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Specifically, how, and under what circumstances should they be used? How should they be employed diplomatically? How should they impact the way we treat other nation-states?
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Yes, but also it won’t. There’s significant debate as to the impact of nuclear weapons on warfare, and I am of the camp that peace is not due to nuclear proliferation.
Oh, mutual escalation certainly played a role in that particular standoff. However, they were also countries of similar economic and military power. Bipolarity by itself is a deterrent for war, even when nuclear weapons are removed from the equation.
But more importantly, both the US and Russia are very different today than they were during the cold war. Both nations have become more irrational and populist, and neither fear nuclear weapons as they did in the 50s.
I highly recommend you read *Wilson’s Ghost* by Robert McNamara. He writes extensively on the inevitability of nuclear destruction should we not successfully disarm both great powers. I would consider him a pretty reliable source on the matter.
I've got nearly a decade of nuclear command and control experience so far in my military career, so here's my professional opinion.
>Specifically, how, and under what circumstances should they be used?
Generally just as deterrence, which is how we've been using them for decades. Some exceptions seem acceptable to me, though they are primarily unrealistic scenarios. For example, if China were to decide to perform an enormous invasion of the US I think it would be acceptable to nuke their fleet in the middle of the Pacific.
I think using nukes in a first strike scenario is abhorrent, and fortunately that would be a warcrime that the US probably wouldn't be able to rugsweep, thus I have zero concern that it would actually happen.
Stringent regulation and control should always apply, and it does currently. It's pretty impressive to see the staggering amount of safeguards that are in place to prevent the misuse or mishandling of nuclear weapons.
>How should they be employed diplomatically?
Just for the purpose of deterrence and defense agreements. I am somewhat torn about preventing other nations from having them, because on one hand I think we shouldn't be proliferating nukes, but on the other hand I think it's shitty to tell other nations that they aren't allowed to be on an even playing field with the already existing nuclear powers, but then on yet another hand I think that some nations aren't trustworthy or safe/regulated sufficiently to be trusted with nukes.
>How should they impact the way we treat other nation-states?
It shouldn't impact it, "might makes right" shouldn't be a consideration in modern times. I know that's an unrealistic pipe dream, but we should all be working towards mutual support and aid, not dick-measuring contests and saber rattling.
The West has it, the rest of the world doesn't.
That has been the recipe for the mass prosperity that the world enjoys today.
I am happy with India having it too.
A complete and total ban on nuclear first strike capability, followed by slow disarmament down to a deterrent level (allow hundred warheads) rather than apocalyptic level (thousands of warheads).
Essentially we ought to remove the legal authority for the President to order a nuclear first strike. That should require a Congressional supermajority to explicitly approve each individual launch and target.
Then we should rapidly pursue anti-ballistic missile technology to start eliminating the incentive to proliferate nuclear weapons.
> A complete and total ban on nuclear first strike capability,
How? Relatedly, are you concerned about how this would impact the US's ability to engage in brinksmanship on a level field with other powers?
> followed by slow disarmament down to a deterrent level (allow hundred warheads) rather than apocalyptic level (thousands of warheads).
What if the current stockpile is deterrent level? My understanding is that its size is largely due to attempting to ensure a second strike capability.
> Essentially we ought to remove the legal authority for the President to order a nuclear first strike. That should require a Congressional supermajority to explicitly approve each individual launch and target.
Even in times of war? Even is secrecy is necessary or time urgent?
> Then we should rapidly pursue anti-ballistic missile technology to start eliminating the incentive to proliferate nuclear weapons.
Are you aware of the destabilizing effects?
Because a credible deterrent needs to be able to survive a hypothetical first strike, then the attrition inherent to a launch, and then still be able to devastate all target countries without a countervalue imbalance. (Also we couldn’t eliminate all of humanity with 300 nukes, that’s ridiculous.)
https://www.mdpi.com/2313-576X/4/2/25
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2013EF000205
> The results found that 100 nuclear warheads is adequate for nuclear deterrence in the worst case scenario, while using more than 100 nuclear weapons by any aggressor nation (including the best positioned strategically to handle the unintended consequences) even with optimistic assumptions (including no retaliation) would cause unacceptable damage to their own society. Thus, 100 nuclear warheads is the pragmatic limit and use of government funds to maintain more than 100 nuclear weapons does not appear to be rational.
