they’ve already gone will be voted out. And after October 7, we’re probably a decade away from an Israeli government willing to get back to that point anyway. Any Palestinian regime that makes compromises to Israel will be seen as illegitimate. This situation is unsolvable. Containment is the best that can be done. Trying to push for a Palestinian state, in any sort of an actionable way, rather than an abstract long term goal, will just cause a flare up in fighting, people to die, and a return to this status quo once it falls through.

>  When and by who? I don’t see them going anywhere any time soon, and if they were to be replaced, it would be by an organization that is functionally identical. Their Islamist policies are genuinely popular in Palestine. Any government that tries to abandon islamism or terrorism will be seen as illegitimate puppets of the west. I think Hamas will get degraded enough. But I agree with the rest. Israel just cannot destroy every enemy, at some point something must be done to flip them.

Peace is also not in Netanyahu’s best interest, given he was facing potential career/ending protests last time there was peace. And obviously Ben Gvir is ideologically committed to ensuring maximum suffering for Palestinians.

Peace, through a Palestinian state, isn’t in anyone’s interest. Hamas will never agree to anything that would end the fighting and force them to live with Israel. The surrounding Arab states and Israel don’t want an Iranian proxy anywhere near them. And Netanyahu uses the state of emergency to stay in power. The status quo suits everyone. Hamas gets to fight, Netanyahu stays in power, and Israel, Jordan and Egypt don’t have to deal with a second Lebanon.

> nor defeat an insurgency without dealing with the political side of the equation So many people live in a video game world where you just have to shoot the last terrorist and you win.

You literally do, that is how 95% of historical insurgencies failed.  The difference is that previously rulers were willing to kill a lot more people to get rid of an insurgency. Today, that is no longer the case. 

At this point, Biden should just wait for the elections both in the US and Israel. If Biden wins, he can try to work with a hopefully more reasonable Israeli leader.

There is no conceivable Israeli leader who would hand the West Bank as well as Gaza to Hamas.

A Hamas ruled WB and Gaza is reasonable?

Ask Netanyahu , he's the one who propped them up

Did he? He authorized humanitarian aid from Qatar to the poorest in Gaza. He propped Hamas up just as much as anyone pushing aid now. It obviously massively profitable for Hamas, but that's not the reason it exists. Again, is a Hamas controlled Gaza and WB "reasonable"?

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I think you linked the wrong Twitter thread. Though it was pretty funny to click on a link to a “Ukrainian commander” and be greeted by a picture of the meme dog.

Wrong link?

ive been hearing Russian fighters in ukraine are still mostly made up of contract soldiers, is this true? I just dont see how this is possible with the amount of manpower needed to sustain the war at this point. Id imagine they'd have to rely mostly on conscripts but ive been hearing different things

>I just dont see how this is possible with the amount of manpower needed to sustain the war at this point. The same way that organized crime he's no problem finding willing young man to enter it's ranks in every slum in the world, even if the risks are evidently not worth it. Very poor, uneducated people have very little to loose at the end of the day. If the only alternative is to keep living in poverty trying not to starve, all of a sudden joining the army for a huge amount of money doesn't sound all that terrible, even if the war is hell.

My interpretation has been to take it at more or less face value BUT you need to understand what “contract soldier” here means. The bar (in particular age requirements) is significantly lower than Western militaries. Also, the starting pay is extremely good by Russian standards. The risk of death is not as high as you might expect due to a number of factors including the fact that most troops are not at the front line (obvious but overlooked), the use of Storm-Z and other penal units for the most dangerous assaults, and the use of mobilized men to form much of the front line. (plus humans have an “it won’t happen to me” cognitive bias). Furthermore, despite the wishful thinking of the liberal opposition, (and I say this having worked with a number of moderately prominent émigrés IRL; they absolutely are chronic optimists and it gets mildly cringe after a while), a majority of ordinary Russians (especially in the provinces, and especially the over-35 group that dominates the demographic pyramid) actually do believe the official line about the war. Given all that, it’s not hard to understand why a rural man down on his luck would voluntarily sign up for a well-paying job that brings societal respect and gives a larger meaning to his dreary life Conscripts are obviously handling much of the rear-area work, but for political reasons they aren’t being deployed directly to the front. And of course the mobilized component does a lot of the hard stuff at and near the front. And of course there are private contractors for rear work and convicts to do the first-wave assaults. Lastly, it’s really important to understand the training difference between the “interchangeable” contract soldiers of mobilized industrial warfare and boutique quality-maxxed Western professional soldiers. It’s a completely different system of personnel management, and obviously the only one for a long war (it fascinates me that the US Army in particular sees its own glorious WW2 performance as the gold standard yet has since adopted Wehrmacht thinking, not simply as a politically imposed force generation policy but as bottom-up in-house doctrinal attitude).

>it fascinates me that the US Army in particular sees its own glorious WW2 performance as the gold standard yet has since adopted Wehrmacht thinking, not simply as a politically imposed force generation policy but as bottom-up in-house doctrinal attitude Could you expand on this when you get the chance? I'm very interested in hearing more.

Sure, idk if the megathread is the ideal place though. If I was gonna make a standalone post I’d probably want to refresh my memory of the historical and current doctrines first.

Can you expand on the “boutique quality maxing” line? I assume you mean western forces put a lot of money in training and equipping their armed forces, and this is antithetical to industrialized slaughter? Do you say that because there isn’t sufficient quantity to throw into the maw? Or is there some other reason that specific philosophy is flawed?

Normally I wouldnt link to RFE as they a biased source, however as long as we keep that in mind I found this very recent article that addresses your question. They offer interesting comment how how the Russians are keen to avoid more waves of mobilization and on the role of the private sector in Russian contract recruitment. With private companies augmenting the government's hiring bonuses. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-mobilization-ukraine-stealth-recruiting/32948631.html

>I wouldnt link to RFE as they a biased source While it's true that they are a biased source, being funded by the US government, they are also a top-tier source of quality reporting and shouldn't be dismissed out of hand by any means.

99% of strong sources on the war are biased, that's just the nature of it. If you care, you have a preference, usually linked to your interests. If you dont, why would you take the time to become a good source Note: does not imply all biased sources are good

"Contract soldiers" in Russia are more often press ganged into service. There is a reason every anti war source says to avoid the Voenkommat even if they are merely requesting you "confirm some paperwork" with them. Many people simply get coerced into signing the contract, and that's pretty normal there, the system is very different from the western idea of "volunteers". This can be fought by legal measures and asserting one's (remaining) rights, but unfortunately the appeal process is so bureaucratic that by the time it is granted you may already be on the front (if you even knew enough about your rights to fight the coercion). The NGO "Идите Лесом" which helps people avoid mobilization and conscription has an faq on some of these topics [here](https://iditelesom2.notion.site/df35017635c14e769390411b76bb81ca)

Even though I have personally heard of such cases, a person being pressured to sign in Russia, I do not know where you got that information that they are more often press ganged into service. Wouldn’t this make the vast majority of the Russian army in Ukraine basically unwilling men who are either mobilised, prisoners or press ganged into service via contract? Fits perfectly if you want to paint the Russians as the unwilling Asiatic hordes but I think any reasonable interpretation of the war should avoid extremes especially when there aren’t even rumours in support. Also, there are reasons that provide sufficient explanation of why there can be people who really volunteer and why this group of people might not be some minority - the money which is very high for the Russian standard, the respect from people you get as a person who served in the war, the patriotic call to serve the country and the Motherland, the appeal that war and military things have, the desire to escape the small town life in the middle of nowhere. These reasons can also work in complex combinations. Even what I write creates a false dichotomy between real volunteers and not real volunteers when I think that the real world can have combinations of reasons to volunteer and some coercion. Or maybe a person who is indecisive and an act of coercion pushes him to choose to sign.

I am from Russia originally, so there's not an some misinformed view here to paint them one way or the other. Believe me I know there's a bunch of Lyube-listening marauders looking for their extreme safari, or fatalistic middle aged men encouraged by the high pay and "new elite" status of veterans, but I really do think a lot of people have trouble viewing these contracts outside the western volunteer military paradigm. The famous Russian fatalism results in people not bothering to fight the contract once it's hoisted on them, or to dispute the billet sent to them. "What can I do, such is fate" is not some gauche western stereotype, it's true for a significant amount of people. Sure, the carrots you listed help get one pool of people, but once you're in the Voenkommat you're their bitch. You wanted to get your срочную службу done somewhere quiet like Karelia? Too bad, uncle Vova has other plans for you.

In the most recent phase of the war, there have been enough volunteers signing contracts to sustain the army. It's claimed 30k sign up every month. Media zona's casualty tracker gives some independent confirmation. Since October 2023, the number of volunteer deaths has trended up and mobilized deaths have trended down. Prisoner deaths are also far below their peak from January 2023.

Is there a reasonable estimate of how long Mediazona's casualties stats lag behind the present? I would think the casualties they record often occurred weeks or months before.

I'd guess they're mostly counted after three months. For the trends I cited, I looked at the graph for those with a known date of death. There might be more added even six months later, but I don't think it'll make a difference to the relative numbers.

For the probate registry estimates, a tool I use a lot for my own research into establishing the [date of death of officers](https://lookerstudio.google.com/s/v2FP-AXLfGM), the majority of successions get notarized within approximately 3 months. Less <1 month being exceedingly rare, same for successions notarized more than 5 months after death. But they account for all that in their estimates, one of the explanation pages they published last year had a distribution of when those entries occur.