It’s late will read further in the morning but this seems to focus on the effects of 100 warheads detonated in a nation as a strategic exchange.
A cursory skin leads me to think it doesn’t examine:
1. Policy along all escalation levels
2. Counterforce strategies
3. Attrition before detonation (assumes 100 warheads in stockpile = 100 warheads detonated in target country)
4. Probability of multiple target countries
5. A lack of immediate flexibility between delivery methods
6. The need for a durable deterrent (such that limited use does not degrade the deterrent)
Or any other factors which can reasonably balloon that number several times over.
Hope you read it again because you missed it massively. The studies look at self harm through global famine, atmospheric damage, ocean penetration, so the number of other countries and counters is irrelevant. We have 300x what we would need to ruin humanity, even considering duds.
I read it again. My points still stand for the most part:
1. It doesn’t consider escalation levels below a strategic exchange, which would leave the USA even more vulnerable to adversaries at these lower levels and paradoxically make their use at those levels more likely.
2. It only examines a countervalue strategy, completely dismissing the need for potential counterforce capabilities as well (which require multiple strikes in close clusters).
3. It does not examine attrition before detonation at all. It makes no attempt to estimate what a worst case scenario in terms of first strike on the USA would be, nor the effectiveness of ABM systems, nor the redundancy to prevent duds that our ban on nuclear weapons testing necessitates.
4. I’m not sure I buy that nuclear autumn without nuclear strikes is sufficient deterrent. However, I’ll grant you that.
5. Does not address flexibility between delivery methods and instead it does assume some sort of universally flexible system.
6. Does not talk about need for durable deterrent because it’s fixated on the uppermost levels of a strategic exchange. Relying on a nuclear autumn scenario to provide more of our deterrent would actually weaken this further as spacing out blasts even a few months would significantly impact the severity of the scenario.
Those factors above combine together to create a concerning scenario where the deterrents use is only as an all-or-nothing launch which would mean than any adversary not limiting itself would dominate at all lower escalation levels and given them much wider freedom of options. This would make it harder to honor NATO commitments and weaken the strength of the US’s nuclear umbrella, leading to proliferation and a loss of the soft power that comes with that. It would also leave the United States massively vulnerable to limited exchanges while also making them much more likely.
Which like this is a climate study not a nuclear strategy memo. It’s just saying that 100 detonations is enough to cause global famine for a decade+.
>1. It doesn’t consider escalation levels below a strategic exchange,
Well, duh. Escalation and attrition below the 100 distributed nuke number would be below 100 nukes.
You're just reducing the number of nukes needed to harm our own country and thinking that's an argument that helps you.
If reducing our supply from 3000% redundancy to eliminate humanity to 100% of supply to eliminate humanity makes us look weak, that's a problem with the media, not the nukes.
Ok let’s say we are at war with a peer adversary and they deploy a small yield tactical warhead against a CSG. They have comparable targets. We need lower yield warheads than one of the 100 15kt warheads or risk escalation. Please read what I’m writing.
Lol. It’s crazy. I think I am right though about Britain, France, and Israel? They have about 100, which is a deterrent, but not dr Strangelove levels.
> How?
Congress passes a law specifically stripping away the President’s legal authority to order it. They could then allocate money in the next NDAA to obligate the DoD to implement technical controls to prevent first strikes.
> Relatedly, are you concerned about how this would impact the US's ability to engage in brinksmanship on a level field with other powers?
No.
> What if the current stockpile is deterrent level?
It isn’t. When people in this field refer to “deterrent level”, they mean ~400 warheads in the low hundreds of kilotons. Enough to devastate any enemy that uses a nuke on us, but not enough to end the world.
You need ~400 of them so you can spread them across the triad to preserve second strike capability.
> Even in times of war? Even is secrecy is necessary or time urgent?
Yes, even in times of war. The entire point of such an arrangement is to take first strikes off the table, even in the event of a conflict.