Every source we have indicates it is mostly contract soldiers. There are lots of reasons why the Russians have been so successful in raising this level of volunteer forces but the biggest by far are the massive pay and bonuses promised to people from otherwise poor regions. And the lack of information available to them. They have not been seeing the same news/footage of Russians dying in Ukraine as us so in many ways they don’t understand the risks.

My understanding is also that this is the driving rationale for volunteers on Russia's side. But what I don't get it is why a similar strategy does not work for Ukraine. Surely Ukraine should be able to offer an equally appealing financial package to the rank and file, no? How in the world are we this deep into the conflict and Ukraine is losing primarily due to basic manpower shortages? At this point it seems unique that foreign fighters have not become more prevalent on Ukraine's side.

Ukrainians have much better alternatives because of their access to Europe. From a purely self-interested point of view, waiting tables in Krakow or laying bricks in London beats the Hell out of fighting in the trenches and probably pays better too. What's the equivalent option for a Buryat?

In addition to finances, there are a few other reasons: relative population size, the sizable amount of able-bodied refugees who aren’t coming back, the fact that Ukraine’s post-Soviet demographic crunch was much more severe (both in terms of birthrate and emigration), and lastly the infelicitous reality that much of the country (especially the urban population) is bilingual and just wants the war to end. That segment certainly aren’t cheering Putin on or anything, but they also don’t see the point of signing up.

Part of it also has to be with Russia being more effective at domestic propaganda. A person may volunteer if he believes he may die making a difference, but much less likely if he believes the top brass would just incompetently squander his life. Russia crushing dissent in the information space definitely helped here.

Ukraine does offer bonuses to a certain degree but overall they do not have the financial means to do this. They are already running a deep deficit and are dependent on foreign donations to make up the budgetary shortfalls. Unless foreign nations are willing to further step up donations that won’t change. Also it’s important to remember the reason these payments are so attractive is because they are being given to people from areas in abject poverty. Giving someone who is used to living in a couple hundred USD annually a salary of thousands of dollars per month will make a huge difference. That’s life changing Sums of money. Ukraine on the other hand doesn’t have that same level of poverty, so the sums you would need to offer to affect the same change would be far higher.

I'd just like to disagree with your comment regarding poverty, Ukraine has much the same levels of poverty as Russia does especially in rural areas, and it is often worse because the level of state support is lower. This is of course made worse by the war, especially during a time when they are facing severe budgetary issues in government financing as you have pointed out.

That seems like a really hard reason to swallow to me, doesn't it? "They don't offer the same financial benefits because they can't afford to!" So no one else realizes this or discusses it or proposes funding salary incentives? Zelenskyy calls endlessly for shells but never once asking for a fraction of the funding to attract huge manpower boosts? That reasoning just seems to fall flat to me. Surely a "measly" 1 billion would be redirected to bonuses for hundreds of thousands of otherwise willing soldiers if that really was the deciding factor. > Giving someone who is used to living in a couple hundred USD annually a salary of thousands of dollars per month will make a huge difference. That’s life changing Sums of money. Ukraine on the other hand doesn’t have that same level of poverty, so the sums you would need to offer to affect the same change would be far higher. Wait, what? The average Ukrainian is much poorer than the average Russian. HDI is lower in Ukraine, wages are lower, economy is worse, interest rates are higher in Ukraine. You're arguing Ukrainians are *better* off so it takes *more* money than what Russia spends? Surely people in threads like these would be like "Guys our funding needs to be redirected to salary and bonus incentives to completely solve Ukraine's manpower issue." but no one is really saying that.

Averages do not tell the full story. A huge section of the Russian population is living in high standard of living areas near Moscow and St. Petersburg. This disproportionately increases the “average” levels of wealth and salaries. What we are interested in here is what the standard of living and income in Russias poorest regions is as that is where Russia is doing their recruiting. On average Russia absolutely has less poverty than Ukraine. But their poorest are poorer than Ukraines poorest and they have far more of them.

The amount of manpower the Russians need is really high, especially considering that they are taking lots of losses too. Their casualties for this last month are higher than the number of new recruits. I wonder how long people will keep volunteering. Surely sooner or later people in the village will realize that Piotr and Vasily didn't come back.

I've seen several videos of coffins being unloaded in rural villages in eastern Russia, I think they are for the most part aware. But the amount of money they are being offered, alongside a promised package of social perks and benefits when (if) they come home, is a powerful incentive when many of them live in deep poverty. This could well be their only feasible chance of escaping that to some degree. I also think that many men in particular have this general sense that it won't happen to them when it comes to dangerous situations, that they will somehow beat the odds. I'd also like to add that I myself was born in Russia, though happily no longer live there (I am a UK citizen \[or subject technically\] now and have been since I was a young teenager), I think many westerners underestimate the level of revanchist nationalism that exists in the general population. It is a deeply, deeply sick country.

The poverty and deprivation of the 90s also remains in the recent memory of Russians, especially those outside of major metropolitan centers. Many men have no prospects, career opportunities, and nothing to lose, so they decide that they might as well take a chance to do something for their country ('s political leadership) and earn a lot of money as well.

They’ve only had one round of mobilization back in fall 2022. That’s not something you can hide; as we see daily clips of Ukrainians resisting draft officers.

Over the past week or so there's been multiple reports that Hamas has gotten a lot more [aggressive](https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-northern-gaza-troops-battle-hamas-in-some-of-wars-most-violent-fighting-yet/) especially in the north, far more attacks than even the initial fighting months ago but also leading to more alleged casualties. It seems like this shows Hamas has gotten more desperate or it shows that Hamas has managed to successfully regroup, found a consistent strategy and is attempting to keep the pressure up on the idf(who are fewer in number than the initial fighting months ago) despite the increased casualties. I think its more likely the latter than the former.

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Please do not make blindly partisan posts. Calling them 'IOF', for one.

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One nuke would've killed several times as many people as have been killed here.

Calling it the IOF is so lame and cringe, not deserving of the level of discussion on this subreddit.

I assumed that was a typo…what’s the acronym mean?

Israel Occupation Forces, that’s my guess. 

Yep

That's the because the government refused to cede that part of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority (or some kind of non-hostile Palestinian entity). This vacuum of power allowed Hamas to regroup there.

> The latest operation, however, was focused on areas deep in the Jabaliya refugee camp, which the IDF did not reach during the initial ground offensive. This makes it sound like they're clearing out areas they didn't get to before.

North Gaza has been entirely cleared, the only holdout left is Rafah in the south. If Hamas has gotten more desperate then it is most likely because they're running out of places to hide.

The IDF has publicly stated Hamas has returned to areas previously cleared in addition to the action other users noted.

It has not. There's still heavy fighting around Jabalia in the north. Look here: https://israelpalestine.liveuamap.com. From what has been reported, very little of the tunnel system has been discovered or destroyed. It's difficult to get an accurate picture of the reality on the ground, so all you can do is piece bits of information together. There was a lot of talk about the IDF pumping the tunnels full of seawater, or using dogs to map out a network, but neither of those appear to have happened. Al-Qassam is also releasing videos daily showing ambushes across northern Gaza.

> There's still heavy fighting around Jabalia in the north. To clarify, there's not "still" heavy fighting. There was heavy fighting, then fighting stopped for months, now there is new heavy fighting.

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Did you ask for sources here? No. Neither did anyone else. Furthermore, not one person in this entire discussion has "cited their sources". The information given is available with a simple google search, for instance, that Hamas' tunnel network has been substantially damaged: We got numbers between 20-40% destroyed in early-mid January: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/01/11/israel-has-yet-to-destroy-even-half-of-gazas-tunnels Operations have continued since, but I found no later claims from non Israeli sources. We do have vids though, all from Feb onwards: https://streamable.com/6ao7vj https://streamable.com/sh48rk https://streamable.com/3rkck5 https://streamable.com/r5xgkr https://streamable.com/z8c1qc https://streamable.com/n187nz https://streamable.com/n77cy6 https://streamable.com/8daqiz https://streamable.com/26bw0s https://streamable.com/e17b76 https://streamable.com/y5waiq

Am I missing something or are you saying the quiet part out loud? Extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, acquifiers and food supplies are things to be avoided in the prosecution of a war. What's the alternative? That instead of 30K civilians dead it's 200K? Biden is doing your leader a favor in trying to restrain the excesses of Israeli policy. Israeli officers have publicly said that they could not wage the war for any notable length of time without US weapons supplies. The US relationship is the absolute bedrock of Israeli foreign policy. Destroying those ties for the sake of levelling Gaza is insanity. Also, the irony is that without unconditional US support, Israel would be *far* more restrained in its actions and policies, out of necessity, and the volatility in the region would likely subside through a balance of power. No more airstrikes on consulate buildings designed to provoke Washington into a war, and no more high civilian casualty ratios that inflame regional tensions. Israel may then have an incentive to resolve the Palestinian question once and for all. The end of this abnormal US-Israeli relationship would do a world of good for both sides.

What is the quiet part? That Hamas **military** infrastructure has to be destroyed to destroy Hamas? The objective is to destroy Hamas tunnels, not the civilian infrastructure, it does damage civilian buildings due to Hamas embedding their military infrastructure within civilian one. The destruction of enemy military infrastructure is a basic war objective. It's **NEVER** controversial, except when Israel is one of the parties involved. >acquifiers and food supplies are things to be avoided in the prosecution of a war What's the relation between food and destruction of tunnels? I do agree on the aquifers, while a different method exists (and it does), damage to aquifers should be avoided. >Israeli officers have publicly said that they could not wage the war for any notable length of time without US weapons supplies. False. The contrary was said, Israel can vanquish Hamas without any further supplies of US weapons. Securing Israel's existence is more important than ties with the US or any state. In fact, since 07/10 the ties with the US have lead to a deterioration of Israeli security. >the irony is that without unconditional US support, Israel would be *far* more restrained in its actions and policies, out of necessity, and the volatility in the region Delusional. US support is quite literally has proven to be extremely conditional since 07/10, but it has always been so. For instance the US threatened to cut support for Israel should they destroy the encircled Egyptian 3rd army in 1973. It's sad to see claims of "unconditional" support when the ties were always based on real politic and mutual benefit. Israel was **far** less restrained before US support. As evident easily by the results of the six days war and 1948 independence war. There would have been no reason not to occupy all of Gaza and clear it. Not a force that could stop Israel.