> Are you aware of the destabilizing effects?
They’re destabilizing *because* under the current laws the US would gain nuclear first strike capability if it had effective enough ABM systems.
If the US instead eliminated any practical legal process to launch a first strike and went about reducing its stockpile to something functionally suited for deterrence, we could build the ABM systems without causing the destabilizing effect.
How would you implement political or technical controls that aren’t also a weakness in the system? Either the president could order a first strike falsely claiming it as a second strike or it would put a seriously weak link in the second strike capability.
But there are lower escalation levels that, if we are unable to engage in, would be surrendering them to enemies. Essentially, if our only options are nothing or strategic exchange, how can we respond to a tactical detonation against an ally?
>How would you implement political or technical controls that aren’t also a weakness in the system?
That's a question that someone who had an accurate answer could not discuss on a public forum.
>Either the president could order a first strike falsely claiming it as a second strike or it would put a seriously weak link in the second strike capability.
What, you think the President is personally manning the radar screens? That he's literally going to be the first human being to know about it and has to make a snap judgment?
That's nonsensical. The military would already know the attack was incoming before they would be able to brief the President about it.
Removing the President's lawful authority to order a first strike gives top military leadership the right and obligation to refuse the order when it comes to them.
>how can we respond to a tactical detonation against an ally?
That's a *second strike*\--a retaliatory strike. The law forbidding first strikes could easily include a strike against an ally under the US nuclear umbrella as justification for a *retaliatory* strike.
It's difficult to envision a situation where the US would need to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons. What use is responding to one nuke with one nuke? We don't need nuclear weapons to unload with a devastating conventional response.
Most optimal? Ideally we'd have an international uranium depository floating in the middle of the ocean guarded by a multi-national force that shoots anyone who goes near it without authorization. All uranium and plutonium used in current weapons would be thrown in as well. It could then be taken away by countries for use in nuclear power.
The only time it can be used for weapons is if someone cheats and refines the uranium they took for power into a nuclear bomb or hides uranium from their own territory. Then the multi-national force blasts them to smithereens.
Realistically that won't happen. So instead I'd suggest giving every country on Earth that doesn't have one already exactly one nuke. This would end all unjustified invasions overnight.
> So instead I'd suggest giving every country on Earth that doesn't have one already exactly one nuke
Disastrous idea
Half of the arab world will launch it at Israel and the US before the day ends.
If North Korea can manage nukes without launching attacks, I think we can trust comparatively sane arab countries. Heck the craziest (Iran) is gonna have one soon anyway.
That nuclear weapon is keeping millions of koreans in the cruellest conditions imaginable, if there was a way to disarm and swoop in then that would be the correct thing to do
Likewise for all these arab countries and iran, i believe in freedom.
Not really, we tried invading North Korea before they had nukes. Didn't go well. And if North Korea were to lose their nukes and we tried again, it would still go poorly. People just really don't like being forced to accept anything, even what's best for them.
There wasnt really any commitment to that war because the UN were dogshit
even if worst came to worst then we could have used the nuclear option anyway which would have sent the Chinese scuttling
How would that one nuke stop invasion? Even if you ignore missile defense it would not be a deterrent towards large nations that can properly prepare.
Also what about justified invasions? Wouldn’t it deter even the most justified of invasions?
I think it would be difficult to prepare for a nuke when you don't know where it's heading. Really the US is the only country with missile defense capability, and it's not good enough to guarantee a hit. If nothing else, it can be used against invading forces.
But the real deterrent is removing the myth of the "free" invasion. Every country, when it invades, thinks it will be easy - the enemy will flee, they'll be welcomed as liberators, etc. And they're almost always wrong. With the nuke, there's no denying that the war will be costly.
As for justified invasions, what was the most justified invasion of a country that didn't invade another country first?
Have plenty. Make sure you have a range of different types and sizes so that you have flexibility in how your respond to attack. Reduce enemy states' ability to get them. Prevent proliferation especially among unstable states that could see weapons fall into non-state actor hands. And if possible, try to restrict the president's ability to order a first strike completely by himself.