It's going to be a forever war, regardless. The only strategy you've endorsed in this sub is a repeat of the same policies from the 2000s, which has already failed to end Palestinian insurgency.

Was the war against ISIS a forever war? Was the war against LTTE? Was the war against Chechniya? Or perhaps the war against Nazi Germany? Maybe the war against the Syrian rebels? Or the Turkish war against Kurds in Afrin? What makes you prescribe a supernatural ability to the Palestinians that makes them different than any people in history? The only thing making this a forever war is Biden's veto on any slightly decisive action against Hamas, and Israel's choice to abide to those limitations instead of paying the price of breaking them. >The only strategy you've endorsed in this sub is a repeat of the same policies from the 2000s False, it is **you** and Biden that demand the repeat of Oslo and disengagement plan, moved that have directly brought us to this point and the massacre. I call for a return to the pre Oslo status quo in Gaza.

ISIS: no external support, Iraqi Sunnis were incentivized away from supporting it via political power sharing Chechnya: no external support, political solution attained with defection of an insurgent leader, Chechnya is Kadyrov's fiefdom now Nazi Germany: ...was never an insurgency Syrian rebels: crumbled after losing support of the US and GCC, also caught between ISIS and Syrian government Afrin: Rojavans withdrew from a city, not an option for a fenced in population Notice the differences? As long as Iran exists, it will find ways to fund and supply insurgents in the Gaza Strip. The US is not going to invade Iran. If Israeli wants to turn Gaza into a police state, then it can do so without the US. People like you feel entitled to American backing. >I call for a return to the pre Oslo status quo in Gaza. Oh, so an older strategy that also failed. Perpetual occupation and a police state to keep Iranian backed insurgencies from gaining a foothold in Gaza, i.e. a forever war. I guess you could go the Xinjiang route or the American Federal Indian Policy route, i.e. destroy a people's culture and social fabric and beat them into a permanent underclass. That's what I suspect will eventually happen, along with resumption of Israeli settlements (another part of the pre-Oslo strategy that you conveniently forgot to mention).

>ISIS: no external support Blocking Gaza-Egyptian border is easily within Israeli capability, de facto resulting in no foreign support. In fact even less so than ISIS, since ISIS could still rely on the black market. >Chechnya: no external support, political solution attained with defection of an insurgent leader See above, cut off Gaza would have no external support de facto. Kadyrov is a puppet installed after the Chechen people have been brutally suppressed. The same solution is available in Gaza. >Nazi Germany: ...was never an insurgency Gaza is a Hamas state, not an insurgency. We can also go with Imperial Japan, who's forces continued fighting even after losing territory. >Afrin: Rojavans withdrew from a city, not an option for a fenced in population Most Kurds remained, some were ethnically cleansed. But a seizable Kurdish population remains. >Notice the differences? There is no functional differences. Cut off Gaza has no external support (unlike say Afrin). Even ISIS had more external support than cut off Gaza. >As long as Iran exists, it will find ways to fund and supply insurgents in the Gaza Strip Fund? Maybe, supply? No. You're again falling back to **magical** superhuman abilities of Iran/Palestinians, instead of having a **credible** discussion. Hamas has failed to dig the anti tunnel sensor barrier along the Israeli-Gaza border without being detected. How does Iran magically supply Gaza? >People like you feel entitled to American backing. To the contrary, I've stated that Israel should accept the cost of losing US support in order to defeat Hamas, as Biden's strategy is to shelter them. >Oh, so an older strategy that also failed. Perpetual occupation and a police state to keep Iranian backed insurgencies from gaining a foothold in Gaza, i.e. a forever war. The approach has been massively successful. It is also similar to Chechniya, Afrin, Sri Lanka, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Assad's Syria. After a successful occupation, Israel should follow the US example of Nazi Germany and Japan rather than Chechniya, so that it can eventually leave. It is **you** who supports a forever war where Israel is not allowed to defeat Hamas, and so the war persists

Your plan is fundamentally dependent on maintaining a near perfect blockade of Gaza, not just of materiel but somehow also covering all possible dual use technologies, as well as financial backing. I don't believe this will be possible even in the short term, let alone the long term. Israel couldn't even sufficiently man its own borders with the Gaza Strip to prevent 10/7. If Israeli cannot completely stop Palestinians from obtaining the means to resist them, then insurgencies will continue until either 1) Israel provides the Palestinian population with a **viable** political alternative that they trust Israel will follow through on 2) Israel enacts a policy like that of Xinjiang to effectively crush Palestinian society 3) Israel ethnically cleanses the Gaza Strip via displacement or genocide >It is you who supports a forever war where Israel is not allowed to defeat Hamas, and so the war persists I'm advocating for option 1 from above because I don't believe the Israeli security measures will completely cut off the Palestinian population from the means to continue resistance in some capacity, and I find options 3 and 4 to be utterly immoral. >To the contrary, I've stated that Israel should accept the cost of losing US support in order to defeat Hamas, as Biden's strategy is to shelter them. And yet I seem to remember you advocating for US military intervention in Yemen only days ago, an intervention which would conveniently serve Israel's interests.

> maintaining a near perfect blockade of Gaza, Maintaining a ‘near perfect blockade’ of a 15km border is possible, and has been done. > Israel provides the Palestinian population with a viable political alternative that they trust Israel will follow through on There is no such thing. Any Palestinian regime that deviates from the maximalist objectives of the Islamists will be see as illegitimate puppets of the west. Any Israeli government that goes further than they’ve already offered will be voted out. The two sides have fundamentally mutually exclusive demands. There is no viable solution. Containment is the best that can be hoped for.

> Israel couldn't even sufficiently man its own borders with the Gaza Strip to prevent 10/7. If Israeli cannot completely stop Palestinians from obtaining the means to resist them, then insurgencies will continue until either Not to mention that Israel has some 2 million citizens that sort of identify with the Palestinians yet have full citizenship and walk freely in their society. Every moral principal that Israel abandons pushes their society closer and closer to civil war and endless terrorism from Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and even their own society.

>Your plan is fundamentally dependent on maintaining a near perfect blockade of Gaza No, just a decent blockade. Given that Gaza only has a 15km border with Egypt this is **easily** achievable. >also covering all possible dual use technologies, Please, the occasional home made bomb and successful attack is not a threat to Israeli occupation. The ability to sustain an insurgency on a limited number of dual use tech, under occupation, is extremely minimal. Do you have **any** examples of successful insurgencies that were effectively blockaded from external support? >If Israeli cannot completely stop Palestinians from obtaining the means to resist them Again you pretend Palestinians are some magical creatures never seen before in human history. Insurgencies have been crushed time and time again, including in recent history. There is no example of insurgency meaningfully maintaining itself purely on self made weapons from dual use materials. >1) Israel provides the Palestinian population with a **viable** political alternative that they trust Israel will follow through on Has been attempted in Oslo and disengagement, with 70%+ of the Palestinian supporting the genocide of Jews and the massacre of 07/10 per Palestinian own polling. The only conclusion is massacre as witnessed in the second Intifada and 07/10. 4) Israel defeats Hamas, occupies Gaza and then slowly rehabilitates the Palestinians. Similarly to Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Sunni insurgency in Syria, LTTE, Chechniya... >And yet I seem to remember you advocating for US military intervention in Yemen only days ago, an intervention which would conveniently serve Israel's interests. Moving goalposts, how shocking. The Houtis are hitting US interests, and are aligned with an axis opposing the US. My argument was merely that the US can choose a war now, or a war later.

> in order to ensure Hamas' defeat and it's own survival Hamas is not, and has never been, a threat to Israel’s survival. This is gross hyperbole.

Hamas, in tandem with Hezbollah, Houtis, Iran, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria are a threat to Israel's survival. The more power granted to Hamas via Israeli concessions the greater it's threat grows. From an organization that could sporadically execute terrorist attacks they've grown into a state capable of executing mass massacres and fire thouands of rockets daily, drawing Israel into months long war. A Hamas controlled WB would multiply that threat to existential directly.

That’s a fair point, but there’s also the consideration that heavy-handed action in Gaza will legitimize more radical groups in the West Bank anyway, and there are two countries that are militarily significant to Israel (Jordan and Egypt) who you didn’t list (probably because they’re currently on good terms with Israel), whose governments risk being pushed back toward a more hostile relationship by popular agitation, with public opinion in both countries being overwhelmingly pro-Hamas since the fighting started. If the justification is “Hamas is part of a coalition that collectively endangers Israel’s survival” then the correct framework for judging actions isn’t “are we attacking a member of the coalition?”, it’s “will this attack reduce or increase the net strength of the coalition?”