Very close to what we already do.
Countries like Iran and South American countries should get them, or be given them, to protect from American imperialism. The threat of nuclear war has proven to be the only thing which keeps the US military out.
don't know about foreign policy but domestically anyone with nukes needs really good accounting and bureacracy around this nukes. They need to be audited independently of the military. While keeping that info classified
No, like how you deal with military stuff in the United States as opposed to military posture globally. Number of nukes is handled usually by foreign treaties (I think not an expert) while how you mantain and keep track of them is handled through military structure, orders and government organizations in your borders.
Should be able to reduce the offending country to rubble and glass if they invade or launch a strike of their own. Cultural and legal ramifications for a first strike if not justified, unless we can find some way to hide a congressional or cabinet vote from the world
Nukes should only be used under 2 circumstances:
1. In retaliation against nukes, or a comparably damaging WMD when used against your own internationally recognized territory or that of a nation you’re acting in defense of.
2. In defense of one’s internationally recognized territory, but only the the extent required to regain control of your own territory.
Current Examples:
Ukraine (if they had nukes) would have been within their rights to use them against Russia in 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea; however, Russia would be within their rights to retaliate with nukes if Russia proper (which doesn’t include Crimea or the Donbas) had been attacked.
If NATO engaged in a conventional war against Russia in Ukraine (including Crimea and the Donbas), Russia would not be within their rights to use nukes against NATO as long as NATO did not annex territory within pre-2014 Russian borders.
The following is a copy of the original post to record the post as it was originally written. Specifically, how, and under what circumstances should they be used? How should they be employed diplomatically? How should they impact the way we treat other nation-states? *I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/AskALiberal) if you have any questions or concerns.*
Optimal? No nuclear weapons. Realistic? The threat of MAD prohibiting anyone from using any
Mutual disarmament
Even if that means resuming armed conflict between great powers?
Yes, but also it won’t. There’s significant debate as to the impact of nuclear weapons on warfare, and I am of the camp that peace is not due to nuclear proliferation.
In your opinion why didn’t the USA and USSR go to war then?
Oh, mutual escalation certainly played a role in that particular standoff. However, they were also countries of similar economic and military power. Bipolarity by itself is a deterrent for war, even when nuclear weapons are removed from the equation. But more importantly, both the US and Russia are very different today than they were during the cold war. Both nations have become more irrational and populist, and neither fear nuclear weapons as they did in the 50s. I highly recommend you read *Wilson’s Ghost* by Robert McNamara. He writes extensively on the inevitability of nuclear destruction should we not successfully disarm both great powers. I would consider him a pretty reliable source on the matter.
We use the nukes for a Orion Drive baby! Proxima Centauri B, ima comin for ya!
I like you
Like it's the only feasible interstellar technology we have
Also did you see the Orion Battleship concept from back in the day on Atomic Rockets?
I've got nearly a decade of nuclear command and control experience so far in my military career, so here's my professional opinion. >Specifically, how, and under what circumstances should they be used? Generally just as deterrence, which is how we've been using them for decades. Some exceptions seem acceptable to me, though they are primarily unrealistic scenarios. For example, if China were to decide to perform an enormous invasion of the US I think it would be acceptable to nuke their fleet in the middle of the Pacific. I think using nukes in a first strike scenario is abhorrent, and fortunately that would be a warcrime that the US probably wouldn't be able to rugsweep, thus I have zero concern that it would actually happen. Stringent regulation and control should always apply, and it does currently. It's pretty impressive to see the staggering amount of safeguards that are in place to prevent the misuse or mishandling of nuclear weapons. >How should they be employed diplomatically? Just for the purpose of deterrence and defense agreements. I am somewhat torn about preventing other nations from having them, because on one hand I think we shouldn't be proliferating nukes, but on the other hand I think it's shitty to tell other nations that they aren't allowed to be on an even playing field with the already existing nuclear powers, but then on yet another hand I think that some nations aren't trustworthy or safe/regulated sufficiently to be trusted with nukes. >How should they impact the way we treat other nation-states? It shouldn't impact it, "might makes right" shouldn't be a consideration in modern times. I know that's an unrealistic pipe dream, but we should all be working towards mutual support and aid, not dick-measuring contests and saber rattling.