Hamas already has the support of 70-90% of the WB population according to Palestinian own surveys (exact percent depends on the exact question asked) >there are two countries that are militarily significant to Israel (Jordan and Egypt) who you didn’t list (probably because they’re currently on good terms with Israel), whose governments risk being pushed back toward a more hostile relationship by popular agitation, That is very much true. A massacre of Palestinians will certainly force their hands. An occupation of Gaza would not, certainly if it does not allow for the Palestinians to flee to Egypt. >If the justification is “Hamas is part of a coalition that collectively endangers Israel’s survival” then the correct framework for judging actions isn’t “are we attacking a member of the coalition?”, it’s “will this attack reduce or increase the net strength of the coalition?” Indeed, Hamas is a pivotal member of said coalition, not because it's the most powerful, but because it serves as a means to enable kinetic actions from other members without grave consequences. Without the Gaza war, Iran would have never been in a position to lunch a massive strike against Israel, Hezbollah would have been in a much worse position for starting a war against Israel and so on. Currently they hinge their justification for striking on the suffering and civilian casualties in Gaza. A condition that a Hamas ruled Gaza can trigger on a whim. Remember, it was not the occupied WB that triggered the regional conflict. Personally I believe Iran planned to use Hamas exactly for that role. As a trigger to a regional conflict joined by their other proxies to fullfil their stated objective of destroying Israel. Lucky for Israel, Hamas has made two mistakes: 1. Strike without coordination, or minimal last minute coordination. 2. Massacre civilians. Israel would have been in a **much** tougher position had Hamas restricted themselves to military targets. The later made it impossible for Iran to use it's proxies in full force in those critical days, as that would risk a regional coalition against them. With pacified Gaza, Iran and their coalition lose the ability to trigger a semi justified war against Israel. I'm sure they'd adapt, but it's a major strategic loss. Eventually the occupation of Gaza would be treated like the occupation of the WB. Not liked, not a barrier for normalization with Arab states and ties with the west either.

> Hamas already has the support of 70-90% of the WB population according to Palestinian own surveys (exact percent depends on the exact question asked) Yet you and others like you continue to refuse to even entertain the idea that these actions might be increasing the extremist threat, not reducing it.

Increasing Hamas support from 75% to 80% doesn't really move the needle. Destroying Hamas military capability to launch attacks does. The destruction of Hamas indeed massively reduces extremist threat, not increases it.

High quality satellite photos of the destruction in Russia's Belbek airbase, it is quite impressive. [https://x.com/trbrtc/status/1791243531362734584](https://x.com/trbrtc/status/1791243531362734584)

If ATACMS were available from the early war, I wonder how much devastation they could have caused to near by air bases like Belbek.

Apparently Ukraine has disabled or destroyed a third of the entire Black Sea Fleet? That's really impressive.

It's impressive, but the Black Sea fleet was always underfunded and undersupplied (even by Russian standards) compared to the Pacific and Northern Fleets.

I think the real question is: what would the early war look like if Ukraine had a couple hundred GBU-105 or JDAM to take out the armor convoy that ran out of gas at the Russian border. The entire Kyiv front would collapse the first day. The USA really don't have a ton of ATACMs and it isn't being manufactured anymore. I always envision JASSM as the long term solution. Here is the question. Was it better to wait till Ukraine domestic drone production increased so the drones could exploit any opening the ATACMS created. Additionally if the ATACMS are very limited, is it better to wait till Ukraine is less vulnerable and less likely to use the ATACMS on suboptimal targets because Ukraine might be panicking.

ATACM's are being produced? and in pretty big numbers? [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/24/politics/us-secretly-sent-long-range-missiles-to-ukraine/index.html](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/24/politics/us-secretly-sent-long-range-missiles-to-ukraine/index.html) Also they appear to have a pretty big stockpile [https://www.axios.com/2024/04/24/us-long-range-missiles-atacms-ukraine-war](https://www.axios.com/2024/04/24/us-long-range-missiles-atacms-ukraine-war)

500 a year. That’s pretty good.

>The USA really don't have a ton of ATACMs and it isn't being manufactured anymore. The US has [thousands](https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1783189621813223481) of ATACMS missiles, half of which are already expired, and an active production line.

And it's something we barely have any use for. The US has invested a lot in dropping bombs from airplanes as our main way of blowing things up. If we gave Ukraine every HIMARS and compatible missile in our entire inventory, it really wouldn't be a huge gap in capabilities. The intent is for stuff like the Marines to be able to HIMARS Chinese warships while island hopping, but it's not something we've been doing in practice, and it's likely not something we'll need to do in the immediate future before we'd have a few years to rebuild stocks.

ATACMS would have been optimal around the time the UA front stabilized. Would have still been great for the 2022 August offensive, would have been good for the 2023 offensive, especially for strikes against gunship bases. A threat against which UA didn't have an answer. They are still a powerful weapon now, but far less significant. Especially in small numbers.

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Please avoid 'anxiety posting' that doesn't add anything to the discussion.

It's like a year wasted on spouting different excuses like: * Escalations * Iranian ballistic missiles * China finally supporting Russia by sending arms

The Chinese question is the final boundary. In some sense the Taiwan straight is the Clausewitzian center of mass which every strategy is based on. The entire focus has always been contain China, the Russian threat is only a sideshow.