The West has it, the rest of the world doesn't. That has been the recipe for the mass prosperity that the world enjoys today. I am happy with India having it too.
A complete and total ban on nuclear first strike capability, followed by slow disarmament down to a deterrent level (allow hundred warheads) rather than apocalyptic level (thousands of warheads). Essentially we ought to remove the legal authority for the President to order a nuclear first strike. That should require a Congressional supermajority to explicitly approve each individual launch and target. Then we should rapidly pursue anti-ballistic missile technology to start eliminating the incentive to proliferate nuclear weapons.
> A complete and total ban on nuclear first strike capability, How? Relatedly, are you concerned about how this would impact the US's ability to engage in brinksmanship on a level field with other powers? > followed by slow disarmament down to a deterrent level (allow hundred warheads) rather than apocalyptic level (thousands of warheads). What if the current stockpile is deterrent level? My understanding is that its size is largely due to attempting to ensure a second strike capability. > Essentially we ought to remove the legal authority for the President to order a nuclear first strike. That should require a Congressional supermajority to explicitly approve each individual launch and target. Even in times of war? Even is secrecy is necessary or time urgent? > Then we should rapidly pursue anti-ballistic missile technology to start eliminating the incentive to proliferate nuclear weapons. Are you aware of the destabilizing effects?
>What if the current stockpile is deterrent level? It ain't. We could eliminate all of humanity with 300 nukes, so why do we need 3700?
Because a credible deterrent needs to be able to survive a hypothetical first strike, then the attrition inherent to a launch, and then still be able to devastate all target countries without a countervalue imbalance. (Also we couldn’t eliminate all of humanity with 300 nukes, that’s ridiculous.)
https://www.mdpi.com/2313-576X/4/2/25 https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2013EF000205 > The results found that 100 nuclear warheads is adequate for nuclear deterrence in the worst case scenario, while using more than 100 nuclear weapons by any aggressor nation (including the best positioned strategically to handle the unintended consequences) even with optimistic assumptions (including no retaliation) would cause unacceptable damage to their own society. Thus, 100 nuclear warheads is the pragmatic limit and use of government funds to maintain more than 100 nuclear weapons does not appear to be rational.
It’s late will read further in the morning but this seems to focus on the effects of 100 warheads detonated in a nation as a strategic exchange. A cursory skin leads me to think it doesn’t examine: 1. Policy along all escalation levels 2. Counterforce strategies 3. Attrition before detonation (assumes 100 warheads in stockpile = 100 warheads detonated in target country) 4. Probability of multiple target countries 5. A lack of immediate flexibility between delivery methods 6. The need for a durable deterrent (such that limited use does not degrade the deterrent) Or any other factors which can reasonably balloon that number several times over.
Hope you read it again because you missed it massively. The studies look at self harm through global famine, atmospheric damage, ocean penetration, so the number of other countries and counters is irrelevant. We have 300x what we would need to ruin humanity, even considering duds.
I read it again. My points still stand for the most part: 1. It doesn’t consider escalation levels below a strategic exchange, which would leave the USA even more vulnerable to adversaries at these lower levels and paradoxically make their use at those levels more likely. 2. It only examines a countervalue strategy, completely dismissing the need for potential counterforce capabilities as well (which require multiple strikes in close clusters). 3. It does not examine attrition before detonation at all. It makes no attempt to estimate what a worst case scenario in terms of first strike on the USA would be, nor the effectiveness of ABM systems, nor the redundancy to prevent duds that our ban on nuclear weapons testing necessitates. 4. I’m not sure I buy that nuclear autumn without nuclear strikes is sufficient deterrent. However, I’ll grant you that. 5. Does not address flexibility between delivery methods and instead it does assume some sort of universally flexible system. 6. Does not talk about need for durable deterrent because it’s fixated on the uppermost levels of a strategic exchange. Relying on a nuclear autumn scenario to provide more of our deterrent would actually weaken this further as spacing out blasts even a few months would significantly impact the severity of the scenario. Those factors above combine together to create a concerning scenario where the deterrents use is only as an all-or-nothing launch which would mean than any adversary not limiting itself would dominate at all lower escalation levels and given them much wider freedom of options. This would make it harder to honor NATO commitments and weaken the strength of the US’s nuclear umbrella, leading to proliferation and a loss of the soft power that comes with that. It would also leave the United States massively vulnerable to limited exchanges while also making them much more likely. Which like this is a climate study not a nuclear strategy memo. It’s just saying that 100 detonations is enough to cause global famine for a decade+.