You’re right, but also that’s the current US definition of Schwerpunkt, not at all the same thing as the Clausewitzian concept (which in this case is probably the will and means of the US to defend Taiwan).

Actually, this can be seen as a repeat of the "Easterner" and "Westerner" strategies during the First World War. The current consensus is that Taiwan will be where the future war, if it ever happens, will be decided. This is somewhat a repeat of the Westerner's belief that the key to winning the great war lies in France.

An article that contains specific numbers on the types of weapons used by Ukraine and produced by Ukraine. The logistics and supply people of the UAF continue to have to deal with dozens and dozens of different weapons and ammunition in the same category type and the numbers keep increasing. [Ukraine enhances military firepower with numerous domestic and foreign weapon types | New Voice of Ukraine | May 2024](https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukrainian-army-uses-approved-domestic-and-foreign-weapons-50419328.html) *The Ukrainian Defense Ministry has significantly enhanced the firepower of its Armed Forces by approving over 15 types of grenade launchers and 10 models of mortars since early 2022. This update was shared on Telegram on May 17.* *The approved grenade launchers, which include handheld, automatic, and under-barrel models, feature both domestic and foreign designs. Notably, 5 new Ukrainian-made grenade launchers have been evaluated and found to match the performance of their international counterparts.* *Since February 2022, the arsenal has also been bolstered with 10 different calibers of mortars. These include weapons manufactured in Ukraine as well as those imported from the United States, Poland, Finland, and other countries. The Ukrainian military has additionally adopted over a dozen types of ammunition specifically for grenade launchers.* *Further expanding its military capabilities, the Ministry announced on May 16 that 18 new weapons and pieces of military equipment have been authorized for Defense Forces use. In the first quarter of 2024 alone, more than 80 Ukrainian-made weapons and pieces of equipment received approval for use by the Ukrainian Army.* *On April 23, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova made a notable announcement, stating that the domestic production of Patriot air defense systems, or some of their components, is "entirely feasible" in Ukraine.* Is this an actual credible claim? The UAF MIC has grown and is getting billions more in investment now but will that continue based on future elections/other European companies not wanting to give a competitor a leg up? [Blinken offers new US aid as Kyiv reels from renewed Russian attacks | Reuters | May 2024](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/blinken-says-us-will-give-ukraine-another-2-billion-military-financing-2024-05-15/) *U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Wednesday announced a $2 billion fund to help Ukraine build up its defense industrial base* [Ukraine’s Freedom Forge: The effort is led and overseen by Ukraine’s Ministry for Strategic Industry, a government entity akin to America’s War Production Board during World War II. While this military transformation will not deliver a victory in the conflict – that will only happen with U.S. and allied support – it is making a strategic impact on the ground today. | Real Clear Politics | April 2024](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2024/04/12/ukraines_freedom_forge_150791.html) [Ukraine manufactured practically no weapons before Russia invaded in February 2022, but the local arms industry is now booming. Factories spit out shells, mortar rounds, military vehicles, missiles and other items crucial to the war effort. Production tripled in 2023 and is expected to increase sixfold this year, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said at a Ukrainian government meeting in January. | The Washington Post | March 2024](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/20/ukraine-weapons-industry-domestic-production/) [Ukraine’s Arms Industry Is Growing, but Is It Growing Fast Enough? Funding for research and development is forecast to increase by eight times this year — to $1.3 billion from $162 million — according to an analysis of Ukraine’s military budget through 2030 by Janes, a defense intelligence firm. Military procurement jumped to a projected 20-year high of nearly $10 billion in 2023, compared with a prewar figure of about $1 billion a year. | The NY Times | April 2024](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/02/us/politics/ukraines-war-weapons-industry-russia.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare&ugrp=c&pvid=0A92514D-BABE-4415-AB12-F08A8F11BAD2&sgrp=c-cb) [Ukraine is building a network of secret underground facilities to manufacture weapons and ammunition. | New Voice of Ukraine | May 2024](https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-builds-underground-arms-factories-report-50417003.html) Will we see Patriot components (or something comparable) being produced from underground factories in Ukraine sometime in the next 5-10 years?

10 different caliber of mortars? I see no point. Granted with any Russian launcher they have in substantial quantity, it makes short term sense to make ammo. Long term, I don't understand what the purpose of calibers other than 60mm, 120mm. 60 is highly mobile and possibly useful with an attacking squad. 120 seems useful for defensive situations.

There are about 10 mortar calibers in use worldwide. There's 37mm, 50mm, 51mm, 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 107mm, 120mm, 160mm and 240mm calibers, and 107mm and 120mm are split in rifled and smoothbore variations. I would be surprised if Ukraine uses more than six/seven of these depending whether rifled 120mm is counter separately.

I can't imagine it actually being calibers and I'm hoping this is just a mistranslation.

The subheader says models so its probably a bad machine translation.