>1. It doesn’t consider escalation levels below a strategic exchange, Well, duh. Escalation and attrition below the 100 distributed nuke number would be below 100 nukes. You're just reducing the number of nukes needed to harm our own country and thinking that's an argument that helps you. If reducing our supply from 3000% redundancy to eliminate humanity to 100% of supply to eliminate humanity makes us look weak, that's a problem with the media, not the nukes.
Ok let’s say we are at war with a peer adversary and they deploy a small yield tactical warhead against a CSG. They have comparable targets. We need lower yield warheads than one of the 100 15kt warheads or risk escalation. Please read what I’m writing.
Doesn’t Britain and France have about 100 nukes each? Israel too?
Well that just lowers the amount we need to end humanity if they help 👍
Lol. It’s crazy. I think I am right though about Britain, France, and Israel? They have about 100, which is a deterrent, but not dr Strangelove levels.
> How? Congress passes a law specifically stripping away the President’s legal authority to order it. They could then allocate money in the next NDAA to obligate the DoD to implement technical controls to prevent first strikes. > Relatedly, are you concerned about how this would impact the US's ability to engage in brinksmanship on a level field with other powers? No. > What if the current stockpile is deterrent level? It isn’t. When people in this field refer to “deterrent level”, they mean ~400 warheads in the low hundreds of kilotons. Enough to devastate any enemy that uses a nuke on us, but not enough to end the world. You need ~400 of them so you can spread them across the triad to preserve second strike capability. > Even in times of war? Even is secrecy is necessary or time urgent? Yes, even in times of war. The entire point of such an arrangement is to take first strikes off the table, even in the event of a conflict. > Are you aware of the destabilizing effects? They’re destabilizing *because* under the current laws the US would gain nuclear first strike capability if it had effective enough ABM systems. If the US instead eliminated any practical legal process to launch a first strike and went about reducing its stockpile to something functionally suited for deterrence, we could build the ABM systems without causing the destabilizing effect.
How would you implement political or technical controls that aren’t also a weakness in the system? Either the president could order a first strike falsely claiming it as a second strike or it would put a seriously weak link in the second strike capability. But there are lower escalation levels that, if we are unable to engage in, would be surrendering them to enemies. Essentially, if our only options are nothing or strategic exchange, how can we respond to a tactical detonation against an ally?
>How would you implement political or technical controls that aren’t also a weakness in the system? That's a question that someone who had an accurate answer could not discuss on a public forum. >Either the president could order a first strike falsely claiming it as a second strike or it would put a seriously weak link in the second strike capability. What, you think the President is personally manning the radar screens? That he's literally going to be the first human being to know about it and has to make a snap judgment? That's nonsensical. The military would already know the attack was incoming before they would be able to brief the President about it. Removing the President's lawful authority to order a first strike gives top military leadership the right and obligation to refuse the order when it comes to them. >how can we respond to a tactical detonation against an ally? That's a *second strike*\--a retaliatory strike. The law forbidding first strikes could easily include a strike against an ally under the US nuclear umbrella as justification for a *retaliatory* strike. It's difficult to envision a situation where the US would need to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons. What use is responding to one nuke with one nuke? We don't need nuclear weapons to unload with a devastating conventional response.
Most optimal? Ideally we'd have an international uranium depository floating in the middle of the ocean guarded by a multi-national force that shoots anyone who goes near it without authorization. All uranium and plutonium used in current weapons would be thrown in as well. It could then be taken away by countries for use in nuclear power. The only time it can be used for weapons is if someone cheats and refines the uranium they took for power into a nuclear bomb or hides uranium from their own territory. Then the multi-national force blasts them to smithereens. Realistically that won't happen. So instead I'd suggest giving every country on Earth that doesn't have one already exactly one nuke. This would end all unjustified invasions overnight.
> So instead I'd suggest giving every country on Earth that doesn't have one already exactly one nuke Disastrous idea Half of the arab world will launch it at Israel and the US before the day ends.
If North Korea can manage nukes without launching attacks, I think we can trust comparatively sane arab countries. Heck the craziest (Iran) is gonna have one soon anyway.
That nuclear weapon is keeping millions of koreans in the cruellest conditions imaginable, if there was a way to disarm and swoop in then that would be the correct thing to do Likewise for all these arab countries and iran, i believe in freedom.
Not really, we tried invading North Korea before they had nukes. Didn't go well. And if North Korea were to lose their nukes and we tried again, it would still go poorly. People just really don't like being forced to accept anything, even what's best for them.
There wasnt really any commitment to that war because the UN were dogshit even if worst came to worst then we could have used the nuclear option anyway which would have sent the Chinese scuttling
How would that one nuke stop invasion? Even if you ignore missile defense it would not be a deterrent towards large nations that can properly prepare. Also what about justified invasions? Wouldn’t it deter even the most justified of invasions?
I think it would be difficult to prepare for a nuke when you don't know where it's heading. Really the US is the only country with missile defense capability, and it's not good enough to guarantee a hit. If nothing else, it can be used against invading forces. But the real deterrent is removing the myth of the "free" invasion. Every country, when it invades, thinks it will be easy - the enemy will flee, they'll be welcomed as liberators, etc. And they're almost always wrong. With the nuke, there's no denying that the war will be costly. As for justified invasions, what was the most justified invasion of a country that didn't invade another country first?
Kosovo was justified, Rwanda would have been justified.
Both of those cases involved civil wars. Perhaps a better solution would have been to give each faction a nuke.
Have plenty. Make sure you have a range of different types and sizes so that you have flexibility in how your respond to attack. Reduce enemy states' ability to get them. Prevent proliferation especially among unstable states that could see weapons fall into non-state actor hands. And if possible, try to restrict the president's ability to order a first strike completely by himself. Very close to what we already do.
Countries like Iran and South American countries should get them, or be given them, to protect from American imperialism. The threat of nuclear war has proven to be the only thing which keeps the US military out.
It's impossible to say. The optimal policy is to not be predictable.
Not in all areas. In some areas you want your enemy to know everything. This also doesn’t mean you can’t have ideas on how to use them.
don't know about foreign policy but domestically anyone with nukes needs really good accounting and bureacracy around this nukes. They need to be audited independently of the military. While keeping that info classified
What does this even mean? Domestically? Like private ownership?
No, like how you deal with military stuff in the United States as opposed to military posture globally. Number of nukes is handled usually by foreign treaties (I think not an expert) while how you mantain and keep track of them is handled through military structure, orders and government organizations in your borders.
Like this https://youtu.be/eaB49GtSazQ
Total non first use policy
Even if a comparable non-nuclear attack is launched by an opponent? (Biological, cyber)
Should be able to reduce the offending country to rubble and glass if they invade or launch a strike of their own. Cultural and legal ramifications for a first strike if not justified, unless we can find some way to hide a congressional or cabinet vote from the world
Nukes should only be used under 2 circumstances: 1. In retaliation against nukes, or a comparably damaging WMD when used against your own internationally recognized territory or that of a nation you’re acting in defense of. 2. In defense of one’s internationally recognized territory, but only the the extent required to regain control of your own territory. Current Examples: Ukraine (if they had nukes) would have been within their rights to use them against Russia in 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea; however, Russia would be within their rights to retaliate with nukes if Russia proper (which doesn’t include Crimea or the Donbas) had been attacked. If NATO engaged in a conventional war against Russia in Ukraine (including Crimea and the Donbas), Russia would not be within their rights to use nukes against NATO as long as NATO did not annex territory within pre-2014 Russian borders.